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I. ABSTRACT 
With Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) as a generic concept of 
working together of all airport partners, the main aim of this research project was to 
increase the understanding of the Influences on the Target Off-Block Time (TOBT) 
Prediction Accuracy during A-CDM. Predicting the TOBT accurately is important, 
because all airport partners use it as a reference time for the departure of the flights after 
the aircraft turn-round. Understanding such influencing factors is therefore not only 
required for finding measures to counteract inaccurate TOBT predictions, but also for 
establishing a more efficient A-CDM turn-round process.   
The research method chosen comprises a number of steps. Firstly, within the 
framework of a Cognitive Work Analysis, the sub-processes as well as the information 
requirements during turn-round were analysed. Secondly, a survey approach aimed at 
finding and describing situations during turn-round that are critical for TOBT adherence 
was pursued. The problems identified here were then investigated in field observations 
at different airlines’ operation control rooms. Based on the findings from these previous 
steps, small-scale human-in-the-loop experiments were designed aimed at testing 
hypotheses about data/information availability that influence TOBT predictability. A 
turn-round monitoring tool was developed for the experiments.   
As a result of this project, the critical chain of turn-round events and the decisions 
necessary during all stages of the turn-round were identified. It was concluded that 
information required but not shared among participants can result in  TOBT inaccuracy 
swings. In addition, TOBT predictability was shown to depend on the location of the 
TOBT turn-round controller who assigns the TOBT: More reliable TOBT predictions 
were observed when the turn-round controller was physically present at the aircraft.   
During the experiments, TOBT prediction could be improved by eight minutes, if 
available information was cooperatively shared ten minutes prior turn-round start 
between air crews and turn-round controller; TOBT prediction could be improved by 15 
minutes, if additional information was provided by ramp agents five minutes after turn-
round start.   
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I. LIST OF ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS  
1 Acronyms 
ACARS Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System 
A-CDM Airport Collaborative Decision Making 
ACIS  Airport CDM Information Sharing  
ACISP  Airport CDM Information Sharing Platform  
ADEP  Aerodrome of Departure 
ADES  Aerodrome of Destination 
A-DPI  ATC-Departure Planning Information Message 
ADS  Aeronautical Decision Making 
ADS  Abstraction-Decomposition Space 
AEGT  Actual End of Ground Handling Time 
AGHT  Actual Ground Handling Time  
AHM  Airport Handling Manual 
AIBT  Actual In-Block Time 
ALDT  Actual Landing Time 
AMAN  Arrival Manager 
ANSP  Air Navigation Service Provider 
AO  Aircraft Operator 
AOBT  Actual Off-Block Time 
AOC  Airport Operator Committee 
AOC  Airline Operation Centre  
AOT  Airport Operations Team  
APT  EUROCONTROL Throughput Division Airport  
ARDT  Actual Ready Time (for Movement)  
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Centres 
ASAT  Actual Start-Up Approval Time 
ASBT  Actual Start Boarding Time 
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System 
ASRT  Actual Start-Up Request Time 
ATA  Air Transport Association 
ATC  Air Traffic Control 
ATD  Actual Time of Departure 
ATM  Air Traffic Management  
ATFCM Air Traffic Flow Capacity Management  
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ATFM  Air Traffic Flow Management  
ATOT  Actual Take-Off Time 
ATTT  Actual Turn-round Time 
AXIT  Actual Taxi-In Time 
AXOT  Actual Taxi-Out Time 
CDM  Collaborative Decision Making 
CEDM  Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 
CFMU  Central Flow Management Unit 
CODA  Central Office for Delay Analysis 
CPDLC Controller Pilot Data Link Communication 
CRM  Crew Resource Management  
CSA  Common Situational Awareness 
CSCW  Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
CSE  Cognitive Systems Engineering 
CTA  Cognitive Task Analysis 
CTOT  Calculated Take Off Time 
CTRP  CDM Turn-Round Process 
CWA  Cognitive Work Analysis 
DAA  Delivery at Aircraft 
DDM  Distributed Decision Making 
DEP  Departure 
DMAN  Departure Manager 
DMEAN Dynamic Management of European Airspace Network 
DPI  Departure Planning Information message 
DSA  Distributed Situational Awareness 
DSS  Decision Support System 
DTM  Direct Mode Turn-round Management 
EATM  European Air Traffic Management  
ECAC  European Civil Aviation Conference 
EIBT  Estimated In-Block Time 
EID  Ecological Interface Design 
ELDT  Estimated Landing Time 
EOBT  Estimated Off-Block Time 
ETOT  Estimated Take Off Time 
ETTT  Estimated Turn-round Time 
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EXIT  Estimated Taxi-In Time 
EXOT  Estimated Taxi-Out Time 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FADE  FAA/Airline Data Exchange 
FMP  Flow Management Position 
FUM  Flight Update Message 
GEMS  Generic Error-Modelling System 
GH  Ground Handler 
GUI  Graphical User Interface 
HHI  Human-Human Interaction  
HCI  Human-Computer Interaction 
HMI  Human-Machine Interface 
IATA  International Air Transport Association 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IDSS  Intelligent Decision Support System 
IFPS  Integrated Initial Flight Plan Processing Unit 
IOSA  IATA Operational Safety Audits 
ISO  International Organization for Standardization  
KBB  Knowledge Based Behaviour  
LTM  Local Turn-round Management  
MTTT  Minimum Turn-round Time 
NAS  National Airspace System 
NBAA  National Business Aviation Association 
NDM  Naturalistic Decision Making 
PAX  Passenger  
RAA  Regional Airline Association 
RBB  Rule Based Behaviour  
RFID  Radio Frequency Identification 
RP  Response Planning  
RTM  Remote Turn-round Management  
RWY  Runway 
SA  Situation Assessment/ Situational Awareness 
SBB  Skill Based Behaviour 
SESAR   Single European Sky ATM Research Programme  
SIBT  Scheduled In-Block Time 
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SJU  SESAR Joint Undertaking 
SLA  Service Level Agreement 
SME  Subject Matter Expert 
SMR  Specialized Mobile Radio 
SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control System  
SOBT   Schedule Off-block Time 
SSCT  Scheduled Service Completion Time 
SSDT  Scheduled Service Deliver Time 
STTTT  Scheduled Turn-round Time 
SWIM  System Wide Information Management  
TAM  Total Airport Management  
TIBT  Target In-block Time 
TLDT  Target Landing Time 
TMA  Terminal Control Area 
TMAC  Target Movement Arrival Entry Count 
TMAT  Target Movement Area Entry time 
TOBT  Target Off-block Time 
TRCM  Turn-round Control Mock-up 
TSAT  Target Start Up Approval Time 
TSCT  Target Service Completion Time 
TSDT  Target Service Delivery Time 
TTOT  Target Take-off Time 
UDPP  User Driven Priorisation  
ULD  Unit Load Device  
VTTC  Variable Taxi Time Calculation 
WCH  Wheelchair 
WDA  Work Domain Analysis 
WLAN  Wireless Local Area Network 
WIFI  Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance 
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2 Definitions 
For purpose of understanding, some terms applied in this project require definition 
because their interpretation of the meaning is often differs throughout the literature. 
Emphasis here is not placed on erroneous or correct interpretation, but on an 
unambiguous usage within this research project. Attention should be given to the 
definition of ‘collaboration’ versus ‘cooperation’ or ‘situational awareness’ (e.g. shared, 
common, distributed....) because of the tendency to use them interchangeably.  
A-CDM: Airport Collaborative Decision Making is the concept aimed at improving Air 
Traffic Flow and Capacity Management (ATFCM) at airports by reducing delays, 
improving the predictability of events and optimising the utilisation of resources. 
Implementing Airport CDM allows each Airport CDM Partner to optimise their 
decisions in collaboration with other Airport CDM Partners, knowing their preferences 
and constraints and the actual and predicted situation. Decision making by the Airport 
CDM Partners is facilitated by the sharing of accurate and timely information and by 
adapted procedures, mechanisms and tools. The Airport CDM concept is divided into 
the following elements: 
• Information Sharing; 
• Milestone Approach; 
• Variable Taxi Time; 
• Pre-departure Sequencing; 
• Adverse Condition; and 
• Collaborative Management of Flight Updates.  
Airport CDM is also the name of the EUROCONTROL project coordinating the 
implementation of the Airport CDM concept at European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC) airports. 
A-DPI: A Departure Planning Information (DPI) message sent by the CDM Airport to 
the CFMU notifying them of the Target Take-off Time (TTOT) between ATC time of 
pre-departure sequencing and Actual Take-off Time (ATOT). 
Adverse Condition Concept Element: Adverse Condition Element consists of 
collaborative management of the capacity of an airport during periods of a predicted or 
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unpredicted reduction of capacity. The aim is to achieve a common situational 
awareness for the Airport CDM Partners, including better information for the 
passengers, in anticipation of a disruption and expeditious recovery after the disruption. 
The concept elements Information Sharing, Milestone Approach, Variable Taxi Time, 
and Pre-departure Sequencing need to be in place at the airport before the Adverse 
Conditions Element can be implemented successfully.  
Airport CDM Information Sharing Concept Element: The Information Sharing 
Element defines the sharing of timely and accurate information between the Airport 
CDM Partners in order to achieve common situational awareness and to improve traffic 
event predictability. The Airport CDM Information Sharing Platform (ACISP), together 
with defined procedures agreed on by the partners, are the means used to reach these 
aims. Information Sharing is the core Airport CDM Element and the foundation for the 
other Airport CDM Elements. It needs to be implemented before any other Concept 
Element.  
ACISP: The Airport CDM Information Sharing Platform (ACISP) is a generic term 
used to describe the means at a CDM Airport of providing Information Sharing between 
the Airport CDM Partners. The ACISP can comprise systems, databases, and user 
interfaces. 
Airport CDM Partner: An Airport CDM Partner is a stakeholder of a CDM Airport, 
who participates in the CDM process. The main Airport CDM Partners are: 
• Airport Operator; 
• Aircraft Operators; 
• Ground Handlers (including push-back, catering, cleaning, etc.);  
• De-icing companies; 
• Air Navigation Service Provider (ATC); 
• Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU); 
• Support services (Police, Customs and Immigration etc.).    
Alert: A system generated message which alerts the Airport CDM Partners of an 
irregularity and which normally requires one or more partners to make an active 
intervention to resolve the irregularity.  
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Arrival Manager (AMAN): An arrival flow management tool that optimises the traffic 
flow to a Terminal Control Area (TMA) and/or runway(s) by calculating Target 
LanDing Time (TLDT) taking various constraints and preferences into account.  
Anticipation-action-comparison unit: An anticipation-action-comparison unit is a set 
of information components allowing to predict changes in the environmental input as 
resulting from our own actions and our changes in our position and posture. 
A-SMGCS: System at airports having a surveillance infrastructure consisting of a Non-
Cooperative Surveillance (e.g. SMR, Microwave Sensors, Optical Sensors etc) and 
Cooperative Surveillance (e.g. Multi-lateration systems). 
ATFM: A service established with the objective of contributing to a safe, orderly and 
expeditious flow of air traffic by ensuring that air traffic control capacity is utilised to 
the maximum extent possible, and that the traffic volume is compatible with the 
capacities declared by the appropriate Air Traffic Services authority. (ICAO Annex 11, 
Chapter 1) 
CDM Airport: An airport is considered a CDM Airport when Information Sharing, 
Milestone Approach, Variable Taxi Time, Pre-departure Sequencing, Adverse 
Conditions and Collaborative Management of Flight Updates Elements are successfully 
implemented at the airport.  
Cognition: Human thought processes and their components such as perception, 
memory and decision-making.  
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA): The framework and methods used to analyse 
cognitive structures and/or processes that support job performance. CTA differs from 
traditional task analysis in many ways, including the goals, methods used, and data 
produced.  
Common Situational Awareness: CSA is used here as defined by EUROCONTROL 
(2008b) to describe the desire that all relevant up-to-date flight progress information is 
freely and universally available to all participating airport partners via the ACISP which 
allows them to improve their pre-tactical and tactical planning processes. CSA does 
neither account for the fact of how much information is required by individual airport 
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partner nor how it should be presented to support decision making (EUROCONTROL, 
2008b) 
Collaboration: The process of two or more people/machines working together by in an 
intersection of common goal(s). Unlike cooperation, collaboration can also take 
adversarial forms thriving on differences and dissents among participants. It seeks 
divergent insights and spontaneity, rather than structural harmony and uses this 
information to create something new.   
Collaborative Management of Flight Updates Concept Element: The Collaborative 
Management of Flight Updates Element consists of exchanging Flight Update Messages 
(FUM) and Departure Planning Information (DPI) messages between the CFMU and a 
CDM Airport, to provide estimates for arriving flights to CDM Airports and improve 
the ATFM slot management process for departing flights. The aim is to improve the 
coordination between Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management (CFMU) and airport 
operations at a CDM Airport. The Concept Elements such as Information Sharing, 
Milestone Approach, Variable Taxi Time, Pre-departure Sequencing, and Adverse 
Conditions need to be implemented at the airport before the Collaborative Management 
of Flight Updates can be implemented in cooperation with the CFMU. 
Communication: The process of transferring data/information/knowledge from one 
entity to another including the way of the interchange forms, not only just facts, but also 
policies, prospects, failures, and human experiences.  
Complexity: For the A-CDM context, complexity refers to the large number of 
dependencies that intentionally or not are built within the various items of the system.  
Cooperation: The process of working together versus separately and in competition.  
CTOT: A time calculated and issued by the appropriate Central Management Unit as a 
result of tactical slot allocation at which a flight is expected to become airborne. (ICAO 
Doc 7030/4 – EUR, Table 7) 
Decision Making: Decision-making is one of the basic functions of Turn-round 
monitoring. It is an active cognitive process which selects one out of a set of possible 
courses of action. It includes a weighing-up of the pros and cons of different 
alternatives.  
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Decomposition: A structured analysis that breaks down higher level units based on 
categories, such as consistent components, decision required, or concurrent tasks. 
Decomposition is useful in most types of analyses.  
Distributed Situational Awareness (DSA): DSA defines SA as a dynamic, and 
collaborative process among actors on a situational basis. It regards different systems as 
having different purposes and different partners as having different domain knowledge. 
This requires in turn all participating to actively create an understanding of the situation 
from the information available.   
DMAN: DMAN is a planning system to improve the departure flows at an airport by 
calculating the Target Take off Time (TTOT) and Target Start Up Approval Time 
(TSAT) for each flight, taking multiple constraints and preferences into account.  
Ground Handling: Ground Handling covers a complex series of processes and services 
that are required to separate an aircraft from its load (passengers, baggage, cargo and 
mail) on arrival and combine it with its load prior to departure.  
IFPS: A system of the CFMU designed to rationalise the reception, initial processing 
and distribution of IFR/GAT flight plan data related to IFR flight within the area 
covered by the participating States. (ICAO Doc 7030/4-EUR, paragraph 3.1.1) 
Mental Model: Mental models are the cognitive processes/representations whereby 
humans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations of 
system functioning and observed system states and predictions about future system 
states (according to Rouse and Morris, 1986). 
Mental Picture: The actual mental picture of a situation represents a moment-to-
moment snapshot of the actual situation based on the mental model and the actually 
perceived external cues. A series of mental pictures represents the actual mental model 
including the actual parameterisation (Whitfield & Jackson, 1982).  
Milestone: This is a significant event that occurs during the planning or operation of a 
flight. A successfully completed milestone will trigger the decision making process for 
downstream events and influence both the further progress of the flight and the accuracy 
with which the progress can be predicted.  
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Milestone Approach Concept Element: The Milestone Approach Element describes 
the progress of a flight from the initial planning to the take off by defining Milestones to 
enable close monitoring of significant events. The aim is to achieve a common 
situational awareness and to predict the forthcoming events for each flight with off-
blocks and take off as the most critical events. The Concept Element Information 
Sharing needs to be in place at the airport before it can successfully implement the 
Milestone Approach. The Milestone Approach combined with the Information Sharing 
element is the foundation for all other Concept Elements.  
Monitoring: Monitoring is a process of continuous or discrete comparison between the 
actual state of the system and the expected state of the turn-round situation. Monitoring 
is a top-down process governed by the expected state of the system.  
Pre-departure Sequencing Concept Element: The pre-departure sequencing is the 
order by which aircraft are scheduled to depart from their stands (push off-blocks) 
taking into account partners’ preferences. It should not be confused with the pre-take off 
order whereby ATC organise aircrafts at the holding point of a runway. The aim is to 
enhance flexibility, increase punctuality and improve slot-adherence while allowing the 
airport partners to express their preferences. The concept elements Information Sharing, 
Milestone Approach, and Variable Taxi Time need to be implemented at the airport 
before the Pre-departure Sequencing can be implemented. The Pre-departure sequence 
can also be derived by a departure manager (DMAN) which calculates the take off time 
TTOT based on demand and derives the TSAT from the runway sequence. Airports can 
implement different solutions to achieve the pre-departure sequence, depending on local 
traffic complexity and surface congestion.   
Situational Awareness (SA): SA is the perception of environmental elements within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, the projection of their 
status in the near future, and includes a prediction of how their behaviour may affect the 
environment (Endsley, 1995). Situational awareness is often used in the literature with 
confusing meanings and terms like Individual versus Shared Situational Awareness, 
Common Understanding, Team shared Awareness, Shared Understanding, Distributed 
Cognition, Distributed Understanding, Group Situational Awareness, Shared Cognition, 
Shared Visualization, Team Awareness, and Coherent Tactical Picture are often used 
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interchangeable. For the purpose of this research project, only the terms ‘common’ 
versus ‘distributed’ situational awareness are used, compared with each other, and 
determined how they are used for this project. 
System: A system in A-CDM context denotes the set of all features required for the 
performance during the time of a certain function. These features include humans, 
machines, interfaces, data, computers, procedures, and processes.  
TOBT: The time that an Aircraft Operator or Ground Handler estimates for an aircraft 
to be ready, all doors closed, boarding bridge removed, push back vehicle available and 
ready to start up/ push back immediately upon reception of clearance from the TWR .  
TSAT: The time provided by ATC taking into account TOBT, CTOT and/or the traffic 
situation that an aircraft can expect start up/ push back approval. Thereby, the Actual 
Start-up Approval (ASAT) can be given in advance of TSAT.  
Variable Taxi Time: Variable Taxi Time is the estimated time that an aircraft spends 
taxiing between its parking stand and the runway or vice versa. Variable Taxi Time is 
the generic name for both inbound as outbound taxi time parameters, used for to 
calculate TTOT or TSAT. Inbound Estimated Taxi Time (EXIT) includes runway 
occupancy and ground movement time, whereas Estimated Outbound Taxi Time 
(EXOT) includes push back and start up time, ground movement, remote- or apron de-
icing, and runway holding times.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Development of A-CDM     
The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) adopted a strategy in the 1990s 
with the overall objective ‘to provide increasing airspace and control capacity 
urgently…while maintaining a high level of safety’. As a consequence, the European Air 
Traffic Control Harmonization and Integration Program (EATCHIP) and Airport/Air 
Traffic System Interface (APATSI) were introduced (EUROCONTROL, 2009b). These, 
together with the implementation of the Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU), 
should help to improve capacity and efficiency. However, these improvements have 
been overtaken in recent years by continuing increase in demand. The ECAC Air 
Traffic Management (ATM) Institutional Strategy from 14th February 1997 was 
superseded by a comprehensive Gate-to-Gate oriented ATM Strategy for the years 
2000+ in order to meet future air transport needs. The principal characteristics 
governing the new concepts of the ATM Strategy 2000+ include strategic organisation 
and enhanced predictability, flight management from gate-to-gate, enhance flexibility 
and efficiency, collaborative decision making, responsive capacity management to meet 
demand, and collaborative airspace management. The Airport CDM Project and the 
Airport CDM Concept support these characteristics directly or indirectly by facilitating 
better decision making and improved predictability.  
Many individual initiatives towards improved co-operation, communication, and 
information sharing are currently undertaken in the European ATM community. The 
EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre has been involved in CDM through many 
studies that have opened the perspectives for Collaborative Decision Making. These 
include ATFM Priorities (1998), CDM Expert Group (1999), FASTER Study (1999), 
CDM Applications (1999), ATFM Improvement (2000), and the A-CDM-D Evaluation 
(2000).  
 The Airport CDM Information Sharing and the Turn-round Process (Milestone 
Approach) concept developments were based on experimental work conducted at 
several major European airports during trials at Brussels, Barcelona, Helsinki, 
Stockholm, and Milan.  
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An Airport CDM Task Force has been created under the European Air Traffic 
Management (EATM) Airport Throughput Division Airport (APT) to guide the Airport 
Operations Team (AOT) in Airport CDM issues and undertake specific work. This task 
force has now initiated additional projects in other airports such as London Heathrow, 
Lisbon, Budapest, Athens, Zurich, and Munich where the various Concept Elements are 
being tested, taking into account local constraints and requirements.  
The A-CDM concept was established within an Airport Operations Plan having five key 
areas like A-SMGCS, Airport CDM, ACE, Airport Safety, and Wake Vortex. Since then, 
the EUROCONTROL Airport CDM team in Brussels coordinated the initial trials at 
selected airports and is now responsible for ensuring standardisation and dissemination 
of best practice of Airport CDM implementation at European airports. Meanwhile, the 
A-CDM concept is also an integral part of both the Dynamic Management of the 
European Airspace Network (DMEAN) and the Single European Sky ATM Research 
(SESAR) program. Within the SESAR proposed operating principles, Airport CDM, 
System Wide Information Management (SWIM), Network management function in 
support of User Driven Priorisation Process (UDPP), and the Total Airport Management 
(TAM) have been introduced as the main enablers to support such airspace/airport users’ 
requirements (EUROCONTROL, 2008b) 
A number of common objectives for A-CDM are defined which include: 
• improvement of on-time performance and predictability; 
• enhance/optimize use of ground handling resources, stands, gates and  
       terminals; 
• reduction of ground movement cost; 
• optimize the use of the airport infrastructure and reduce congestion; 
• reduce ATFM slot wastage; 
• flexible departure planning; and 
• reduce apron and taxiway congestion.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
          Matthias Groppe                Influences on Aircraft TOBT Prediction Accuracy                    20                 
1.1.1 The European Airport-CDM Concept  
Different CDM concepts have been proposed in the US and Europe. Within Europe, 
the CDM concept is called Airport-CDM (A-CDM) and a number of A-CDM concept 
elements are defined aiming at achieving greater operational efficiency.  
For the implementation of A-CDM, different phases through a bottom-up concept are 
described:  
• Information Sharing: is the essential part that forms the foundation for all the other 
elements and must be implemented first. This should be achieved by creation of an 
Airport CDM Platform for information sharing between partners with a 
standardised format. This includes real-time data and alert messages to all partners 
available via interdependent user displays or HMIs allowing generic or local 
processes a direct link to the A CDM Platform. All airport partners contribute to the 
Information Sharing: 
o Aircraft Operator/ Handling Agent: delivers planning data, turn-round times, 
flight plans, movement data, priority of flights, aircraft registration and type 
changes, TOBT, and movement messages.  
o Air Traffic Control: contributes information like Estimated Landing Times, 
Actual Landing Times, Target Start up Approval Times, Target Take off 
Times, runway and taxiway conditions, taxi times, SID allocation, runway 
capacity. 
o Airport Operations: stand and gate allocation, environmental information, 
special events, reduction in capacity, airport slot data, ADES, Scheduled 
Off-Block Times. 
o CFMU: data from flight plans, SAMs, SRM, CHG, CNL, changes or 
cancellations, actual movement messages, ELDT, FUMs. 
o Service Providers: de-icing companies, MET office with weather forecast or 
actual weather, others including police, customs, fuel, etc..) 
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• Milestone Approach: is often referred as Turn-Round Process aims at achieving a 
common situational awareness by tracking the progress of a flight from the initial 
planning to the take off via a continuous sequence of different events. Different 
airport partners can be responsible for different milestones; significant events are 
determined in order to track the progress of flight via these key events. 
Implementation of these milestones requires a technical infrastructure and hence 
information sharing with agreement on the required processes in place and working 
properly. A total of 16 milestones have been defined, however, more milestones 
may be needed to cover for extra updates on key events, e.g. de-icing. Local 
procedures may substitute milestones; therefore not all milestones are highly 
recommended.  
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     TABLE 1: THE A-CDM MILESTONES (SOURCE: EUROCONTROL, 2009) 
 
NUMBER MILESTONES 
TIME 
REFERENCE 
EXPLANATION 
1 
ATC Flight Plan 
Activation 
3  hours before 
EOBT First point of Awareness 
2 EOBT – 2h 
2 hours before 
EOBT 
CTOT Allocation in case of airspace or 
local constraints 
3 
Take-off from 
Outstation 
ATOT from 
Outstation 
Most commonly transferred via 
Movement Messages 
4 
Local Radar 
update 
Varies according to 
Airport Arrival Manager builds sequence 
5 Final Approach 
Varies according to 
Airport 
Usually the trigger for ATC to set the 
first TOBT according to MTTT 
6 Landing ALDT Aircraft now under Local Management 
7 In-block AIBT Trigger for Ground Handling start 
8 
Ground Handling 
Starts ACGT 
Aircraft Operator now provides 
information to the Partners 
9 
TOBT Update 
prior TSAT 
Varies according to 
airport 
Most accurate TOBT should be 
provided 
10 TSAT Issue 
Varies according to 
Airport 
ATC issues TSAT based on latest 
TOBT 
11 Boarding Starts 
Varies according to 
Airport 
Trigger independent from mode of 
boarding (e.g. air-bridge, stand) 
12 Aircraft Ready ARDT Aircraft is physically ready to move 
13 Start-up Request ASRT Flight crew ask for start-up clearance 
14 
Start-up 
Approved ASAT Start-up approval by ATC 
15 Off-block AOBT Aircraft starts push-back or taxi 
16 Take off ATOT Aircraft takes off from the runway 
 
• Variable Taxi Time: is the key to predictability of accurate take-off and in-block 
times especially at complex airports. This is also used by the CFMU in order to 
calculate the CTOT and due to the complexity of airports taxi time may vary 
significantly depending on the parking position or runway configuration.  
• Pre-departure Sequencing: Establishing a pre-departure sequence for the off-block 
time taking operators’ preferences and operational constraints into account in order 
to replace the common principle of ‘first come first serve’. This allows avoiding 
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long waiting times at the runway and ATC to provide a TSAT which places each 
aircraft in an efficient pre-departure sequence for the off-block time.  
• CDM in Adverse Conditions: achieves Collaborative Management of partners 
during periods of predicted or unpredicted reductions of capacity, because different 
events either planned or unplanned can disrupt the normal operation of an airport far 
below normal operation. Such conditions may be snow, industrial action which 
means adverse conditions can be foreseen with more or less accuracy. A manager 
should be employed who is able to collaboratively reduce capacity in the most 
optimal manner and to facilitate a swift return to normal capacity once adverse 
conditions no longer prevail. This includes increased predictability during de-icing 
processes.  
• Collaborative Management of Flight Updates: as an information exchange of flight 
updates between CFMU and CDM Airport, it enhances the quality of arrival and 
departure information. Within this scope, the goal is to enable flight punctuality and 
efficiency having regard to the available resources with emphasis on optimizing the 
network capacity. This strategy does not look for imposing ATFCM solutions to 
airspace users through ATFM delays, but rather through a robust and comprehensive 
collaborative decision making process that will allow widespread dissemination of 
relevant and timely information. This is realized through Departure Planning 
Information Messages (DPIs) from the airport to the CFMU or Flight Update 
Messages (FUMs) from the CFMU to the airports concerned.  
With all these concept elements in place the local airport is regarded as a CDM Airport. Additionally, there 
are advanced concepts available. As yet undefined, these Elements will enhance and 
extend common situational awareness and increase collaboration between airports by 
utilizing advanced technologies and linking with advanced tools, e.g. A-SMGCS, 
AMAN/DMAN: 
• DMAN: is a planning system to improve departure flows at an airport by 
calculating the TTOT and TSAT for each flight, taking multiple constraints and 
preferences into account. It is the technical enabler developed by several 
industrial companies, using the data elements provided by Airport CDM and A-
SMGCS concept. However, its application within European has not yet been 
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harmonized and it must also be considered reliable before considered by 
operational controllers.  
• AMAN: is a planning system improving arrival flows by optimal throughput, 
considering relevant constraints like airspace structure, runway system, wake 
vortex category, speed, restrictions, wind, etc. 
• A-SMGCS: Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System. The 
main functions of A-SMGCS as they are defined in the ICAO A-SMGCS Manual 
are: 
 Surveillance, which provides controllers (eventually flight crews and 
vehicle drivers) with situational awareness on the movement area (i.e. a 
surveillance display showing the position and identification of all aircraft 
and vehicles). 
 Control, providing conflict detection and alerting on runways (and 
eventually the whole movement area). 
 Routing, through which manually (eventually automatically) the most 
efficient route is designated for each aircraft or vehicle. 
 Guidance, giving flight crews and drivers indications enabling them to 
follow an assigned route. 
1.1.2 The US CDM Concept 
Starting in 1993, experiments with data exchange between the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and the airlines (FADE experiments) where airlines sent updated 
schedule information, the FAA proved to positively impact air traffic management 
decision making. CDM has evolved from this same principle, based on the belief that 
shared information on all sides will create a National Airspace System (NAS) that is 
beneficial to everyone. CDM brings together airlines, government, private industry and 
academics in an effort to improve air traffic management through information exchange 
and data sharing. This philosophy of collaboration promises to become the standard in 
aviation (FAA CDM Webpage, 2009). A stakeholder group consisting of the Air 
Transport Association (ATA), National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), 
Regional Airline Association (RAA), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
provides recommendations to the FAA. A number of sub-teams like the Flow Evaluation 
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Team, Future Concepts Team, Surface CDM Team, Enhanced Ground Delay Program, 
Special Traffic Management Program, Weather Evaluation Team, Fuel Team and CDM 
Training Team are established to address specific issues in a focused group of experts. 
Additionally, joint initiatives are undertaken and aimed at exchanging ideas that will 
mutually benefit both European and American CDM organizations. These initiatives 
include mutual exchange programs of CDM team members where interest was raised by 
the FAA to build on expertise from European Concept of A-CDM. 
1.1.3 The Differences between the European and the US CDM Concept 
While both the European and the US CDM concepts are aimed at increasing the 
predictability and reliability of air traffic, differences between the two approaches evolve 
from the regulatory environments and the different measures as they are established in 
Europe, respectively the US. The main difference between both approaches is the non 
adoption of Target Start-up Approval Time (TSAT) as a means to control the traffic 
flow on the ground in the US. Instead, ATC provides the Target Movement Arrival 
Entry Count (TMAC), a number of slots to that spot when ATC takes over with aircraft 
start taxiing to the runway. A Target Movement Area Entry time (TMAT) is allocated 
by Departure Reservoir Management (DRM). The reason for this is that in the US the 
Aprons are controlled by the airlines and not ATC.  
In Europe, focus is applied to monitoring of delays through key monitoring stages 
because airports are getting increasingly congested and parallel planning exists between 
airports and Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM). Consequently, the harmonisation 
between the various local airport partners and the CFMU has initially been in the 
spotlight in Europe, while the US CDM has established their focus in the various sub-
teams. As a result, the collaboration among participating partners at strategic, tactical and 
operational level has developed quite differently during day-to-day flight operation.  
1.1.4 A-CDM Implementation 
There are four distinct and fundamental phases defined for the implementation 
process which are the Information Phase, Analysis Phase, Implementation Phase, and 
the DPI Operational Implementation Phase. To ensure data quality, a validation process 
will take place before to assess level of CDM implementation at the airport. 
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EUROCONTROL offers far ranging assistance to support the local implementation 
including CBA at airport sides, gap analysis, dedicated website, CDM document library, 
multiple subgroup meetings, and yearly coordination group meetings. 
Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) has now been established as a concept of 
working together of all airport partners who are best placed for operational decision 
making. Partners recognized as required for CDM include airport operators, aircraft 
operators, ground handlers, Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) in Brussels, and 
Air Traffic Control (ATC). CDM aims at improving operational efficiency at airports by 
reducing delays, improving the situational awareness during the progress of the flight, 
and optimizing the utilization of resources. The inherent aim is to make improved 
decisions based on more accurate and timely information that result in all airport partners 
having the same operational picture, with the same meaning to all involved. By knowing 
possible constraints of the actual or predicted situation, each airport partner is able to 
improve own decisions in collaboration with other partners by applying own preferences. 
The improved decision making by all airport partners will be facilitated by the sharing of 
accurate and timely information (EUROCONTROL, 2009a).  
With CDM in place, also the ATM network benefits from more accurate information 
about the flight status. This allows deriving ATFM slots based on the actual situation and 
reducing the current buffer capacity for the en-route phase of the flight.  
For the implementation of CDM, operational procedures, automated processes and 
tools have to be established at the participating airports. The EUROCONTROL Airport 
CDM team is responsible for proposing standardization and dissemination of best 
practice Airport CDM implementation guidelines at European airports, but does not 
have regulatory power. 
1.2 The Milestone Approach Concept Element (Turn-round Process Element) 
The Milestone Approach Element has traditionally been called ‘CDM Turn-round 
Process Element’ (CTRP) and describes the progress of a flight from the initial planning 
to the take off by defined milestones that allow close monitoring of significant events. 
Turn-round operation has so far been viewed as a standalone process with 
responsibilities shared between airline and airport. SESAR Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) research however aims at eliminating today’s fragmented approach to European 
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air traffic management by synchronising all stakeholders and network resources. Because 
successive flights depend on each other, today’s ATM concept links the arrival phase, 
turn-round, and departure phase of a flight as one entity, The ground process and en 
route traffic are now considered as part of a time-dependent chain. Airport Collaborative 
Decision Making (A-CDM) is used as the mechanism to integrate airports into the ATM 
network. An airport is considered a CDM airport when the Information Sharing, the 
Milestone Approach, the Variable Taxi Time, the Pre-departure Sequencing, the Adverse 
Conditions, and the Collaborative Management of Flight Updates concept elements are 
successfully implemented at an airport (EUROCONTROL, 2009b).  
Figure 1 shows the milestones within the different phases - arrival phase (inbound), 
turn-round phase, and departure phase (outbound). Flight Update Messages (FUMs) and 
Departure Planning Information (DPI) are in place to inform all participating CDM 
partners of the flight progress, thus improving ATFM slot management process for 
departing flights (Collaborative Management of Flight Updates Element). 
 
 
FIGURE 1: AIRPORT CDM GENERIC MILESTONES (SOURCE: EUROCONTROL, 2006) 
 
Among the milestones used for monitoring the flight progress, the period of the flight 
between milestone 7 (actual in-block time) and milestone 15 (actual off-block time) is 
called Turn-round. Monitoring this turn-round phase is a complex task, because 
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situational awareness has to be established across various subsystems of different 
organizational and operational structures with their own causal and intentional domain 
constraints. Subsystems are here referred to as participating partners and include airport 
operator, airline company, air traffic control, ground handler, service provider and 
Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU). Additionally, many terminal and ramp 
processes have operational interdependencies, e.g. processes that normally cannot be 
done in parallel, as well as legal requirements, e.g. one side of the aircraft has to be clear 
of obstructions to ensure that fire fighting access is always possible (Fricke et al, 2008). 
In order to increase situational awareness during turn-round, a number of agreed trigger 
events are defined by the A-CDM concept to inform all partners of updates to estimates 
and/or aircraft turn-round status. A CDM compliance alert will appear on the Airport 
CDM Information Sharing Platform (ACISP) in cases of disruptions. Any internal or 
external disruption at these milestones generates an alarm and has to be communicated to 
all partners in order to maintain situational awareness.  
 Due to the complexity, size, speed, and functionality of the ATM network between all 
airport partners during this turn-round phase, it is important to understand how operators 
monitor the turn-round operation, the challenges they face in the monitoring task, and 
the tools they use for monitoring and decision support. Designers can use this 
information to create interfaces that not only enhance operation monitoring, but also 
alleviate information overload, integrate or highlight required information, decrease 
response time, and thereby increase efficiency by providing an intelligent decision 
support for turn-round related decision making. Failures during turn-round monitoring 
can result in insufficient situational awareness with negative consequences on TOBT 
reliability.  
1.3 The Role and Importance of TOBT  
Within A-CDM, the Target Off-block Time (TOBT) represents the time that an 
airline or handling agent estimates an aircraft to be ready, all doors closed, boarding 
bridge removed, push back vehicle available, and ready to start up or push back 
immediately upon receiving clearance from air  traffic control (EUROCONTROL, 
2009b). The airline or airline representative (referred to here as ‘turn-round controller’) 
issues the TOBT and is ultimately responsible for its accuracy. The turn-round 
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controller controls and monitors the CDM turn-round process. He can update the TOBT 
up to 15 minutes before Estimated Off-Block Time (EOBT), but needs approval from 
the airlines’ dispatch manager if deviation from EOBT is greater than 15 minutes. 
The TOBT is an important trigger for all airport partners in departure management 
because ATC issues a Target Start-up Approval Time (TSAT) based on the TOBT to 
inform the flight crew and all partners of the time when the aircraft can expect start-up 
and/or push back approval. Such a TSAT also takes into account a possible Air Traffic 
Flow Management (ATFM) slot delay, and/or the actual traffic situation at the airport. 
As such, the TOBT is not only the key indicator for all participating actors and 
operators: But it is also used by the airport and ground handlers as a basis for resource 
planning, by the CFMU to assess airspace congestion, by local ATC to build pre-
departure sequence, and by the passengers as the expected departure time of the flight. 
The large number of participants who depend on accurate TOBT predictions reveals the 
importance of this milestone for the success of an efficient and reliable flight operation.  
Airport partners are also referred to as ‘decision makers’ at the tactical level; individuals 
participating at the airport terminal or the ramp are referred to as ‘actors’, and 
encompass flight managers, pilots, ramp agents, loaders, cleaners, catering personnel, 
vehicle drivers, and fuelling personnel.    
The crucial role of milestone 9 (Final Update of TOBT) within all other milestones has 
to be emphasized. While all other milestones can potentially be important to increase 
the situational awareness among A-CDM decision makers, milestone 9 requires the 
highest accuracy because it ties up the largest number of resources including airspace, 
ground handling equipment, airport facilities, personnel, and passengers’ time.  
As a consequence of predictable and accurately assigned TOBTs, ATC is able to 
reduce time buffers between period of milestone 14 (Actual Start-up Approval Time 
ASAT), and milestone 16 (Actual Take-off time ATOT). Due to the continuing 
instability in predicting TOBT, it is common practice for ATC to build time buffer into 
the period between milestone 14 and milestone 16 in order to account for irregularities 
that emerge during turn-round. Consequently, better predictability and accuracy in 
TOBT assignment enables ATC to reduce these time buffers.  
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When TOBT is more reliable, Actual Take-off Time (ATOT) also becomes more 
predictable and other positive network benefits can be expected. A study has shown that 
a broader implementation of A-CDM could increase sector capacity, reduce en-route 
delays, and reduce the number of regulated flights (EUROCONTROL, 2008a). Other 
advantages of reliable TOBT predictions include reduced taxi times, environmental 
benefits, improved resource planning, and last, but not least, increased passenger 
satisfaction. 
A prototypical situation showing the importance of the TOBT is a flight constrained 
by a Calculated Take-Off Time (CTOT). Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) is 
the enforcing power for delaying flights based on a calculated airspace sector overload 
or restrictions that emerge before the departure by imposing a CTOT on the flight. Such 
CTOT requires the flight to get airborne within a 15-minute-window [-5;+10 minutes] 
This CTOT is based on the TOBT resulting from the Departure Planning Information 
(DPI) that the airline forwards to the CFMU. If the TOBT is inaccurate the flight fails to 
depart within the CTOT window and the airspace reserved for this flight gets redundant 
because it cannot be assigned to another flight anymore that has also been delayed. This 
example shows the key role of the TOBT in coordinating the turn-round phase with the 
en-route phase of the flight.  
1.4 Characteristics and Dynamics of the TOBT 
TOBT decision making has the characteristics of an evolutionary approach within a 
dynamic environment: The task of assigning the TOBT is only one component of a 
larger decision making problem that does not simply end with a TOBT assignment. It 
requires continuous monitoring of the turn-round situation, because any unanticipated 
event can affect the TOBT significantly. Thus, coordination of actions is mandatory: 
depending on the required response to a single turn-round process or any unexpected 
situation, a long sequence of subsequent process coordination or remedial decision 
making may be necessary. Such response may include actions like data exchange or 
sharing information up to jointly creating contingency plans via numerous interactions 
between actors or operators involved.  
During  flight operation at congested airports, the minimum time available for turn-
rounds is often restricted by predefined minimum periods called Minimum Turn-round 
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Time (MTTT). However, such MTTTs are not based on the actual turn-round duration 
required, but are a fairly arbitrary choice of the airline. If only MTTT is available, the 
TOBT needs to be updated even when only one turn-round process is delayed during the 
so called critical path of the sequential turn-round processes: While a number of turn-
round processes can be executed simultaneously, the critical path stems from the 
sequential sub-processes, where a delay can propagate across the turn-round, thereby 
affecting the TOBT. Therefore, not only close monitoring of this critical path is required, 
but also predictions are required for each single turn-round process, since TOBT 
accuracy depends heavily on the exact prediction of all sequential sub-processes.   
However, until today no unified approach has been found on what time, space, 
individuals or units are required during turn-round management or whether decision 
making should be centralized or distributed among participants. Examples of who is 
responsible for forwarding information, when should information be shared, or how the 
nature of the distributional network should look like because accountability in decision 
making is an inherent point of conflict between the various actors and participants. 
Additionally, the influence of external factors like time pressures during turn-round, 
interruptions in the ATM network, or the consequences resulting from the uncertainty of 
situations have not been systematically investigated so far. Such characteristics and 
dynamics of the current approach to turn-round decision making reveal opportunities for 
an improvement in the overall TOBT prediction.        
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1.5 Motivation for this Research 
Sections 1.3 and 1.4 have outlined how TOBT plays a key role for all airport 
partners, not only as a benchmark time for the execution of all ground services, but also 
as the reference time for the airport, ATC, CFMU, the passengers and the aircrews. This 
importance for all involved together with the little attention that TOBT has gained so far 
marks the motivation for this research project.  
Moreover, the issue of TOBT accuracy has not been systematically investigated at 
airports thus far. A number of reasons may explain this fact:  
 Operational A-CDM airports: only a few airports in Europe have officially 
introduced A-CDM and are using the milestones as outlined in the A-CDM 
implementation manual (EUROCONTROL, 2009b). 
 The importance of TOBT predictability has not yet been sufficiently emphasized 
when considering the introduction of A-CDM at an airport; focus has always 
been applied on other CDM implementation issues.  
 Lack of awareness required for TOBT during A-CDM: due to insufficient 
dissemination of working rules and guidelines of the CDM procedures, turn-
round managers are not fully aware of the newly implemented procedures not 
directly affecting their own working environment. TOBT awareness however, 
has to be established via an interdepartmental information exchange.  
 Airlines and ground handlers are worried about possible negative consequences 
when sharing their internal data to allow accurate TOBT predictions: precise 
information on expected turn-round completion may also potentially reveal 
ground handling irregularities. Communicating such information demands a 
culture change by the airline or the representative ground handler, because 
penalties from providing poor turn-round service have to be expected, e.g. IATA 
delay code assignment or payment deductions. Finally, airline agents often 
remain hopeful that delay encountered during turn-round might be compensated 
for by accelerated working procedures: In such cases, providing a late TOBT 
early would be disadvantageous for the airline.  
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1.6 Aims, Objectives and Research Questions   
The overall aim of this project has been defined as:   
Identifying measures that can increase TOBT prediction accuracy.  
A number of objectives were derived from this aim for the research project: 
• Understanding the environmental constraints influencing TOBT decision making. 
• Identifying unexpected situations critical for TOBT adherence. 
• Understanding how major European airlines actually assign TOBT today. 
• Determining countermeasures for dealing with unanticipated situations and  
• Identifying strategies and decision support systems able to predict accurate TOBTs. 
Taking the environment within today’s A-CDM context into consideration, the first 
research questions looked at the social and organizational aspects of the turn-round and 
were formulated:  
 What are the fundamental constraints that are imposed on TOBT decision making?  
 What are the specific environmental factors that influence TOBT decision making? 
The perspective of the flight crews was used to describe situations critical for TOBT 
adherence: 
 Which situation can arise unexpectedly that is critical for TOBT adherence?  
 Within the identified situations, does cooperative behaviour of participating actors 
have an influence on TOBT adherence? 
The next questions were aimed at zooming closer into the actual TOBT decision making 
process and include:  
 What are the different modes for monitoring the turn-round and what are the current 
strategies used to predict the outcome of the turn-round via the assignment of the 
TOBT? 
 What cognitive strategies have operators developed to facilitate early detection and 
resolution of a critical TOBT adherence situation? 
 What factors contribute to turn-round monitoring difficulty because key indicators 
for emerging problems are not available? 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
          Matthias Groppe                Influences on Aircraft TOBT Prediction Accuracy                    34                 
The underlying motivation for the next questions was to find countermeasures for the 
identified problems, formulated as: 
 How can provision of cooperative information increase TOBT prediction accuracy? 
 Is cooperative information sharing able to identify strategies that can be applied 
during unexpected turn-round situations? 
 Is it possible to get more accurate TOBT predictions already earlier than today? 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 
The scope of the thesis is delimited to the A-CDM Information Sharing and Milestone 
(Turn-round Process) Element of the A-CDM concept. While it was realized that also 
other concept elements are useful to be included, this boundary was chosen because the 
overall aim is to identify measures that are able to increase TOBT prediction accuracy by 
kind, but not by quantity. This means, it was preferred to find suitable measures that can 
be transferred to other A-CDM concept elements. While the concept element of CDM in 
Adverse Condition (e.g. de-icing) was deliberately not included, interactions with Air 
Traffic Control were initially considered (e.g. Flight Crew Survey), but later disregarded 
as not being useful to be included in the experiments.  
The conceptual research framework was selected based on the specific characteristics 
of today’s turn-round management and its influence on TOBT prediction, while 
considering the specific environment and the identified constraints that are shaping turn-
round management and TOBT decision making.  
For such problem setting, the theoretical framework being used should be able to 
provide a method for analysis, evaluation, and design of a decision support system that 
can aid decision makers during turn-round operation. For example, how can the required 
information be displayed, which format should be used to display information in order to 
facilitate cooperative working behaviour and effective decision making? How should the 
tasks be effectively distributed across manual or automated systems? The proposed 
system design should be evaluated at a later stage to determine its usability and 
effectiveness, and whether it leads to enhanced performance.  
Therefore, the literature review was performed with three major goals in mind: First, 
the environment of the A-CDM turn-round should be captured. While legal, operational, 
or cognitive perspective that may influence the turn-round operation, and consequently 
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also the TOBT, should also be considered. Second, the design criteria for a system that 
could support reliable TOBT decision making should be identified. Third, a suitable 
framework for the analysis of the research objectives should be chosen. The following 
chapters are therefore organized as follows:  
Chapter 2: This chapter provides a review of the overall A-CDM turn-round 
environment, outlines how turn-round is managed, and looks at the processes required 
for its execution. This includes a review on the identified shortcomings of the turn-round 
processes as well as the legal aspects shaping the turn-round management.  
Chapter 3: provides the theoretical approach towards A-CDM. It begins by looking at 
the design lessons from decision support literature and identifies some challenges in 
designing of a human-computer interaction system that could potentially support TOBT 
decision making. Subchapter 2 describes the disciplines of Decision Making and 
Information Sharing with concepts that are available to support effective human-
computer systems, while focus is placed on the cooperative element that supports 
decision making. Subchapter 3 describes the cognitive element as one of the 
interdependent elements between actors within the given decision making environment 
and how cognitive engineering can be used to find design criteria for decision support in 
the given environment. The following Subchapter 4 examines the first stages of a 
Cognitive Work Analysis that were used as the framework for the project and how it was 
applied as an overall modelling tool for capturing the cognitive constraints influencing 
the decision making environment. The results of the literature review were then used to 
determine the research methods.  X 
The following chapters use the Cognitive Work Analysis as an overall framework. 
Four major studies were executed, each using a different research method and 
different mode of analysis. The research method used for each study was determined 
using the results from the previous literature review. The issues identified during the 
investigations were outlined in the relevant section of this paper.  
Chapter 4: outlines the application of the Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) to the A-
CDM work system and turn-round management. First, the aims and objectives of this 
analysis are provided as well as the limitations of a Cognitive Work Analysis to be useful 
applied to the A-CDM work domain. Subchapter 3 provides the Work Domain Analysis 
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as the first step of a CWA, while Subchapter 4 describes the Control Tasks Analysis as 
the second step of a CWA. Both steps rely on a methodology proposed by Naikar et al. 
(2005) who describes how the analysis should be applied.  
Chapter 5: provides a flight crew survey and how it was used to identify the critical 
situations for A-CDM turn-round management.  It includes the aims, objectives, method, 
findings, and concluding aspects of the study. The study shows how flight crews are 
involved in decision making during turn-round, how cooperative behaviour of all 
participating affects the turn-round, and which situations are critical for accurate TOBT 
predictions.  
Chapter 6: provides a study via field observations during turn-round management 
with the aims, and method applied. Details are given that describe how turn-round 
management is established at major European airports and how the outcome of the turn-
round is assessed by the various turn-round representatives. Due to the quantity of 
identified data/information during the observations, the findings of the study were 
integrated into a qualitative cognitive model that was used to identify critical areas for 
data/information flow. Identified data/information was seen as essential for accurate 
TOBT predictions. 
Chapter 7: As a central part of the investigations, small-scale human-in-the-loop 
experiments outlined here were proposed in order to find measures to counteract 
inaccurate TOBT predictions. A Turn-round Control Mock-up that was exclusively 
developed for the experiments is described as well as details on the participants, the 
experimental design, the method applied, and the analysis of the collected data, are 
given. This Chapter concludes with a discussion about the validity and limitations of the 
experiments.   
Chapter 8: presents a summary and conclusions drawn from the overall results, offers 
recommendations, suggests possible areas for future research, and discusses the 
limitations encountered. While some concluding aspects are given for each of the studies 
at the end of the relevant Chapter, the conclusions given here draw a line from the initial 
development of the research concept to the specific details of the final results.    
Chapter 9: Publications and References 
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Chapter 10: includes appendices with further details on A-CDM, theoretical aspects 
of cooperation, distributed decision making, and turn-round management. These are in 
particular the A-CDM concept with the mandatory or recommended milestones, the 
design of the flight crew survey, the IATA Delay Code Table, turn-round tools that are 
currently used in Europe, further results of the literature studies on cooperation and the 
Cognitive Work Analysis, and details of the Games-Howell Test. 
1.8 Potential Contribution to Knowledge  
Prior to a more detailed discussion of the literature review, this section provides the 
main areas of this project that are aimed at contributing to the existing body of 
knowledge. 
• Despite the connotation of A-CDM as highly relevant to the success of airport 
operation, a surprisingly small amount of research has been dedicated to the 
domain specific problems of aircraft turn-round operation. 
• Furthermore, no research project has been found to date that applies a cognitive 
engineering approach to investigate the factors influencing the predictability of 
aircraft off-block times.  
• In addition, following the Cognitive Work Analysis framework outlined by 
Vicente (1999), a concept of human-information work interaction analysis has 
been applied to turn-round management for the first time.  
• Finally, a major effort has been dedicated to cooperation analysis of the work 
domain being investigated. In order to better understand the specific aspects of 
the A-CDM turn-round process management, two alternative forms of 
cooperation analysis were integrated into the research framework, by way of a 
descriptive and an experimental form of investigation. Such an approach has not 
been taken in this turn-round management environment thus far.  
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2 THE A-CDM TURN-ROUND PROCESS   
2.1 Introduction  
     A number of issues that frame the management of the turn-round relate to the 
environment in which the turn-round takes place. Such issues include organizational as 
well as legal aspects. They are outlined here in order to understand the specific 
constraints that influence the A-CDM processes including TOBT decision making.  
2.2 The IATA Airport Handling Standards and the Airline Standards  
Historically, airports were managed and owned by federal governments around the 
globe. However, the development and adoption of standards for airport handling arose in 
Europe where an overlap of many different airlines resulted in the necessity for airlines 
to arrange handling contracts with each other (IATA, 2004). These standards were 
developed under the auspices of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) over 
a period of thirty years and have been established as procedures for passenger and 
aircraft handling during turn-round. As of August 2009, more than 230 airline or ground 
handling companies are members of IATA and have to adhere to these standards. IATA 
Operational Safety Audits (IOSA) are performed to assess the operational management 
and control systems of the airlines. In the Airport Handling Manual (AHM) all standards 
are lined out affecting passengers, cargo/mail, aircraft handling, load control, airside 
management and safety, aircraft movement control, and ground handling agreements 
including the handling of ground support equipment. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
are in place to act as a structure for measuring the service quality of ground handling 
service providers. Finally, the airlines themselves develop their own standards to ensure 
that ground handling performance is maintained during the turn-round processes. 
2.3 The EU Directive on Ground Handling in Europe 
In 1996, 15 member states of the European Union adopted a Directive to encourage 
competition in ground handling services at European airports. In a number of member 
states, ground handling services had historically been provided on a monopoly basis, 
either by the major base airline (e.g. Iberia, Olympic) or by the airport operator itself. 
This was a common model in Austria, Germany and Italy. However, many problems 
arose from the new arrangement created by this Directive (Smith, 2001). Smith outlines 
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the different configurations of stakeholders’ interests which may result from the various 
combinations of circumstances. These configurations range from a simple model where 
the airport operator is responsible to appoint third party ground handlers while taking 
the interests of the various airlines into account to more complex models where airports 
and airlines provide ground handling services at the same airport. Since governments 
are frequently shareholders of the airport, such configurations of handling 
responsibilities may create potential for conflicting interests. Airport operator 
involvement in ground handling services creates suspicion in the minds of other ground 
handlers who feel disadvantaged in terms of access to facilities (e.g. air bridge served 
parking stands) or a centralized infrastructure (e.g. baggage handling system or even 
terminal building).    
2.4 The IATA Delay Code System 
As part of the Airport Ground Handling Manual (AHM), the IATA Delay Codes 
were established to help the airlines with standardization of the delay causes from their 
commercial flights. Traditionally, airlines were using their own delay assignment 
system; The IATA however standardized the transmission format of delay information 
into delay codes. Such delay codes assign the responsibility and time of the delays to a 
function that is seen as the cause of the delay. As a consequence, the airlines may 
penalize the service company or other partner according to the contract or Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) in place. Airlines often use bonus-penalty or other incentive systems 
that affect the remuneration for services provided.  
Several groups of delay codes exist that group the delays into categories like 
passenger processing, baggage handling, or aircraft defects (See Appendix III). The 
delay can also be attributed to several sources, if more than one cause of delay was 
determined.    
However, identifying the function where the delay originates is not always easy 
because delays are often reactionary. Moreover, during turn-round, restrictions to 
providing service may not be visible at first glance, or the background of the delay 
reason is not available to the function which is responsible for assigning the delay code. 
Although service providers may encounter restrictions or face hurdles from other 
participants, the delay code is assigned to them. For instance, hindrances to start the 
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service may be caused by another ground handling service or a blocked equipment. 
These factors are often not visible from the location where the delay code is assigned. It 
is questionable whether an accurate code can be attributed to delays encountered away 
from the physical locations of their emergence. According to EUROCONTROL (2007), 
there are suggestions that delay statistics are compromised if they are gathered by 
airlines, because of the temptation to assign blame and the attempts by one or more of 
the direct contributors to hide their influence on the delay caused. Delay statistics 
collected by aircraft operators are used primarily to direct improvement efforts. 
However, airlines tend to focus on infrastructure deficiencies that serve their individual 
needs. Differences can be observed when comparing Central Flow Management Unit 
(CFMU) and Airline delay statistics (see Figure 2). 
Conversely, for delay codes 81-84 and 89 (Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) 
and airport delays), EUROCONTROL realized a tendency that airlines are keener today 
to solve the problem accurately. So the relationship between airspace users and airport 
service providers has become more cooperative: Regular statistics from 
EUROCONTROL’s Central Office for Delay Analysis (CODA) compared with those 
recorded by operators’ shows that although absolute values vary slightly due to the 
comparison of sample data to full data, the trends nonetheless match exactly 
(EUROCONTROL, 2007).  
 
 
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF DELAYS (SOURCE: EUROCONTROL CODA, 2007) 
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2.5 Turn-round Complexities 
A turn-round delay may have numerous causes. Even though each turn-round is 
unique in itself, there are complications occurring on regular basis that have to be taken 
into account when calculating TOBT. E.g. the company SITA (SITA, 2009) describing 
itself as the world's leading specialist in air transport communication and IT solutions, 
notes that aircraft turnaround complications can emerge from:  
• processes that differ depending on the airlines and/or the aircraft; 
• airports having different levels of capacity that impact turnaround performance; 
• pressure to achieve the optimal long-haul passenger/ cargo mix; 
• the shrinking window for receiving passengers/cargo prior to departure affects 
fuel truck availability and fuel requirements; 
• reduced staff; 
• pressure to utilize aircraft more efficiently and to limit ground time; 
• zero excess fuel requirements (excess fuel is kept close to safe minimums); 
• increased air traffic; and  
• limited airport expansions (increasing need for operational efficiencies). 
The complexities which arise from the differences between the turn-round processes 
are part of the focal point of this project. The analysis starts with a categorization of 
turn-round processes as either within the critical path of parallel or part of the sequential 
chain of turn-round events. While parallel turn-round processes can also cause delays, 
poor coordination or unawareness about the progress of sequential turn-round processes 
is usually responsible for a turn-round delay. Through the number and kind of processes 
can differ between airlines, airports, operators and situation. Figure 3 provides a general 
overview of the different sequential and parallel turn-round processes:  
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FIGURE 3: TURN-ROUND PROCESSES (SOURCE: WU, 2008 & SNELLING, 2002) 
 
In order to get time estimates for turn-round process durations, each individual 
process has to be analysed. As illustrated by the example of baggage loading time, the 
issues that have to be taken into consideration when analysing process duration of 
baggage loading include size, amount, and weight of baggage, transit time available, 
nature of baggage, bulk, baggage per passenger, location of compartment, timing for 
loading, special passenger baggage, life cargo, available loaders, available equipment, 
amount of Delivery At Aircraft (DAA), Unit Load Device (ULD) or loose loading, 
distance and movement time from baggage check-in to aircraft to be loaded, etc. This is 
an example of the complexities arising from just a single process within this turn-round 
process chain that has to be considered in order to make estimates of the time when 
baggage loading is completed. Accurate process completion times for all turn-round 
processes however, are essential for making reliable predictions of the TOBT.  
Additionally, the overall turn-round time varies from flight to flight because of the 
different passenger numbers or the amount of ground handling services required. A 
typical approach of airlines to managing the turn-round operation is by using a turn-
round reference model, where pre-defined timeframes indicate the coordination of all 
ground handling processes towards the end of the turn-round. The reference model 
incorporates the different durations of ground handling services for different aircraft 
types.   
The airlines assign ground handling services to third party companies. Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) are negotiated between the airline and the ground handling company 
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to reinsure that quality standards are maintained as required by the airline. Figure 4 
shows a generic reference model of a turn-round at a remote position where the number 
indicates the time before EOBT in minutes; however depending on the specific turn-
round situation the actual turn-round itself can be far more complex.  
 
FIGURE 4: GENERIC MODEL OF TURN-ROUND TIMES  
 
Different strategies exist among airlines for the execution of the turn-round. While 
low-cost carriers tend to use a ‘team strategy’ where a team is assigned to each turn-
round to handle all turn-round activities, the prevailing strategy among incumbent 
airlines is to handle the turn-round through grouped processes and sequential work flows, 
where different units are responsible for individual flows, e.g. baggage handling, 
catering, cleaning, etc. This strategy however requires good coordination between the 
participating units. In general, the number of participating functions today is rising 
because the airlines are increasingly employing third party service providers for ground 
handling services. This complicates the coordination required during each turn-round 
with the consequence that the responsibility for the overall turn-round management is not 
visible or is lost among participants. 
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2.6 Turn-round Monitoring Systems 
To counteract emerging delays resulting from increasingly complicated ground 
handling processes and the short time often available for the turn-round, airlines often 
use different turn-round monitoring systems which enable them to compile timestamps 
in real-time - either manually or automatically, e.g. via an Aircraft Communication 
Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) or other sensors on-site. Such monitoring 
devices range from WIFI (Wireless Fidelity) hand held or WLAN (Wireless Local Area 
Network) systems with manual process tracing to fixed installations based on Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) technology and that often allow tracking each single 
ground handling process while using this data for monitoring the overall turn-round.   
However, in order to understand how a single ground handling process can influence 
the overall turn-round performance, the effect of an individual turn-round process on the 
path of ground handling events (See Chapter 3.4) has to be taken into consideration. 
 Allegro or HubStar are tools that are used for monitoring  the turn-round in the 
Airline Operation Centers (AOCs) or used as a ground handling data base. HubStar 
describes itself as a generic product able to adapt to any turn-round operation. It also 
claims being able to monitor the concatenation of correlated handling tasks for turn-
round flights, arrivals and departures, to identify the critical path and in doing so, 
supplying all decision-support information required.ALLEGRO was developed to 
gather information with focus on timeliness of turn-round processes between in-block 
and off-block time. Landside and airside processes can be analysed in order to identify 
required measurement points where timestamps can be set (See Appendix IV). Such 
monitoring tools are named differently when used by different airlines; however, the 
functionalities of these tools are similar. Wu (2008) claims that application of such real-
time monitoring systems makes turn-round operation more transparent, identifies 
potential delay sources, and helps to develop airline schedule optimization algorithms.  
2.7 Turn-round Shortcomings during A-CDM 
The Airport CDM Operational Document (EUROCONTROL, 2003) describes 
shortcomings of today’s operational processes. These include: 
• Unsatisfactory information exchange between aircraft operators/ground handlers 
and ATC/FMP or airport operators. As a result, not only decisions regarding 
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management of ATC and airport resources such as runway, taxiways, stands and 
gates are suboptimal, but also adherence to Air Traffic Flow Management 
(ATFM) restrictions and airport slots are likely to be compromised. 
• Often no visible link between airborne and ground segment of the flight exists 
with the consequence that changes within one segment are not communicated to 
all participating partners. Hence, pre-planning of appropriate measures to re-
schedule resources or other activities necessary cannot be done. This results in 
poor data quality or predictability of flights or segments of flights. 
• At most airports today, default taxi times are used to calculate an in-block or off-
block taxi time. However, due to the size of the airports and the weather at the 
airport that defines the runway configuration, taxi times can vary significantly and 
default values result in inaccuracies and hamper Calculated Take-off Time 
(CTOT) adherence. As a result, poor traffic prediction leads to inefficient use of 
existing en-route capacity, bunching or even sector overload. 
• Ground processes and en-route traffic is not yet considered as a time-dependent 
chain and therefore, the impact on down-stream events is not evaluated. Aircraft 
operators compensate for this information lack by using their own fleet 
management systems. However, the picture gained of one aircraft operators’ daily 
network operation is only a part of the entire network - often failing to include 
ATC and stand or gate management from airport of departure. Airport partners 
often do not believe that such information could be interesting for them. To tackle 
this problem, CFMU tries to obtain a view of the complete ATM network in order 
to identify bottlenecks and calculate regulations, if required. However, the quality 
of such regulations depends largely on the quality of available data. The major 
source of inaccuracy is the Estimated Take-off time (ETOT) derived from 
Estimated Off-block Time (EOBT) + default taxi time. 
•   The still prevailing principle of ‘first-come-first-served’ does not reflect the ATC 
situation or takes aircraft operators’ preferences into account. 
• Also an airport aiming for maximum efficiency can run into problems during 
events that require procedures different from standard operations or cooperation 
among partners. Even though operators have different methods of dealing with 
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such events, the overall operation can be affected if these methods are 
inconsistently applied or cooperation is poor. As a result, available capacity is not 
fully used at the time needed during such adverse conditions. X 
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3 HUMAN DECISION MAKING AND DECISION SUPPORT 
3.1 Decision Support Systems  
3.1.1 Introduction   
Human decision making is a crucial element of turn-round management and airport 
operation, but often shows conflicting demands among participating partners. As an 
answer to the increasing complexities at airports especially during aircraft turn-round, 
the A-CDM concept was established which considers decision making as one of the 
most critical activities for successful flight operation (EUROCONTROL Doc, 2009a). 
In order to provide support for all airport partners during turn-round decision making, 
the Airport CDM Information Sharing Concept has been created as one of the essential 
elements for decision support. This should be available during all phases of the flight, 
including the turn-round phase. The most crucial decision during this phase is the 
TOBT assignment and TOBT updates to the actual situation. However, the decision 
support that is required for TOBT assignment especially during the turn-round phase, 
has never been systematically analysed to the effect that TOBT prediction typically is 
based on oversimplified approaches leading to poor accuracy and stability of the 
predictions.    
During management of the turn-round, every decision about the affected turn-round 
processes produces a TOBT. This target time marks the turn-round controllers’ estimate 
of the time that the aircraft is ready for push-back and start-up. This decision includes 
her/his opinion about completion of the turn-round and sharing this information via the 
A-CDM Information Sharing Platform. This decision can either be based on her/his sole 
opinion about the turn-round completion or on a shared opinion encompassing her/his 
own assessment and the inputs or turn-round updates which he receives from other 
participating actors like ramp agent, aircraft pilot, or flight manager.  
The underlying question for the development of a Decision Support System (DSS) 
that aids TOBT prediction is now: What role and functions can be assigned to a DSS 
that as a result is then able to assist the turn-round manager in his task? Millot (1987) 
states a number of functions required by such a system if seen from user’s perspective 
which include ‘assisting decision makers in their decision process during semi-
structured tasks; supporting and enhancing rather than replacing managerial 
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judgments; improving the effectiveness of decision-making rather than its efficiency; 
attempting to combine the use of models or analytical techniques with traditional data 
access and retrieval functions; specially focusing on features that make them easy to 
use by none-computer people in an interactive mode; emphasizing the flexibility and 
adaptability to accommodate changes in both the approach of the decision maker and 
the environment in which he acts’.    
However, even with the improvement of today’s technologies for enhancing the 
performance of DSSs, the growing complexity creates a hurdle for the design of support 
systems incorporating these functionalities.  Chalmers (2002) realizes this problem and 
proposes as a first step to describe the requirements for understanding decision makers 
by asking: 
• What are the specific data needed, in what context, and when? 
• How does it need to be processed and integrated? 
• What should be its representational form? 
• How should this form be encoded into sensory form and mapped to an interface 
for information extraction by the decision maker? 
• What are the performance limitations of decision makers in accessing and 
decoding information? 
• What proactive strategy is used by the decision maker in unanticipated 
situations? 
The search for a suitable decision support system for turn-round management might 
also benefit from comparisons to the current shortfalls and functionalities of other 
decision support systems. O’Neill (1996) describes the limitations of current decision 
support in command and control environments which include:  
• difficulty in eliciting tacit expert knowledge; 
• decision makers’ discretionary need for ordering tasks and determining task 
goals themselves based on their local, dynamic situations; 
• difficulty in eliciting implicit expert knowledge about desired situation end 
states (goals) and impossibility of representing such knowledge as symbolic 
rules; 
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• difficulty, if not impossibility in particularly dynamic situations, to completely 
predefine information requirements; 
• failure to incorporate knowledge about operational plans and context in which 
aid is provided; 
• lack of mechanisms for supporting change; 
• no formal facility for framing and solving ill-structured problems; and  
• lack of support for informal communication among decision makers and for 
capturing the context of this communication for purposes of recall and reuse.  
In order to accommodate these limitations O’Neill proposes the design of a highly 
flexible decision aid architecture that is able to support also emergent work behaviour 
and provide an answer to the inadequacy of the routine problem-solving method which 
is currently used for decision making. Examples of attempts to design methods to 
operate on routine basis are the ‘Turn-round Reference Models’ of the airlines (See 
Chapter 2.6); However, such standardized turn-round models are not able to 
accommodate for non-standard situations requiring flexible decision making aids.  
3.1.2 Intelligent Decision Support for TOBT Assignment  
The traditional A-CDM Information Sharing Concept does not provide a decision 
support that gives the flexibility required for the assignment of a realistic TOBT based 
on all available information. Existing systems provide extensive information and data; 
nonetheless, no concept for structured ways of dealing with complex turn-round 
situations can be found. In addition to the aspects hampering successful turn-round 
management as outlined in Chapter 1, the complexity of the relations between all airport 
partners, the number of decision makers and organisations involved, the amount of 
information sources available, and the decreasing time of the turn-round itself are 
contributing to the requirements for a DSS that is able to aid TOBT decision making.   
Intelligent Decision Support Design is an approach that integrates human intellectual 
and computer capacities to not only provide passive information, but to actively 
improve decision making quality in semi-structured problem situations (Keen and 
Morton, 1988). It is particularly necessary, if the amount of information is so large or 
time constraint so high that human errors are likely (Gadomski, 1999). Especially when 
coping with unexpected situations, decision makers are required to immediately apply 
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complex knowledge which - if not properly available - causes poor decisions. Gadomski 
(1999) proposes an Intelligent Agent Approach for the development of an Intelligent 
Decision Support System (IDSS).  
According to Hollnagel et al. (1985), the development of an IDSS that is able to 
perform such cognitive tasks requires a corresponding shift in the multiple disciplines 
that can support effective human-computer systems. As a consequence, contributions 
from decision theory, systems engineering, cognitive engineering, and artificial 
intelligence have to be integrated into the development of an IDSS (Figure 5).  
A minimum of two of such disciplines should be combined in order to develop a 
comprehensive description of an IDSS (Hollnagel, 1985). For this research study the 
disciplines of Cognitive Engineering (see Chapter 3.3) and Decision Theory (see 
Chapter 3.1) were chosen in order to describe and develop a decision support system 
that can support decision making in the A-CDM work system. While studying the 
literature some overlaps of the cognitive engineering and systems engineering 
disciplines were found.  
 
 
FIGURE 5: DECISION SUPPORT IN PROCESS ENVIRONMENTS (SOURCE: HOLLNAGEL, 1985) 
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3.2 Decision Theory  
3.2.1 Introduction to Decision Making 
Decision making can be defined as an outcome of mental processes (cognitive 
processes) leading to the selection of a course of action among several alternatives (Mc 
Dermott, 2008). Decision making has been subject of active research from several 
perspectives, e.g. from a psychological perspective as the ‘individual decisions in the 
context of a set of needs, preferences and values of an individual are examined’ or from 
a cognitive perspective where the decision making process is regarded as ‘a continuous 
process integrated in the interaction with the environment’. From a normative 
perspective, the analysis of individual decisions is concerned with the logic and 
rationality of the decision-making.  
This chapter does not intend to provide a comprehensive analysis of decision making 
perspectives or theories, but to introduce theoretical decision making aspects that could 
have an influence on the design of a possible decision support system for TOBT 
decision making. The aim hereby is to identify critical aspects for decision making 
related to the specific operational scenarios of the turn-round and the task of assigning 
an accurate completion of the turn-round by predicting the TOBT. The Decision Making 
Theory is one of the four pillars that have been chosen to develop an intelligent decision 
support for the A-CDM work system (See Figure 5). 
Even though the A-CDM concept has already been established and realized as a key 
enabler for today’s turn-round operation, a number of theoretical decision making 
aspects can be identified that have not yet been sufficiently taken into account, but are 
necessary to understand how decision support in such a specific process environment 
can be provided. Due to the turn-round complexity and therefore limited possibilities to 
manage the turn-round processes - especially in unexpected situations, a structured way 
of decision support for turn-round monitoring and TOBT decision making is seen as 
beneficial.  
According to Hollnagel (1985), decision making in complex environments no longer 
follows a single set of rules or strategy, but constant attention to the process is required, 
because its state can change dynamically. In addition, a process execution with 
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optimized outcome depends more on the environment of the processes than on an 
optimized sequence (Boeckmann et al, 2008).  
A number of aspects from decision theories that affect CDM during turn-round 
management with focus on TOBT decision making are lined out.  
3.2.2 Situational Awareness during Decision Making 
Situational Awareness (SA) can be defined as ‘the perception of environmental 
elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, the 
projection of their status in the near future, and including the prediction of how their 
behaviour may affect the environment’ (Endsley, 1988). Common Situational 
Awareness (CSA) has been proposed as a key enabler for successful A-CDM 
(EUROCONTROL, 2003) and describes the aim that flight progress information is 
freely and universally available to all interested parties within the A-CDM Information 
Sharing Platform. Although a common view of the flight progress is not essential as a 
core of information available to all users in the same form and for common awareness, 
many types of flight progress information are required that are able to turn out in an 
unique understanding and response by the particular airport partner or actor. For 
instance, the airport focuses on a picture of the flight progress for taxi guidance or 
parking stand assignment, while the airline focuses on a picture of the aircraft and 
passenger flows.  
SA has become a central model of many real-time decision making problems within 
dynamically alterable environments where information is constantly changing and 
frequent monitoring is necessary to grasp the current state of knowledge (Endsley, 
1988). Stewart et al (2008) argue that SA should be examined in a system-wide 
perspective rather than individual-oriented. She proposes the novel characterisation of 
Distributed Situational Awareness (DSA) in a teamwork context based on the argument 
that cognitive processes in distributed teams occur at a systems rather than an individual 
level. Relevant cognitive factors include the representation, transformation, and 
manipulation of information. As a consequence, each individual member of a team uses 
the information in a way that supports his/her own mental picture of the situation. 
Stewart (2008) defines Distributed Situational Awareness (DSA) therefore, as activated 
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knowledge for a specific task within a system. The DSA theory was developed by 
Stanton et al (2006) and is based on six basic propositions: 
• SA is held by both human and non-human agents. 
• Communication between agents may be in the form of non-verbal behaviour, 
customs, and/or practice. 
• Non-overlapping and overlapping SA depends on the agent’s goals. 
• There are multiple facets of SA pertaining to the same scene held by different 
agents. 
• One agent may compensate for degradation in another agent’s SA. 
3.2.3 The Aspect of Time 
While process environments are characterized by time constants, Volta et al. (1986) 
points out that decision theories traditionally do not contain any element of time and 
therefore fail to recognize an essential attribute of process environments. However, 
decisions can be viewed as separation or cut in time. Before and after a decision has 
been made, things may look different. Volta also connects space and time as 
phenomenological dimensions. When viewed from the perspective of experience, 
decisions can be completely different and so has to be linked with the decision making 
process as part of the decision making structure, if time is a factor. Although 
historically, preference has been given to static models of decision making and the time 
dimension has been realized, the dichotomy between the subjective/perceived and 
objective/physical time aspects remains a challenge when modelling time aspects in 
decision making processes.  
Recognized time aspects during TOBT decision making are the dynamical changes 
of the turn-round process state requiring constant attention by the decision maker. 
Decision making trade-offs result from the number of turn-round processes that require 
a decision and the time available for monitoring the processes in order to make the 
decision. Control loss has to be expected, if decision maker fails to maintain attention. 
Available knowledge bases are required in order to consult the decision makers - 
assuming time is sufficient. Another time aspect is the moment itself when the 
information required for TOBT decision-making emerges. The significance of the 
moment that this information is available and then directly used for TOBT decision has 
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not been analysed yet, but may affect TOBT decision making significantly. Interactions 
for such information exchange between participating airport partners and actors with 
time aspects are referred to here as ‘asynchronous’ and ‘synchronous’ interactions. 
3.2.4 Turn-round Dynamics: The Uncertainty Aspect  
Another characteristic of turn-round management is the uncertainty about data and 
information arising from the complexity and dynamics of the turn-round. Since time can 
be critical during turn-round management, required knowledge for the process must be 
directly available, if a decision is required. Thereby, knowledge is seen as a set of 
flexible and adaptable skills allowing the actor or decision maker involved to wield and 
to apply information as required to the specific turn-round situation/problem. Such 
skills are in part, what differentiates information or data from knowledge. On the other 
hand, the information/data available has to be shared between partners involved where 
required, and procedures need to be established for standardized sharing of such 
information/data opposite to sharing information/data accidentally as it is predominant 
during real time operation.  The amount of processes and number of actors involved for 
each turn-round process can be so high that failures in sharing information during a 
single turn-round process can jeopardize the overall turn-round. 
 Another uncertainty aspect is the inherent risk of unanticipated events resulting 
momentarily in a heterogeneous information sharing situation, e.g. the captain detects a 
technical failure during the outside visual inspection of the aircraft, but so far no one 
else is informed about it. This however, can happen even shortly before passengers start 
boarding, but during normal turn-round operation flight crew members are generally not 
directly involved in turn-round process coordination. Therefore, this information has 
first to be transferred to the turn-round controller in order to be reflected in the TOBT 
decision. Since such necessary interactions between actors and airport partners can arise 
at any time during turn-round, optimized coordination of the processes is required in 
order to make reliable TOBT updates.   
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3.2.5 Human-Information Interactions during Decision Making 
A. Introduction to Human-Human Interactions  
The design of interfaces for intelligent decision support systems requires an 
understanding of the human-human information interactions taking place within the 
system under analysis (Belkin, 1985).The concept of A-CDM elicits only information 
interactions between the recognized airport partners via the Information Sharing and 
Milestone Approach (See Appendix I). Interactions between airport partners are here 
referred to as Human-Human Interactions (HHI) and Human-Computer Interactions 
(HCI) at the planning level. However, many interactions required for information 
exchange during the turn-round arise from HHI at the action level or HHI between the 
action and planning levels: whereby, HHIs at the action level refer to interactions that 
can be found among actors like pilots, ramp agents, service providers or others. Usually 
they have a shorter time span and less abstraction compared to HHIs at planning level.     
In this context it will be investigated, how the interactions between the action level 
and the planning level are established during turn-round and whether they create the 
situational awareness required by all participating. Focus is applied to HHI situations 
between aircrews and other airport partners during turn-round where cooperation is 
required for the coordination of processes. All processes between Milestones 7 and 14 
should be regarded where interactions between the action and planning levels are 
mandatory. Examples include not only interactions during all turn-round processes like 
boarding, loading, catering, fuelling, cleaning, but also those interactions with ATC: 
Starting from aircraft leaving the parking position, coordination with other departing 
aircraft is necessary prior off-block for the usage of taxiways, runways and airspace. 
While it is the responsibility of the pilots to execute the flight according to defined rules 
aiming at the highest degree of safety possible, ATC is responsible for flight safety by 
keeping sufficient separation between aircraft already during taxi and take-off, and 
managing air traffic flow by issuing clearances to the pilots. Differences in the level of 
control between pilots and operators like ATC in such situations are that ATC has 
authority over assigning the taxiways, runways, and airspace in form of clearances to 
the pilots and again depend on cooperation from pilots, to adhere to these clearances.  
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The results gained from the literature research of this Chapter have largely 
influenced the design of the experimental study on cooperative information sharing (See 
Chapter 7).  
B. Incomplete and Asynchronous Information-Interactions  
The designers of the turn-round process control also have to determine the level and 
timing of information required allowing for adequate situational awareness. They need 
to determine what kind of information has to be shared and when. However, 
Parasuraman et al. (1996) argues that as far as humans are involved in information 
provision and creation, failures may occur resulting in drifts of perception and not 
established situational awareness having obvious consequences on process reliability.  
To share information, operators like aircrews, ground handlers or other airport 
partners communicate with each other either verbally (e.g. via phone or radio) or 
through written text (e.g. via ACARS) while Controller Pilot Data Link Communication 
CPDLC is only used during en-route phase of the flight. Hence, how the airport CDM 
information sharing process is influenced by the following variables, has to be analysed: 
• Synchronous versus asynchronous interactions: synchronous interaction means 
that all actors and airport partners share the information required for TOBT 
decisions at the time that the information arises using any available interaction 
tool as opposed to asynchronous interactions where a time delay arises between 
emerging and passing on of information.  
• Homogeneous or heterogeneous information distribution: actors and/or airport 
partners do not have the same information available (heterogeneous) as opposed 
to homogeneous information where all involved share the same information.  
During turn-round process management, interactions between participating actors or 
airport partners can be synchronous or asynchronous. Coordination of actions takes 
place by way of predetermined key events (milestones), organized as a sequence of 
interactions between airport partners; if a non-standard situation (like aircraft change, 
technical repair, adverse weather operation, etc.) occurs, ad hoc coordination through 
face-to-face communications or via two-way radio/mobile phone between the affected 
actors has to take place. However, because of the information dynamics in the volatile 
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environment of the turn-round processes and the varying tasks of the different 
participating actors/airport partners’ information distribution during the turn-round 
process is still heterogeneous between participating airport partners and actors.  
Homogeneous information sharing is not always easy to achieve because barriers to 
sharing information can exist. 
C. The Notion of Cooperation during Human-Human Interactions  
According to Ferber (1995), three variable components of HHI are required to classify 
different types of interaction situations as cooperation, antagonism, and indifference 
situations. These components are the aims, resources, and abilities inherent in the minds 
of all participating actors. Depending on the distribution of the components among 
actors it can thus be analysed whether a contemplated turn-round situation is 
cooperative or non-cooperative in itself (see Figure 6). The question is whether the 
individual aims of the participating actors are compatible or conflicting, the resources 
sufficient or limited, and the abilities of the participating actors sufficient or insufficient 
to complete their assigned tasks.   
The aim of the analysis here was to identify how the HHI are established between the 
pilots and the others during the turn-round and the extent of cooperative behaviour 
during the day-to-day turn-round operation among all actors. This was done during a 
survey study with airline pilots, which aimed at identifying critical situations for TOBT 
adherence (See Chapter 5). Cooperation is assumed to be necessary in the context of A-
CDM and therefore, TOBT decision making.  
D. The Emergence of Cooperation  
     In the context of turn-round operation, HHIs are seen as dynamic relations between 
pilots and other operators and are established through a number of mutual actions. Each 
action by one operator has consequences that influence the behaviour or the prospective 
behaviour of the other operators. Ferber (1995) defines interaction situations as a 
number of behavioural patterns which evolve from a group of agents, who have to act in 
order to reach their targets; thereby, they have to regard their more or less limited 
resources and capabilities. By using this definition, interaction situations can be 
described and analysed, because it defines abstract categories like cooperation, 
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antagonism, and indifference by differentiating observed key commonalities and 
different interaction situations. The relevant components for classification of interaction 
situations are the aims and intentions of the different agents, the relations of the agents 
to available resources, and abilities of the agents with regard to their assigned task. 
These criteria are used to define the different types of interaction situations (Figure 6). 
 
 
FIGURE 6: CLASSIFICATION OF INTERACTION SITUATIONS (SOURCE: FERBER, 1995) 
 
Each type of interaction situation has its own relation towards cooperation: In an 
Independence situation, no interaction takes place and sufficient resources and abilities 
allow a coexistence of operators without any constraint. This situation has no relevance 
for ATM at congested airports. A Simple Working Together situation defines a 
collaboration situation which does not require coordination between operators because 
resources are sufficient, while a Blockade, Coordinated Collaboration, Pure 
Individual/Collective Competition, and Individual/Collective Resource Conflict are 
situations which are expected to dominate in our contemplated HHI situations. These 
situations require coordination between operators and, depending on resources, aims, 
and abilities, can result in cooperative or antagonistic behaviour. 
According to Ferber (1995), the prerequisites for human-human interactions to take 
place are: 
• a number of actors, who are able to act and communicate;  
• situations where actors meet or act via telephone with each other;  
Aims/ Interests Ressources Abilities Type of Situation Category
compatible sufficient sufficient Independence Indif ference
compatible sufficient insufficient Simple working together Indif ference
compatible insufficient sufficient Blockade Cooperation
compatible insufficient insufficient Coordinated collaboration Cooperation
incompatible sufficient sufficient Pure individual competition Cooperation
incompatible sufficient insufficient Pure individual competition Antagonism
incompatible insufficient sufficient Individual resource conflict Antagonism
incompatible insufficient insufficient Collective resource conflict Antagonism
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• dynamic elements, which allow local, time limited relations between agents; and 
• a certain slack within the relations between the agents, in order to not allowing 
them to maintain or get out of the relations. 
According to Hoc (2001), cooperation can exist within various levels in terms of 
distance from the action itself: A cognitive architecture of cooperation model classifies 
cooperation in abstraction level and process time depending on the proximity to the 
action itself (Figure 7).  
 
FIGURE 7: PROCESSING ARCHITECTURE OF COOPERATION (SOURCE: HOC 2000) 
 
The main benefit from the study of HHI situations is expected from an identification 
of antagonistic situations on the action, planning, or between the action and planning 
levels. At action level, the operators perform operational activities related to their 
individual goals, resources, and abilities. Hoc has defined four types of activities at 
action level: Interference creation (e.g. mutual control), interference detection, 
interference resolution, and goal identification (Goal identification also incorporates the 
identification of other operators’ goals). Cooperation at action level has short-term 
implications for the activity, as opposed to the more abstract type of cooperation at 
planning level. Interference creation relates to the deliberate creation of interactions; 
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whereas interference detection to the ability of detecting interferences, especially in 
non-deliberate interference situations. Interference resolution relates to the actual 
interaction in order to find a cooperative solution. Mutual domain knowledge is the 
basis for other operators’ goal identification, to facilitate operator’s own task, the 
other’s task, or the common task.  
At planning level, operators work to understand the situation by generating schematic 
representations that are organized hierarchically and used as an activity guide (Hoc et al, 
1998). Schematic representations include the concept of situation awareness (Salas et al, 
1995), and operators’ goals, plans, and meta-knowledge (Hoc et al, 1998). Therefore, 
the current approach to CDM operation in ATM is seen as an approach with the aim of 
achieving cooperation on planning level. De Terssac and Chabaud (1990) use the term 
‘Common frame of Reference’ (COFOR) as a mental structure playing a functional role 
in cooperation. As a shared representation of the situation between operators, a COFOR 
is likely to improve their mutual understanding (Carlier et al, 2002). The topmost level 
in Hoc’s model, the meta-cooperation, as a level developed from knowledge of the other 
two levels.  
A number of further theories on cooperation were found during the course of research 
that deserve attention, because of their potential to improve cooperation in complex 
environments. They can be found in Appendix V.  
3.2.6 The Influence of Aircrew Decision Making  
Aircrew decision making is usually seen in the context of (aircrew) team 
performance, Crew Resource Management (CRM), and team training. However, while 
the turn-round manager is primarily responsible for the turn-round operation planning, 
participating actors – including aircrew – are responsible to safely execute the turn-
round processes: Dispatch of the aircraft is only possible, if the pilot deems all 
processes complete under the maximum possible safety considerations. In various 
situations, these considerations require interactions and interrelations between aircrew 
and other actors involved in turn-round operation, because relevant information required 
for TOBT can result from such aircrew decision making and has to be shared with the 
turn-round manager.  
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Redding et al (1983) mentioned the problem of not having a unified framework for 
sharing a common decision-making process with aircrews, but emphasises the 
importance of having a shared mental model for situational awareness and decision 
making.  
For the design of a DSS that enables optimum decision making, it has to be analysed, 
how information sharing and situational awareness between aircrews and ground parties 
can be accomplished. Hence, these questions have to be addressed:  
• How is required information delivered to the cockpit?  
• How is required information delivered to cockpit on-time? 
• How is the information, forwarded from cockpit handled by other actors? 
• How long is the delay resulting from information that is not shared between 
cockpit and ground? 
3.2.7 Modes for Sharing Information between Aircrew and Ground 
Information-interaction tools available to the cockpit differ depending on whether the 
aircraft is on ground or in flight. Some possible means that are available during flight in 
the cockpit for providing information include: 
 ACARS: interface to address information requests or to provide operational 
information directly to the turn-round controller at the arrival or departure 
airport. This can be used to address all issues concerning ground handling 
processes, especially those arising during flight. Other ground handling service 
providers can also be addressed directly. 
 Direct voice communication can be established between aircraft cockpit and 
turn-round controller can also be established via two-way radio communication, 
if the aircraft is within the reception range of the ground stations. 
 On Ground: Mobile phones with short-dial function are available for cockpit to 
contact turn-round controller or other ground handling service providers.  
 Direct Information exchange with ramp agent. 
3.2.8 Decision Aiding for A-CDM 
Given the number of characteristics that may influence the outcome of the decision-
making, the proliferation of decision aiding though consultants, analyses, or computer is 
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not surprising (Humphreys et al, 1983; Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978; Wheeler and 
Janis, 1980). A number of reasons can be attributed to the difficulty of individual 
decision making. These include identification of all possible courses of action, 
evaluation of attractiveness or possible consequences, assessment of the likelihood of 
each consequence, and the integration of all these considerations (Fischhoff, 1986).  
 
While already individual decision making can be difficult, decision making becomes 
more demanding in complex systems where interdependent decision makers are 
responsible for overlapping portions of dynamic situations. If putting together the 
various perspectives of multiple decision makers, the notion of distributed decision 
making has been characterised and defined as any situation in which decision-making 
information is not shared completely by those with a role in shaping the decision 
(Fischhoff, 1986). A further characteristic of TOBT decision making is the spatial 
separation of decision makers, but only with a certain distribution of freedom to 
decision-making. Airlines’ control rooms provide a set-up to centralise TOBT decision 
making. However, it is still a form of decision making asking for future elaboration, 
because it has not yet been analysed how decision making at the various locations 
versus centralizing decision making has affected the outcome of the overall TOBT 
decision.  
Common data sets are established among airport partners when introducing A-CDM. 
Such data sets include also process updates at the various milestones aiming at 
increasing the common situational awareness among partners and creating an overall 
picture of the situation. However, it has also never been analysed what parts of the 
overall picture is actually required by the individual decision maker at the various 
locations of airport in order to create a situational awareness that he/she requires for 
making his/her decision: do all partners really need to have the same overall picture or 
is it even better if each partner only possesses the information about the parts of the 
picture that he/she requires for making the decisions or is necessary for managing 
his/her own resources? Such considerations should also investigate what 
communication/interaction links are required so that the information can be best shared 
among actors.   
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It is also argued that distributed decision-makers should have a picture of the other 
participating actors’ aims and intentions in the relevant situation, because this picture 
will shape their situational awareness and communication behaviour and thereby affect 
the outcome of the decision making.  
Complications increase even further with the number of individuals involved during 
turn-round management. This again calls for analysis of behavioural significant patterns 
about how the individual actors understand and manipulate their environment. This 
should be considered when designing an Intelligent Decision Support System.    
3.2.9 Single versus Multiple Decision Makers 
When centralizing turn-round decision making into a single-person decision making 
process, the risk of cognitive or personal biases increases because of the difficulties like 
those mentioned above. According to Fischhoff (1986), complications can arise through 
uncertainty factors like misperception or overconfidence in decision makers’ 
knowledge. In dynamic situations, undue adherence to favoured hypotheses or potential 
solutions can also be causes for poor decision making. When comparing these issues 
with those arising from multi-person decision making, observable arguments in favour 
of individual decision making include the multiple goals of participating individuals that 
have to be managed and the more views that have to be heard. Nevertheless, any 
participating actor’s experiences could significantly influence both, the affected process, 
as well as the overall turn-round process and should therefore be taken into account by 
decision makers. 
A further aspect which should be mentioned in multi-person decision making 
situations is reliability whereby the source of failure can be external (e.g. disruption or 
equipment failure) or internal (e.g. disinterest or desire for autonomy).  
The volume of information can have a double-sided effect: while too much 
information can create an overload condition with the risk of not being able to handle 
the situation anymore, a suitable amount creates situational awareness. Information 
volume also has an impact on the required communication for information exchange: if 
communication lines are not linked appropriately, it can become impossible to manage 
the coordination of information. 
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3.2.10 The Notion of Distributed Decision Making 
Based on the identified characteristics of such multi-person decision making, the 
approach used for TOBT decisions requires modelling decision making situations with 
clear sharing of responsibilities and either centralized or decentralized ways of 
communicating the information and mechanisms to ensure the highest extent of 
reliability possible. For decision making in such an environment, the notion of 
Distributed Decision Making is used as a relatively new terminology in order to account 
for the changes in multi-person decision making that are possible through advances in 
technology. Such technology includes expert systems or computerized decision aids 
which not only increase the distance over which individuals share data, information or 
instructions, but also the amount and the automation of such exchanges. Fischhof 
(1986) proposes a number of design guidelines, if an approach to distributed decision 
making is used:  
• The reality of all participating decision makers at each node should be regarded 
for the design (e.g. if designers are unfamiliar with the operation, they must first 
learn about it). 
• Many group problems may be variants of individual problems. 
• Problems attributed to technology are not necessarily caused by their novelty. 
•  Distributed Decision Making design requires detailed empirical work achieved 
by resisting simplistic design philosophies. 
Nevertheless, approaches to implement such guidelines apparently failed when used 
to design decision support for complex technical systems (National Research Council, 
1983; Perrow, 1999; Rasmussen and Rouse, 1981). Therefore, Fischhof et al. (1986) 
propose describing such problems, to devising possible countermeasures, and validating 
these through empirical tests. He identifies possible remedies like: making contingency 
plans more realistic, generating options for novel decision-making situations, improving 
accessibility of information via computerized databases, structuring judgmental tasks to 
make better use of people’s mental capabilities, and formulating policies that will be 
meaningful in varied circumstances. 
Today, Distributed Decision Making (DDM) provides a framework within the 
Distributed Cognition Theory (see Appendix V) to study automated supervision systems 
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in interaction with humans in complex networks (Rasmussen et al, 1990). It analyses the 
segregation and subsequent coordination of a complex decision problem. Such a 
problem may consist of one or more decision makers who may possess individual 
information.  The DDM approach can be applied to a wide range of complex decision 
making problems; the focus here however is on problems of coordinating complex 
decision models for turn-round situations with multiple distributed decision makers 
having a synchronous or an asynchronous state of information. Whereby, during a 
synchronous state of information as all decision makers are having the same 
information at the same time available for decision making opposite to an asynchronous 
state where decision makers do not have the same information available.  Such 
situations often illustrate problems with the hierarchical structures of decision making.  
Physical separation of decision makers owning individual information critical for the 
affected turn-round process is a possessing problem facing decision makers during turn-
round management. While various means exist to bridge this problem, the cognitive 
phenomena also have to be considered when designing interactions (Wellens, 1988; 
Daft and Lengel, 1984; Short, Williams and Christie, 1976) as well as the influence on 
problem solving and team performance when manipulating the communication structure 
(Leavitt, 1951; Shaw, 1964).  
 
 
FIGURE 8: DISTRIBUTED DECISION MAKING MODEL (SOURCE: WELLENS ET AL, 1988) 
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3.2.11 Distributed Decision Making during the Turn-round Process 
Despite the tendency to centralise decision making for TOBT decision to a single 
turn-round controller who monitors the turn-round in a control room using different data 
sources and interaction tools, the responsibility for the individual turn-round processes 
remains within a number of airport partners including the various service providers, 
ground handlers, airport operator, airline representatives, and participating actors. But 
not only the decision maker, also the information, authorities, and resources are 
physically distributed. Consequently, coordinating and making decisions suitable for 
TOBT accuracy as an overall process outcome and that serve the interests of all 
participants is fundamentally problematic. This reveals the underlying trade-off between 
controlling the individuals involved and the need to let them respond to their own 
demands. Other problems caused by such environments is the difficulty in creating an 
overall objective that is meaningful in the diverse or unanticipated turn-round situations 
and in creating an incentive system that motivates everyone participating.   
Hence, turn-round management shows distinct characteristics of distributed decision 
making among airport partners and actors with diverse interests. The theoretical concept 
of Distributed Decision Making (DDM) is therefore used in order to model the A-CDM 
approach. DDM comprises numerous areas as part of different disciplines like 
operations research, computer science, organisational theory, psychology, sociology, 
and others. Research in human factors disciplines aims at anticipating and 
understanding such decision making in order to shape the design of the organisations 
and technologies involved. This means that skills from different contributing 
professions include psychology, industrial engineering, physical anthropology, applied 
mathematics, training, and sociology. Consequently, each problem requires from all of 
these areas expertise contributing to human factors. Collaboration among specialist 
experts from participating domains has to be established in order to analyse the 
environment where collaboration takes place. Despite existing differences between 
different systems or domains, they all have similar functions and challenges that make it 
possible to identify commonalities. These can be e.g. process coordination, allocation of 
resources, or responsibility and control.  
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Distributed Decision Making research has already been applied in areas like military 
command and control (Warner et al, 2002), fire fighting, and the development of shared 
software.  
Schneeweiss (1999) provides a quantitative decision analysis approach to DDM for 
application to supply chain management, service operations, and managerial accounting. 
He describes three properties of distributed decision making systems like anticipation as 
the ‘base-level’s bottom-up influence on the top-level, instruction as the top-level’s 
decision, and reaction as the base-level’s reaction to the instruction. Reaction can be 
either a communication or negotiation process.  
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3.3 Cognitive Engineering  
3.3.1 Introduction  
Cognitive Engineering arose during the 1980s caused by the increased complexities 
and challenges faced by human operators, as computer technologies became ubiquitous 
in the workplace and changed the nature of work (Woods, 1987). Cognitive Engineering 
offers a principled approach to the design and development of human centred systems 
(Pfautz and Roth, 2006). Researchers in cognitive engineering have addressed problems 
like the decision making and problem solving support via computer systems in domains 
like military systems, aviation, manufacturing, process control, and medicine. 
Fundamental to the research is the emphasis on an interacting triad of humans, the 
system to be acted upon, and the manner in which the humans view and control the 
system (Woods, 1987; Woods and Roth, 1988). Thereby, the inherent goal of the 
interaction design is a mediation that augments rather than limits humans’ view and 
control of humans within the system (Bisantz, 2006).  
Cognitive engineering is also an interdisciplinary approach to designing computerized 
systems intended to support human performance (Roth et al, 2008). It is concerned with 
the analysis, design, and evaluation of complex socio-technical systems (Andriole and 
Adelman, 1995, Rasmussen et al., 1994, Woods and Roth, 1988, and Vicente, 2003). The 
methods of cognitive engineering consider workers and the tasks they perform as the 
central drivers for system design and provide a framework of how people perform 
cognitive work.  
Bonaceto and Burns (2003) describe a number of cognitive engineering methods for 
system design and/or system evaluation, and group them into categories according to 
their intended purpose. Each method can be organized into one of five primary 
categories: (1) describing cognitive/behavioural processes, (2) modelling/simulating 
cognitive processes, (3) modelling/ simulating behavioural processes, (4) modelling 
erroneous actions, and (5) modelling human-machine systems. While some methods 
overlap multiple categories, each method is assigned to a "primary" category (Figure 9). 
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FIGURE 9: COGNITIVE ENGINEERING METHODS (SOURCE: BONACETO AND BURNS, 2003) 
 
Cognitive analysis also needs to satisfy a number of analytical aspects, if design 
information for innovative decision support is required (Potter, 2006). He mentions 
criteria like:   
• Cognitive analysis must be far more than knowledge elicitation. 
• Cognitive analysis must capture the fundamentals of the work domain and 
resulting decision making. 
• Cognitive analysis must systematically transform knowledge elicitation into a set 
of complementary analytic artefacts.  
• Cognitive analysis must serve as the basis for innovative decision support system 
design concepts. 
    Viewing the A-CDM implementation concept however reveals that so far focus has 
been placed on the organisational aspects. While such an approach is useful for the study 
of how the processes of information exchange and interactions with airports partners 
should look, it is argued that the confinement of cognitive aspects in these attempts could 
fundamentally contribute to turn-round problem solving: Given the fact that many work 
activities are inherently cognitive, e.g. decision makers have to process information, 
solve problems, predict TOBT, and make decisions, it is also argued that an 
understanding is required of how work activities are performed at current level of A-
CDM implementation in order to design information systems that can support both 
cognitive activities and social interactions. Therefore, a cognitive analysis and 
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engineering approach is proposed for the analysis of the A-CDM turn-round concept, 
because such an approach comprises a variety of methods to describe, model, and 
simulate cognitive and behavioural processes for the design of human-machine systems.  
3.3.2 Selection of a Cognitive Engineering Method 
In order to find the most suitable method for the objectives of this study, the range of 
factors that should be considered when choosing an engineering method as proposed by 
Stanton (Stanton et al, 2006) was evaluated. These include:  
• the accuracy of the method; 
• the criteria to be evaluated, such as time, errors, communications, movement, 
usability, etc; 
•  the acceptability and appropriateness of the methods to the people being 
analysed; 
• the domain context; 
• the resources available; and 
• the cost-benefit of the method. 
The selection of the method applied was also based on the factors proposed by Annett 
and Stanton (2000) that included:  
• How deep should the analysis be? 
• Which methods of data collection should be used? 
• How should the analysis be presented? 
• Where is the use of the method appropriate? 
• How much time/effort does each method require? 
• How much, and what type of expertise is needed to use the method(s)? 
• What tools are there to support the use of the method(s)? 
• How reliable and valid is/are the method(s)? 
The engineering methods that were assessed for the analysis comprised of 11 
categories and included  
• data collection techniques; 
• task analysis techniques; 
• cognitive task analysis techniques;  
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• charting techniques; 
• human error identification techniques;  
• mental workload assessment techniques;  
• situation awareness measuring techniques; 
• interface analysis techniques; 
• design techniques; 
• performance time prediction/assessment techniques; and  
• team performance analysis techniques. 
The main aim during the selection was to find a method that is useful in providing a 
valid and reliable output. Thereby, a main selection criterion was the usage of the gained 
knowledge: while e.g. psychologists need to get a better understanding of the cognitive 
functioning, the usage for the research project however had practical objectives. The 
findings should contribute to provide intelligent decision support and countermeasures 
for inaccurate TOBT predictions.  Therefore, each method was assessed against the 
characteristics inherent in the A-CDM work system and the possible output of the 
analysis applied. A process model proposed by Stanton (Stanton et al., 2006) was used as 
a strategy for deciding what methods to use in, and how to adapt to the domain context 
(Figure 10). Annett et al. (2000) points out that care and skill is required in developing 
an approach for analysing the problem, formulating the intervention, implementing the 
intervention, and determining the success of the intervention.  
 
 
FIGURE 10: VALIDATING THE METHODS SELECTION (SOURCE: STANTON, 2006) 
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Hence, a method from the category Human-Machine System was used for the analysis 
of the A-CDM work system. Such a method considers how the entire system, consisting 
of all the machines and all the humans, is supposed to work as a whole in order to 
accomplish the overall system goal. In contrast, more traditional human factors 
approaches are primarily focused on determining what role individual human operators 
in the system will play (system-oriented methods).   
From the category Human-Machine Systems, cognitively oriented methods such as 
the Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) focus on the fundamental characteristics of the 
work domain and the cognitive demands that are imposed on humans operating in those 
domains. These methods complement the Cognitive Task Analysis and Knowledge 
Elicitation methods by mapping out the structure and purpose of the domain, allowing 
analysts to identify which cognitive strategies arise from actual domain demands and 
which are workarounds due to poorly designed systems (Bonaceto and Burns, 2003). 
The CWA was therefore chosen as an overall framework and provided a conceptual 
structure for gathering, analysing, and structuring the required system knowledge and 
system functionality. Figure 11 shows the conceptual structure that was used as the basis 
for the analysis during the project: 
 
FIGURE 11: APPLIED CONCEPT FOR THE PURSUED ANALYSIS (SOURCE: POTTER, 2006) 
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The analysis of A-CDM turn-round process was thus performed at a whole-system 
level. The focus thereby is not the role of the individual operator within A-CDM, but the 
fundamental characteristics of the A-CDM work domain and the cognitive demands that 
are imposed on humans operating within the system.  
3.4 Cognitive Work Analysis 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) is a framework that emerged as a principal 
conceptual and methodological tool in the approach to cognitive engineering and uses 
the distributed cognition as its underlying theory. While the primary aim of Chapter 3.4 
is to introduce the CWA, the distributed cognition concept is outlined in Appendix V.  
CWA is a systems-based approach to the analysis, design, and evaluation of human-
computer interactive systems that unifies psychological and technical considerations, 
cognition and the environment where cognition takes place. While traditional human-
computer interaction and system design models are not able to adequately assess user 
needs or to design efficient computer-based information support systems, modelling 
concepts from engineering, psychology, cognitive science, information science, 
computer science, and cognitive systems engineering are taken together and aimed at 
providing a much broader and dynamic framework for analysis. CWA has recently 
grown in popularity for application in various domains, e.g. for the conceptual and 
empirical work of Vicente and Benda at University of Toronto, Lintern and Sanderson at 
the University of Illinois, Higgins, Watson, Skilton, and Camerion at the Swinburne 
Computer-Human Interaction Laboratory, and Lintern and Naikar at the Aeronautical 
and Maritime Research Laboratory at Fishermens Bend, and Stanton at the University of 
Southampton.   
Using from the problems faced in nuclear power plant control in the 1970’s as a 
backdrop, Rasmussen (1986) developed the analytical framework of a Cognitive Work 
Analysis (CWA) at the Risø National Laboratory in Denmark in order to facilitate a 
human-centered design of technologies that people use in their work.  
CWA is able to provide the basis for the design of decision support systems in 
complex socio-technical environments, which is essential for the design of information 
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systems. The rapid development of all types of technologies causes an increasing number 
of recorded failures, because these technologies were not designed to fit the work 
practices of their users.  
 
FIGURE 12: THE LAYERS OF A COMPLEX SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEM (SOURCE: RASMUSSEN, 1996) 
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Issues showing the relevance of CWA towards A-CDM include the fact that the 
courses of events in the A-CDM work system can often not be anticipated, e.g. aircraft 
arrival delays, technical failures requiring flight cancellations, etc. This means that 
interfaces must be designed to support the adaptive and flexible behaviour of 
participating workers. Another issue is the technology used during A-CDM. New 
developments like turn-round monitoring control rooms should allow a radically new 
approach to the way how the turn-round is managed. However, designers still fail to take 
the advantages of new opportunities into account, because they are caught in an 
evolutionary task-artefact cycle in which existing work practices are allowed to 
constrain the options for new designs (Naikar, 2002). Moreover, the fundamental 
constraints in the workplace of all participating during A-CDM have not yet been 
analysed; so far, focus has only been applied to the human cognitive system instead of 
the complex socio-technical system. 
3.4.2 Cognitive Work Analysis and Information Science 
According to Fidel et al. (2004), the CWA is useful for the study of human-
information interactions and the design of information systems because: 
• CWA provides a holistic approach that allows accounting for several dimensions 
simultaneously. 
• CWA is able to facilitate an in-depth examination of the various dimensions of a 
context. A study of a particular context is, therefore, an interdisciplinary 
investigation aimed at understanding the interaction between people and 
information in the work context. 
• CWA provides a structure for the analysis of human-information interaction, 
rather than subscribing to specific theories or models. It is possible to employ a 
variety of conceptual constructs or tools that may be useful for the analysis of the 
specific situation.  
Using this framework in Information Science, CWA first evaluates the system already 
in place, and then develops recommendations for design. As such, the evaluation is based 
on the analysis of information behaviour in context (Fidel et al., 2004). For the design of 
a system, it is necessary to understand the work actors do, their information behaviour, 
the context of their work, and the reasons for their actions. 
 Chapter 3: Human Decision Making and Decision Support 
 
          Matthias Groppe                Influences on Aircraft TOBT Prediction Accuracy                    76                 
As a conceptual framework, CWA allows for analysis of the forces that shape human-
information interactions via the application of conceptual constructs rather than the 
testing and verification of models and theories (Fidel et al, 2004). It is work-centred 
rather than user-centred and considers people who interact with information as actors 
involved in their work-related actions, rather than as users of the system.  
 
FIGURE 13: THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CWA (SOURCE: FIDEL ET AL, 2004) 
 
Figure 13 shows the dimensions of the CWA, where the different dimensions 
represent the constraints on information seeking. The analysis starts with the external 
environment of the work place and moves up to the individual resources and values of 
the actors. As such, each dimension creates the constraints for the one nested in the 
dimension under analysis.  
3.4.3 Research Related to A-CDM  
A. Research in Other Domains 
CWA has already been successfully applied to many other complex domains. The 
majority of studies on CWA have focused on its application to interface design (e.g. 
Burns, 2000; Burns, Bryant and Chalmers, 2000; Dinadis and Vicente, 1999; Gualtieri, 
Elm, Potter and Roth, 2001, Naikar, Hopcroft and Moylan, 2005).  
CWA has been applied to existing systems like, e.g. for process control (Vicente 
1999; Jamieson and Vicente, 1998), to design interfaces or to design teams (Gualtierir, 
Roth and Eggleston, 2000; Naikar, Pearce, Drumm and Sanderson, 2003), to evaluate 
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design proposals (Naikar and Sanderson, 2001); to analyze training needs (Naikar and 
Sanderson, 1999); and to develop specifications (Leveson, 2000).  
The relevance of Cognitive Work analysis for aviation was lined out in a special issue 
of the ‘International Journal of Aviation Psychology’ (Volume 9, Number 3). In 
particular, relevance was demonstrated in the complex information system exemplified 
by modern aircraft cockpits (Lintern, 1999).   
Naikar (2006) emphasizes the applicability of CWA to applications other than 
interface design. These applications include the use of WDA to identify training needs 
and training system requirements, to evaluate alternative system design proposals, to 
develop team designs, and finally to identify training strategies for managing human 
error. Often organisations assume that simply purchasing expensive training devices will 
reduce training costs, increase levels of skill in the workforce, and reduce the risk of 
accidents on the job. For Lintern and Naikar (2002) however, limited attention has been 
placed on the systematic specification of training-system requirements and training 
needs. 
Lintern et al (2002) proposed WDA for the development of a virtual information-
action workspace that is able to organize information for effective actions. Such a tool 
requires an understanding of the information everyone needs for their jobs with this 
information presented in a desirable form of abstraction, suitably organized, and 
including the modes required for acting on it. For instance, vessel command and control 
has numerous information support requirements: Burns et al. (2000) presents an iteration 
of WDA models based on these information requirements for application to decision 
support of the vessel command and control system.  
Ahlstrom (2005) also used WDA for an aviation related problem that results from 
weather displays used by air traffic controllers. Adverse weather conditions create safety 
hazards for pilots, constrain the usable airspace for air traffic control, and reduce the 
overall capacity of traffic. However, it is currently unclear what weather information 
would be beneficial for tactical operation (Ahlstrom, 2005). For this reason, he applied a 
WDA for the assessment of weather information needs for terminal controllers.  
Reising et al. (2002) extended Rasmussen’s abstraction hierarchy to describe where 
sensors should be placed in a system if reliable higher-level information about the 
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system, e.g. for display design, is to be derived, while Watson et al. (1998) evaluated 
human interactions with anaesthesia alarm systems. 
B. Research in Domains Having Characteristics of the A-CDM Work System 
Fidel et al. (2004) used CWA during field studies for the design development of a 
new collaborative work task that did not yet exist. The challenge of this study was to 
determine the constraints and possibilities for collaboration among actors in different 
organisations over different countries. The new task is about work with censorship 
documents that has never been conducted as a collaborative task, with neither national 
nor international censorship material available in one central location. A-CDM also 
requires collaboration among different organisations within different countries. 
Therefore, Figure 14 provides an overview of the methods used for this analysis which 
might also be useful also when analysing the A-CDM work system. 
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FIGURE 14: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES FOR A CWA (SOURCE: FIDEL ET AL, 2004) 
 
 
Another approach to CWA constitutes the application to Manufacturing Scheduling as 
proposed by Higgins (1998). The study explores the problems that arise with an 
intentional system rather than a system with physical constraints. Higgins points out 
limitations in using the Decision Ladders because of the difficulties to integrate the sub-
goals towards the systems’ desired goal state. This characteristic phenomenon is 
comparable with the A-CDM system, because A-CDM also includes predominantly 
intentional constraints inherent at the participating actors. Therefore, his approach of 
integrating a goal theoretic approach from Hacker et al. (1982) could also be useful also 
for A-CDM system analysis.   
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3.4.4 The Work Domain Analysis 
Primary focus of a Cognitive Work Analysis is originally on the work domain. The 
first phase of the analysis identifies a fundamental set of constraints imposed on the 
actions of any actor, and develops an event-independent representation that can be used 
to cope with novel situations. However, a clear distinction between the different types of 
hierarchical relations within the work system is necessary for a proper Work Domain 
Analysis (WDA) (Vicente, 1999). The decomposition (part-whole) hierarchy and an 
abstraction (means-end) hierarchy together form a two-dimensional Abstraction-
Decomposition Space (ADS) that is able to show the generic properties of a complex 
system. While the bottom two layers of the abstraction represent the physical context in 
which the workers operate, they describe the functional capabilities and limitations of 
physical objects. The ADS is independent of specific devices, events, or workers, and is 
valid for many different situations including unanticipated events. This adds unique 
value for understanding the system, and the ADS is used here as a modelling tool to 
develop a schematic representation of the A-CDM domain. The important feature of the 
ADS is the way it provides a representation of the complex system and also how it 
provides a basis for identifying the information actors need, in order to deal with 
unanticipated events.    
Problem solving using the ADS can be carried out via the identification of constraints 
by starting at a high level of abstraction and then deciding which lower level function is 
relevant to the current situation. This iterative “zoom-in” supports goal-oriented problem 
solving through “why, what, or how” questioning. For example, the present level of 
observation defines the what level, while the level above specifies why or the level below 
how.  
However, the greatest value of this framework can be derived from its ability to 
identify information needs that are required to cope with unanticipated events. Although 
some researchers argue that it is not possible to identify such information (Mitchell, 
1996; Shepherd, 1993), Rasmussen (1974) disagrees by laying out the rationale of 
complex systems control requirements imposed by unanticipated events. This leads to 
the design requirements of information representation for actors’ needs during such 
events.    
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mentions also that some traditional techniques do not separate the question of what 
needs to be done from those of how it is done or by whom. Furthermore, while 
traditional methods only allow information processing via a linear sequence, studies 
have shown that experts rarely follow such a linear sequence. Rather, they can develop 
routines based on experience or training that can be linked in different ways in order to 
tackle diverse situations. 
The methodological guidelines developed for the CTA by Naikar et al (Naikar, 
Moylan and Pearce, 2006) consolidate the approaches of Rasmussen and Vicente 
(Vicente, 1999). The guidelines outlined by Vicente (1999) include the decision ladder 
(Rasmussen, 1974) as the most commonly used modelling template for this stage of 
analysis. However, a number of critical aspects were identified that revealed problems 
in the application of the decision ladder to the A-CDM turn-round system (see 
Appendix VI). Therefore, the CTA was confined to identify the contextual activities that 
are relevant for the critical path of the turn-round.  
B. Method 
The CTA decomposes turn-round activities into a set of recurring work situations to 
deal with and/or a set of work functions to perform (Naikar, 2006). Activities are 
characterized as a combination of recurring work situations and work functions within 
their contextual relationships. Therefore, Naikar (2006) introduces contextual activity 
templates for representing activities in work systems that are characterized by work 
situations and work functions. The work situations are shown along the horizontal axis 
and the work functions are along the vertical axis in     below. The circles indicate the 
work functions and the boxes around each circle indicate all of the work situations in 
which a work function can occur (as opposed to must occur). The bars within each box 
indicate those work situations in which a work function will typically occur. The work 
situations and work functions of the turn-round process can occur combined in various 
ways and as such, impose qualitatively different sets of cognitive demands on actors.  
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A-CDM TURN-
ROUND PATH 
Work  
Situation 1 
Work 
Situation 2 
Work  
Situation 3 
Work 
Situation 4 
Work Function A     
Work Function B     
Work Function C     
Work Function D     
Work Function E     
Work Function F     
 
   FIGURE 16: THE CONTEXTUAL ACTIVITY TEMPLATE (SOURCE: NAIKAR, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 16 depicts the template as it was applied to the turn-round work functions. 
Discussions with subject matter experts were used to identify which functions cannot be 
executed in parallel, but have to be done in a sequence, because they depend on each 
other. During turn-round, these functions are especially critical, because any failure 
during one work function has consequences on the following functions. The contextual 
activity approach was used to summarise the underlying control tasks within each 
process of the critical turn-round path.   
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4 COGNITIVE WORK ANALYSIS ON A-CDM  
4.1 Application and Limitations of the Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) 
The Cognitive Work Analysis will be used in the following sections as an integrated 
framework to the A-CDM work system with focus on turn-round management. Originally 
the CWA steps include (1) the Work Domain Analysis WDA, (2) the Control Task 
Analysis, (3) the Strategies Analysis, (4) the Social Organisation and Cooperation 
Analysis, and (5) the Worker Competencies Analysis.  
The first stage of the CWA allowed for modelling the A-CDM work system with 
different levels of abstractions showing the mean-end relations, deriving domain 
constraints, as well as revealing operational information requirements. The following 
steps of the CWA however revealed to have some critical aspects. Therefore it was not 
expected to gain knowledge from these steps as defined within the project aims, because 
of the limitations inherent in the modelling templates that are proposed by the CWA. 
Nevertheless, the CWA framework itself remained useful for providing a conceptual 
model and so only the first two steps of the CWA were applied here. The limitations and 
shortcomings of the omitted steps are outlined in Appendix VI.     
4.2 Aims and Objectives of the Analysis  
The aim of the CWA was to identify constraints that can then be used as conceptual 
distinctions for the A-CDM work system and then be linked to particular types of systems 
design decisions (e.g. which milestones are required, who should participate in decision 
making, etc.). However, this study focused solely on identifying the conceptual 
distinctions related to TOBT decisions in order to tackle the particular problems relevant 
for TOBT decision making. Many other conceptual distinctions could potentially 
contribute to improving the A-CDM work system; however, this was not the intention of 
the project here.  
As a result of this study a representation of design requirements should be created that 
is based on the existing physical A-CDM workspace of an Airline Control Centre This 
should be able to present design concepts and information processing requirements. 
Finally, a prototype or storyboard of an A-CDM decision making environement that is 
suitable to make more accurate TOBT predictions should be made.  
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4.3 Work Domain Analysis    
This first phase of the Cognitive Work Analysis, called Work Domain Analysis (WDA) 
was aimed at finding the fundamental environmental constraints that are imposed on the 
A-CDM turn-round as well as the actions for all participating that are required during turn-
round. As a result, an event-independent representation of the A-CDM turn-round work 
system was described that was used to deduct pilots’ information requirements. A further 
benefit of such turn-round representation is the possibility to identify opportunities of how 
to cope with unexpected turn-round situations.  
4.3.1 Method Applied  
Naikar et al. (2005) describes a step-by-step methodology for the WDA that was 
applied in order to capture the generic properties of the A-CDM system.  
Step 1: Establish the purpose of the WDA 
This first step involved defining the purpose of the analysis. It included two parts - 
defining the problem and defining how WDA will be used to address the problem (Naikar 
et al., 2005). During analysis, two main purposes were identified which are to determine 
the information requirements of all operators during turn-round necessary to maintain 
turn-round process predictability, and to identify the underlying airport infrastructure 
needed to support these requirements. The WDA was used to develop such a functional 
model of A-CDM system from the viewpoint of the flight crews. They should be able to 
identify the different categories of information which decision makers require during 
aircraft turn-round, and the airport infrastructure that might be required to support decision 
making during A-CDM.  
Step2: Identify Project Constraints  
Not only the purpose, but also the constraints that may affect how the WDA is 
conducted have to be identified in order to maintain the desired scope and focus of the 
analysis. The main constraints to this analysis emerged from complexity of the problem 
environment, time, and expertise related constraints. The scope of the analysis depended 
heavily on the information made available by participating stakeholders. 
Step 3: Determine the Boundaries of the WDA 
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The analysed work system of A-CDM can be defined as ‘the processes and information 
necessary to maintain situational awareness during turn-round in order to achieve a 
reliable TOBT’. During this step, the analysis was limited to the timeframe between 
milestones 6 and 15 and included the human-human or human-computer interactions 
related to operational information sharing of all information required to assign an accurate 
TOBT. The purpose of this artificial boundary was to keep the WDA in a useful and 
achievable scope. There are numerous elements outside the focus system which influence 
elements within the focus of the analysis, e.g. weather, legal requirements, but for practical 
considerations they will be excluded from the analysis.   
Step 4: Identify the Nature of Constraints  
According to Naikar (Naikar et al., 2005) it is necessary to identify the location of the 
focus system on the causal-intentional continuum, because the nature of the constraints 
that should be modelled in the Abstraction-Decomposition Space (ADS) has to be 
identified (Hajdukiewicz et al., 2004). Categories defined by Rasmussen (Burns, 2000) are 
used as a basis to determine the nature of the constraints of the proposed problem space. It 
was concluded that A-CDM has major attributes of a system governed by actors’ 
intentions and the nature of constraints modelled by the WDA are intentional constraints 
based on organisational policies, legislation, and other forms of regulation, social laws or 
conventions, and actors’ intentions or motives. This is in line with the defined purpose of 
the WDA. 
Step 5: Identify Potential Source of Information 
The potential sources of information have to be identified to construct an ADS (Naikar 
et al., 2005). A large number of data/ information sources were found that could inform 
the A-CDM system domain. This is due to the presence of numerous and diverse 
participating operators in this system encompassing the airport representatives, airline 
companies, flight crews, air traffic control, technicians, ramp agents, loaders, airport and 
ramp personnel, Central Flow Management Unit and passengers. Major information 
sources are documents relating to legislation and company policies, training manuals, 
airport infrastructure, company reports, and the A-CDM generic procedures.  
The work setting itself was used as the second source of information gathering, where 
observations of work scenarios were made with minimal interruptions to the observed 
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activities. The items observed include the tools and interactions that participants use. 
Hajdukiewicz et al. (2004) recommends distinguishing between exploratory observations 
for understanding the work environment, and focused observations concentrated on 
particular aspects of a chosen system that should be made. Initially only exploratory 
observations were made for this first stage of analysis.  
Focus group meetings, further observations, brainstorming, and interviews with pilots 
as SMEs also contributed to information gathering. Additional data was also gathered 
using talk-throughs, and tabletop analyses. For this phase of research, Rasmussen (1986) 
points out that the analyst should keep in mind that real constraints and actual reasons for 
behaviour are often hidden behind routines and rationalizations. Regardless of the source 
of information the analyser should stay aware of the constraints that shape the behaviour.  
Step 6: Construct ADS- First Iteration 
For a first iteration of the ADS, Naikar (Naikar et al., 2005) outlines the following five 
phases of development:   
• identification of work-domain properties; 
• defining the levels of abstraction and decomposition; 
• developing a sketch of the ADS; 
• evaluating which cells of the ADS to populate; and 
• populating the selected cells of the ADS. 
4.3.2 Results from the Work Domain Analysis 
As a first result of following Naikar’s step-by-step methodology, a matrix was 
developed which populates all cells based on the identified work-domain properties, 
levels of abstraction, and levels of decomposition (Figure 17). This matrix describes a 
conceptual view of the A-CDM system and offers a conceptual level of resolution for 
viewing the A-CDM work domain. The three cells at the purpose-related functions level 
of abstraction is that of the possible functions of the A-CDM system. The three cells offer 
different resolutions for viewing the functions of the A-CDM which are the functions of 
the whole A-CDM Decision Making system, the functions of the CDM Turn-Round 
Element, and the functions of the different components of A-CDM like the milestones, 
Airport-CDM Information Sharing Platform (ACISP), and A-CDM Partners (Figure 17). 
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The five cells in the first column describe the A-CDM work system with an abstraction 
hierarchy that is defined by ‘a structural means-ends relationship between levels’ 
(Rasmussen, 1986). According to Rasmussen (1986), five levels of constraints have been 
found to be useful for describing domains: At the functional purpose level of the analysed 
domain, the lower level of abstraction can be identified by asking ‘how’; while the higher 
level of abstraction has to be justified by asking ‘why’. At functional level the purpose of 
the A-CDM is described and the abstract functional level represents the intended causal 
structure of the A-CDM work system in terms of information it intends to provide to all 
airport partners. At generalised functional level the basic functions are described that A-
CDM is designed to achieve. The characteristics of the A-CDM components are 
described at physical function level, while the physical form level finally describes the 
spatial location of the components in the system.  
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 Total System  
Airport Collaborative 
Decision Making 
Sub-System  
CDM Turn-round Process 
Element 
Component 
   Milestones, ACISP, A-CDM 
Partners 
Functional 
Purpose 
Purposes 
■ Improve working  together at an 
operational level 
■ Efficient and safe daily flight 
operation with reliable information 
provision & Established Common 
Situational Awareness 
External Constraints 
■ Laws & Regulations by airport, 
national government, Europe, 
IATA, EUROCONTROL, ICAO 
■ Local Standard Operationg 
Procedures 
Purposes 
■ Provide the A-CDM partners 
with a common situational 
awareness 
■ Anticipation of disruptions & 
expeditious recovery through 
information sharing among all 
partners including passengers 
External constraints 
■ Distributed location between 
CDM partners and actors 
■ Laws & Regulations   
 
Purposes 
■ Milestones: To provide decision 
makers with information about 
flight progress and trigger 
decision making 
■ ACISP: To provide information 
sharing between the Airport CDM 
Partners 
■ A-CDM Partner Goals 
 
External Constraints 
■ No & design of Milestones, Alert 
Abstract 
Function 
 
Criteria 
■  ATTT 
■ Turn-round compliance    
(STTT vs ATTT) 
■ TOBT/TSAT Predictability 
■ EIBT Predictability: EIBT vs 
time 
■ Ready Reaction Time: AOBT - 
ARDT 
  
Criteria 
■ ATTT 
■ Turn-round compliance (STTT 
vs ATTT) 
■ TOBT/TSAT Predictability 
■ EIBT Predictability: EIBT 
    vs time 
■ Ready Reaction Time: AOBT – 
ARDT   
 
Milestones 
■ CDM Procedure Group 
Meetings 
■ Performance Assessments 
ACISP & A-CDM Partners 
■ User feedback & Performance 
Assessment 
  
Generalised 
Function 
 
■ Safe & efficient usage of 
available resources 
■ Effective law, regualation, 
procedure, and policy 
enforcement 
■ Redesign of airport operational 
procedures  
■ Implementation of CDM 
functions 
 
■ Safe & efficient turn-round & 
flight 
■ Adherence to CDM procedures 
■ Efficient implementation of 
collaborative decisions at action 
level 
■ Enforcement of laws, 
regulations, procedures 
 
Milestones 
■ Data/ Information availability & 
Practicability of Information  
 
ACISP & A-CDM Partners 
■ Physical dynamics of user 
behaviour 
 
Physical 
Function 
 
■ Provision of reliable 
information for all CDM partners 
■ Collaborative operational 
decision making 
■ Increasing Situational 
Awareness 
■ A-CDM Information Sharing 
Platform (ACISP) 
 
■ Efficient information provision 
& cooperation between operators 
& actors 
■ Distributed Situational 
Awareness at action level 
■ Efficient command & control 
structure between pretactical & 
action level of operation 
 
Milestones 
■ Functionality/capability/ 
limitations & status 
■ Inform all partners 
ACISP & A-CDM Partners 
■Functionalability/capability/ 
limitation 
■ Establish Situational Awareness 
 
Physical 
Form 
 
■ IT platforms with operational 
information sources, e.g. TOBT/ 
TSAT 
■ AMAN/DMAN 
■ Airport Operation Centre 
(APOC) 
■ Representative Decision 
Makers of all partners 
■ Meteorlogical features, e.g. 
adverse weather condition 
■ Printed Information/ Data 
about TOBT/TSAT 
■ Information Screens for 
passengers 
■ Airport Infrastructure & 
Airspace  Structure 
■ Alert Messages to all CDM 
partners via the ACISP 
■ Flight Update Messages 
(FUMs) 
■ Electronic Data/ Information 
■ Software Applications 
■ HMIs, e.g. ACARS, Telefon, 
computer 
■ Computer Network 
■ Operation Room 
■ Passengers 
■ Actors 
 
 
FIGURE 17: THE A-CDM CONCEPTUAL MATRIX
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Step 7: Construct ADS- Second Iteration 
For the second iteration of the ADS, additional information sources were used to 
further develop the ADS. Therefore, the following phases were repeated: 
• focused field observations; 
• walkthroughs and talk-throughs; 
• interviews; and 
• table-top analyses with SMEs. 
The resulting ADS (Figure 18) involved reviewing the ADS with domain experts 
who agreed on the various elements of the ADS model including the levels of 
abstraction and means-end relations in the ADS, the level of decomposition and part-
whole relations in the ADS, and the categories of constraints in each cell of the ADS. 
When moving from a higher to a lower level of abstraction or vice versa, it should be 
able to withstand a ’why’, respectively a ‘how’ question.  
 Total System  
Airport Collaborative 
Decision 
Sub-System  
CDM Turn-round 
Process Element 
Component 
   Milestones, ACISP, A-
CDM Partners 
Functional 
Purpose 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Function 
   
Generalise
d Function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Physical 
Function 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Physical 
Form 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 18: THE A-CDM ABSTRACTION-DECOMPOSITION SPACE  
 
Safe & Efficient 
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Satisfaction 
Safe & Efficient Usage of 
Resources/ Information 
Compliant 
Operator 
Behavior 
Effective 
Turn-Round 
Procedures 
WHY 
WHAT 
HOW 
Operators’ 
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Milestones’ 
Functionability 
& Limitations 
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There are different possibilities of using the ADS. While it can provide a field 
description of the analysed work domain that allows mapping the activities of all 
participating as trajectories (Vicente, 1999), it was used here to derive information 
requirements of flight crews.  
Step 8: Derive Flight Crews’ Information Requirements from the ADS (Conceptual 
Matrix) 
The next step was to draw implications from the ADS for possible information 
provision to flight crews and flight crews´ support for operational decision making 
during turn-round. These identified information requirements will later be mapped 
against results from a flight crew survey in order to confirm that the WDA is ‘on track’ 
and the ADS is valid.  
    Information requirements identified by the ADS include data that should be provided 
to flight crews for increasing situational awareness at the distributed location of the 
cockpit. Failing to present required data, presenting data in an inappropriate manner or 
presenting too much data can potentially have detrimental effects upon task 
performance (Salmon et al, 2006). These information requirements can then be used to 
inform the A-CDM design by specifying what data should be presented to the cockpit 
via available communication devices like ACARS, phone, or two-way radio. Salmon et 
al. (2006) has used the ADS to specify information requirements for a command and 
control knowledge wall display, or Ahlstrom (2005) used the ADS for determining the 
types of information that air traffic controllers require for effective performance during 
adverse weather conditions. Therefore it is argued that the ADS of the A-CDM system 
can also be used to identify different categories of information that flight crews require 
to support effective decision making during turn-round. 
Information requirements were extracted from the ADS of A-CDM as they relate to 
purpose related functions of flight crew information requirements (Figure 19).  
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FIGURE 19: PILOTS’ INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS  
 
The information requirements that were derived from the ADS were grouped in 
categories like information already available, not available, or partially available to 
flight crews during current A-CDM turn-round operation (Table 2) and include: 
 
 Total System  
Airport Collaborative 
Decision 
Sub-System  
CDM Turn-round Process 
Element 
Component 
   Milestones, ACISP, A-CDM 
Partners 
Functional 
Purpose 
■ A-CDM Information Sharing, e.g. 
TOBT, TSAT 
■ Common Situational Awareness 
  
■ A-CDM Information Sharing, e.g. 
TOBT, TSAT 
■ Common Situational Awareness 
 
■ Pilots`Goals 
■ Safety Level   
■ Airport Performance 
■ Aircraft Technical Status 
■ A-CDM Partner Goals 
Abstract 
Function 
 
■ ETTT 
■ Turn-round compliance of Actors 
involved 
■ TOBT/TSAT/TTOT/CTOT 
Creation 
■ EIBT Predictability: EIBT vs 
proposed waiting time 
■ Milestones 6 until milestone 15 
■ Not  time & time related data 
■ Aircraft operational statu 
■ Variable Taxi Time Calculation 
■ CDM Complicance Alarms 
 
■ Economic Cost of Planned/ 
Alternative Turn-Round 
■ Safety Level 
■ Performance and Status of  All 
Participating 
■ Aircraft Requirements & Status 
 
Generalised 
Function 
 
■ Airport Apron Rules & 
Regulations 
■ Warnings, e.g. airport policies & 
local restrictions 
■ Behavioral recommendations, e.g. 
taxi time required, 
 
■ TIBT & Stand Information 
■ Ground Handling Start Delay 
■ Runway in use 
■ EOBT/TOBT/CTOT Complicance 
alarms 
■ EXOT 
■ Physical turn-round control task 
support 
■ Cognitive turn-round control task 
support 
■ Turn-Round Complicance control  
Physical 
Function 
 
■ Operational Information Sharing 
with Cockpit 
■ CDM operating procedures 
■ Information Sharing among 
particpating actors 
■ A-CDM Information Sharing 
Platform (ACISP) 
 
■ Information about Changes of 
TIBT & Stand 
■ Information about Ground 
Handling Start Problems 
■ Information about Runway 
changes  
■ Information about 
EOBT/TOBT/CTOT changes 
■ Information about scheduled 
EXOT, if relevant 
■ Capability/ Knowledge Level of 
All Participating   
■ Availability of Resources 
■ Current task status in relation to 
goals 
 
Physical 
Form 
 
■ Access to ACISP from cockpit 
■ Provision of TOBT/TSAT/TTOT 
to cockpit 
■ Information about Passenger 
Boarding Time  
■ Environmental Condition 
Information  
■ Turn-Round disruptions 
■ Access to ACISP from cockpit 
■ Provision of TOBT/TSAT/TTOT 
to cockpit 
■ Information about Passenger 
Boarding Time  
■ Environmental Condition 
Information  
■ Turn-Round disruptions 
■ Current Component Performance 
& Status 
■ Current Airport & Aircraft 
Condition 
■ Other A-CDM users location & 
future movements 
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• A-CDM Information Sharing elements, e.g. Target Take-Off Time 
(TTOT), Estimated Taxi Out Time (EXOT); 
• A-CDM compliance alarms; 
• airport warnings and recommendations; 
• operational status information including disruptions and other actors’ 
goals; 
• participating actors’ performance, status, and knowledge level; and 
• availability of resources.   
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TABLE 2: PILOTS’ INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AS IDENTIFIED VIA ADS  
 
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 
 Information is available Information is provided 
 Yes No Partly Yes No Partly 
Information from ACISP   x     x   
TOBT/ TSAT x     x     
ETTT  x      x   
Turn-Round Compliance of other actors  x      x   
CTOT x     x     
TTOT  x      x   
Apron Rules and Regulations x     x     
Infrastructure related warnings          x 
Behavioural Recommendations   x     x   
Operational Information      x     x 
CDM Operating Procedures x     x     
Passenger Boarding Time  x      x   
Environmental Condition Information x     x     
Turn-Round Disruptions  x      x   
Time related Data, e.g. changes in Traffic Flow, Weather  x        x 
Aircraft Operational Status x     x     
Variable Taxi Time Calculation x      x   
CDM Compliance Alerts x      x   
Target In Block Time x      x   
 Stand Information x     x     
Ground Handling Start Delay  x      x   
Runway in Use x     x     
EOBT/TOBT/CTOT Compliance alarms     x   x   
EXOT  x      x   
Airport Performance     x   x   
Aircraft Technical Status  x    x     
A-CDM Partner Goals   x     x   
Economic Cost of planned/ alternative Turn-Round     x     x 
Performance and Status of all participating actors   x     x   
Aircraft Requirements and Status x     x     
Physical turn-round control task support     x     x 
Cognitive turn-round control task support   x     x   
Turn-Round Compliance control task support   x     x   
Capability/ Knowledge Level of all participating actors   x     x   
Available Resources, e.g. push-back, fuelling, catering, other s  x      x   
Current task status in relation to goals   x     x   
Current component performance and status  x      x   
Current airport and aircraft condition  x        x 
Other A-CDM users location and future movements  x      x   
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     During current approach to A-CDM, focus has not yet been applied on provision of 
such information to the flight crews or how it should be provided. It is argued however 
that availability of this information could potentially contribute to an improved 
distributed situational awareness and thereby also improving turn-round time prediction 
accuracy.      
Step 9: Derive Flight Crews’ Information Requirements from Survey 
A flight crew survey examined air crews’ information requirements during typical 
turn-round operation situations that entail the risk of jeopardizing flight punctuality 
because of problems with information sharing between aircraft cockpit and operational 
decision makers. Pilots were asked to report recent experiences on failures to share 
operational information and the consequences onto the turn-round process, e.g. delay 
encountered during service delivery.   
The survey was conducted on-line for a period of two months and pilots from 
different European airlines were invited to take part. 196 pilots who participated in the 
survey are from airlines such as Austrian (n=2), Air Berlin (n=16), Air France (n=9), 
Easy Jet (n=1), Lufthansa (n=167), and Transavia (n=1). 44.6% of the pilots were 
captains, 55.4% first officers. Average experience rates of 6.6 years as First Officer 
and 14.0 years as Captains were reported. The detailed questions that were asked to 
the cockpit crew members can be found in Appendix II. 
Although the pilots were asked to report events that they experienced, most of the 
pilots used the proposed events. Table 3 shows the turn-round situations that were 
provided to the pilots with the frequency of the reported situation in percentage.  
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TABLE 3: INFORMATION REQUIRED BY PILOTS  
 
Turn-round Situations with Flight Crew Information Requirement Situation Reported  in %  
ATC Request 99 
Availability of Parking Stand 95.1 
Aircraft Change 63.1 
Crew Proposal: Avoidance of A/C Change 47.5 
Baggage Loading/ Unloading Delay 47.1 
Crew Proposal: Necessary A/C repair 33.0 
Crew Duty Change (new duty roster) 18.4 
Boarding Delay 13.7 
Ramp Transfer Bus (Passenger or Crew) Delay 11.8 
Technical Repair 7.8 
VIP Boarding 5.9 
Crew Proposal: Connecting Passenger 5.8 
Crew Other Proposal 5.8 
Fuelling Delay 4.9 
Airport Facilities break down 4.9 
Other 3.9 
Wheelchair boarding 3.3 
Cleaning Delay 2.9 
Delay though Security 2.0 
Missing Flight Documents 2.0 
Crew Change (new crew member) 1.9 
Catering Delay 1.0 
Late Check-In Passengers 1.0 
Special Loading (e.g. musical instrument) 1.0 
UM Boarding 0.0 
 
4.3.3 Further Results derived from the ADS 
A significant number of constraints could be derived from the ADS for the A-CDM 
turn-round process when mapping physical forms of the turn-round components to the 
abstract functions or functional purpose of the A-CDM work system. As these 
constraints appear to have influence on the functional purpose of the work system, 
they should be taken into account when making conceptual distinctions to attain a 
more efficient A-CDM system design. The constraints identified were then discussed 
with A-CDM experts who also shared details for each of the constraints. These are:    
 
Number of participants involved: Airlines are increasingly outsourcing ground 
handling services to third party providers who are often new to the aviation business. 
This requires an identification of third party operators’ inherent goals, motivations, 
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and skills because an adaption to the requirements and needs of the client airline and 
the network itself is mandatory. The airlines and the network also have to understand 
the constraints stemming from a multi-party turn-round process itself. Turn-round 
management requires focus on coordination of supporting turn-round processes 
between the different stages of the turn-round (See also Error! Reference source not 
found.). Particularly during the critical path of sequential ground processes where the 
associated processes cannot be done in parallel and often when a short turn-round time 
is only available cooperation among all partners responsible for controlling the 
supporting processes during critical path is essential.  
Distributed location of partners: Short term coordination is required in the case of 
last-minute changes during turn-round, but service providers are usually physically 
located at different areas of the airport and communication has to be established via 
available channels. However, communication and coordination among parties is not 
standardized yet and coordination takes place on an ad hoc basis via the airline’s 
operation centre or at pilots’ initiatives through interactions with turn-round controller.  
Resistance to sharing information: Competition not only exists among airlines; 
interests among airport partners also not necessarily converge. As a result, some 
partners may withhold information required by others and individual aims are placed 
above possible network benefits - especially if e.g. third party provider is owned by 
competitor. Resistance to share information increases even due to the current practice 
of delay code assignment (See Chapter 2.4).    
Unanticipated events: Unanticipated events require efficient communication and 
coordination among partners involved. However, no procedures are established to 
forward short term turn-round process failures in a standardized format to partners and 
actors involved.  
Not-established situational awareness: During flight, the aircrew often hold 
operational information or information affecting the following turn-round. This 
information is needed by the turn-round controller at destination operation control 
centre in order to prepare the next turn-round on ground, but pilots do not 
automatically have awareness about the need to share this information. Such 
information can include various issues, like technical problems or passenger related 
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handling requirements occurring or emerging during flight.  On the other hand, turn-
round controllers fail to inform the aircrew of the status of turn-round and updates to 
turn-round process estimates. Often this is only a lack of awareness from the turn-
round controllers that the information is required by the pilots.  
Non-standardized acronyms and approaches to the CDM turn-round process at 
different airports: In order to achieve the required situational awareness between the 
airline cockpit and the turn-round controller standardized ways of information sharing 
and cooperation have to be established. EUROCONTROL has published a harmonized 
phraseology and acronyms for the A-CDM, but implementation of such harmonized 
procedures is still very fragmented in Europe. Airports, ANSP, airlines and ground 
handlers are still using different procedures and acronyms. Due to the large number of 
airports within Europe that are within the network of the major airlines, regional pilots 
are facing the challenge of familiarizing themselves with different airport procedures. 
As a consequence, awareness of the local turn-round procedures does not always exist. 
Introduction of new procedures like A-CDM is still greeted with scepticism by pilots 
because of frequent changes and the number of different approaches that airports and 
airlines have taken within the last years. In contrast, when A-CDM became operational 
at Munich airport in June 2007, the results of a study of 300 flight reports by pilots 
revealed increased acceptance of new CDM procedures already shortly after their 
introduction (Source: Lufthansa Internal Company Information, 2010).   
Traffic Density: Low-cost carriers do not avoid major airports only because of 
higher landing fees; they are fully aware of how reliable turn-round operation affects 
airline profitability through higher aircraft utilization and lower exposure to 
unexpected delays. Legacy carriers however, often depend on major airports for their 
hub-and spoke business models and have to build in buffer times into the flight 
schedules to accommodate unexpected disruptions and any consequent delays. Since 
airlines have more control over the turn-round phase than over the flight phase, the 
scheduled ground times for turn-rounds are often used as a tactical means to stabilise 
aircraft rotations or to prevent reactionary delay via time buffers. Fricke et al (2008) 
note that time buffers are not applied systematically yet and suggests an optimisation 
of buffer times by integrating inter-process time buffers during the gate allocation 
planning phase. Given the complex resource connection mechanism between aircraft, 
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passengers, and flight crews, not only the importance of such measure for airlines is 
realized during day-to-day flight operation, but also the cost that is inherent for such 
operations control.  
4.3.4 Validation of the ADS 
In order to make valid conclusions for the A-CDM work system a validation of the 
implicit constraints that were identified is required. This was done by mapping the 
various components on the ADS. Therefore, the results from an independent study 
were used to provide an early validation that the analysis is on track: 
Step 10: Validation of the ADS via Mapping the Survey Results on the ADS 
This step was aimed at determining whether the ADS is as accurate as possible. 
Naikar et al. (2005) proposes a number of possibilities for the validation of ADS. One 
possibility is to use the material already studied for the construction of the ADS-
however it is not necessarily useful to employ the same sources of information for 
validating the ADS.  
A better option is to use reasoning patterns of actors in various situations, e.g. 
incident reports that require decision making (Naikar et al., 2005). For this reason, the 
flight crew survey that was available from the second study was used in order to 
reconstruct inaccurate TOBT prediction situations as reported by the flight crews. 
Thereafter, the identified situations were examined for work-domain properties that 
characterized actors’ reasoning patterns during these turn-round situations and then 
mapped in the form of examples onto the Flight Crews’ Information Requirements 
(Table 1) extracted from the ADS. Thereby, it was examined whether the situations are 
captured by the different categories of constraints. Then it was analysed which parts of 
the decomposition space that are represented in the ADS, were involved. The relevant 
areas identified were highlighted in grey colour.  
It could be determined that the particular information gained from the Flight Crews’ 
survey followed the same functional relations as the ADS identified by the analysis. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows an example of the flight crew information 
requirement ‘Target In-Block Time and Stand Information’ before turn-round start. 
 Chapter 4: Cognitive Work Analysis 
 
          Matthias Groppe                Influences on Aircraft TOBT Prediction Accuracy                    100                 
 
FIGURE 20: MAPPING OF FLIGHT CREWS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS I   
 
 
In such way it could be demonstrated (Figure 20) that information sharing with 
flight crews at generalized function level can be tracked through all levels of the ADS. 
The low level details of information about the capability/knowledge level of all 
participating at the physical function level can be traced back to the overall purpose of 
A-CDM Information Sharing. The physical form of the identified components which 
reveals a need for the current component performance and status, can affect other CDM 
related processes in a dynamic way as shown by the other active highlighted areas of 
the ADS (grey colour). Therefore it is argued that sufficient situational awareness has 
to be established through information sharing among all partners or actors involved.   
Another instance of information not being shared was reported by flight crews 
regarding information updates by apron control. Because information about a runway 
change is not communicated to the flight crews, they require extra time for changing 
take-off performance calculations after clearance request and thereby run the risk of not 
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adhering to TOBT and TTOT. Additionally, runway changes at short notices can also 
significantly change taxi times with the added risk of missing the CTOT. Therefore, 
such change of runway configuration has to be communicated timely to all 
participating.  If the flight is regulated by a CTOT, the estimated taxi out time also has 
to be taken into consideration either by the flight crew or local ATC. Figure 21 shows 
the specific information requirements for such situations as identified from the survey 
mapped on the Flight crews’ Information Requirements extracted from the ADS.  
 
               FIGURE 21: MAPPING OF FLIGHT CREWS INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS II  
 
Figure 21 only shows flight crews’ information requirements.  A runway change that 
is not communicated also affects other A-CDM partners as well as it affects the 
environment.   
These two examples only give a snapshot of the overall information requirements 
from flight crews during A-CDM. The other proposed situations follow a similar 
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pattern throughout the ADS. However, it could be confirmed that the information 
requirements reported in the survey can be identified by using the ADS.  
4.4 Control Task Analysis  
4.4.1 Method Applied 
A representation of the turn-round activities was seen to be useful for turn-round 
management because activities during turn-round are not clearly delimited in time and 
space; instead, activities are better characterized by their content – regardless of their 
temporal or spatial attributes (Vicente, 1999). Therefore, the activities during turn-
round were decomposed into work functions such as passenger processing, aircraft 
dispatch, and monitoring activities, while the activities within a specific work situation 
were further delineated in terms of their functional content. For example, the turn-
round process was decomposed into a set of recurring work situations including: de-
boarding, boarding, unloading, loading and aircraft services. Activities within the 
work situation (i.e. boarding) were then further decomposed into a set of recurring 
work functions including: delivery of wheelchair passengers /unaccompanied minors 
to the cabin crew, open boarding doors, registering of boarded passengers, or loading 
the coach for the transfer to the aircraft at remote position. In this way, the control 
tasks for each work situation can be analysed in terms of when, by whom, and where 
the decision can be made.  
4.4.2 Results from Control Task Analysis  
The CTA was performed analogous to the consolidated approach described by 
Naikar et al. (2005). This approach includes two steps which are ‘identification of 
what needs to be done’ during critical turn-round in terms of work situations and work 
functions, and ‘identification of what needs to be done’ during critical turn-round in 
terms of control tasks for each work situation and work function. The contextual 
activity template (See Figure 16) was used to represent the results of the analysis. 
These steps are now described.  
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Result I: Identification of Work Situations and Work Functions 
The first task of the consolidated CTA was to examine the work segmentation 
within the critical turn-round path. This was done by using the two-dimensional 
activity templates during focus group discussions with participating stakeholders in 
order to identify the valid critical turn-round path that shows the interdependencies 
between the work functions.  Focus group discussions took place during three two-
hour sessions with 15 participants consisting of flight crews and responsible SMEs of 
the relevant turn-round function that are normally at distributed locations during turn-
round management.  
This approach was useful because the work organized during turn-round takes place 
at various stages and at various places.  However, particular functions need to be 
performed in a pre-defined sequence in order to adhere to the TOBT that was 
predicted for the off-block time of the aircraft. While other turn-round activities can be 
performed in parallel to the critical sequence (see also Chapter 2.5). Standard 
terminology that is predominantly used for turn-round management during A-CDM 
was applied to determine work situations. Three flight crews, three controllers, and 
one airport representative performed the activity analysis of the work function as 
representatives of the focus group. At an early stage, documented A-CDM turn–round 
procedures together with procedural descriptions from airlines like Lufthansa, Air 
France, and British Airways were used, updated from observation and validated using 
the stakeholders’ experience on critical turn-round management. Descriptions from A-
CDM documents contained the A-CDM turn-round process with the associated 
milestones as key monitoring events. Even with small variations that may be present at 
different airports, all stakeholders could agree on all work functions required for the 
critical turn-round path. All participating SMEs were asked questions like - ‘Are these 
all functions occurring during critical turn-round path’, ‘Is the critical turn-round path 
correct as shown’, ‘Are the responsibilities during critical turn-round correctly 
depicted’, ‘Are there other locations/potential to better depict the critical turn-round 
path’.  
The critical turn-round path thereby developed includes all processes potentially 
required; however, depending on the given situation, not all work functions will 
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necessarily take place during critical turn-round, e.g. crew change will not always take 
place or no catering on specific flights.  
The decomposition of work situations and work functions during turn-round can be 
done at different levels of detail and granularity. As it concerns the work situations, a 
level was chosen that contemplates only the work situations within the critical path 
that are located at the ramp side of the airport or that directly influence the critical path 
of turn-round. These processes have to follow the described sequence, but other 
processes are taking place in parallel in the airport terminal as well as at other 
locations of the airport. Passenger or cargo handling working situations and functions 
remained outside of the scope of this project.  
As a result of this analysis, the critical turn-round path can be depicted by using the 
contextual activity template (See Figure 22).  
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A-CDM TURN-
ROUND PATH 
DE-BOARDING TURN-ROUND 
SERVICES 
BOARDING CLOSING FLIGHT 
Park/ Marshalling     
Equipment     
Flight Documents     
DAA/ Baggage     
Bus/ Stairs/Bridge     
PAX De-boarding     
Special De-board     
Crew Change I     
Aircraft Cleaning     
Catering     
Fuelling     
A/C Maintenance     
Special Service     
Cabin Sec Check     
Crew Change II     
Special Board     
PAX Boarding     
Baggage Loading     
Load sheet     
Documentation     
Last PAX     
Closing Doors     
Remove Equip     
Start Up      
Push Back     
 
FIGURE 22: CONTEXTUAL ACTIVITY REPRESENTATION (NAIKAR, 2005 & SNELLING, 2002) 
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The boxes surrounding the work functions indicate all turn-round situations in which 
the work function can occur. The typical timing for the work function however, is 
indicated by the bars.  
Result II: The Responsibilities within the Critical Turn-round Path  
During the analysis of the critical turn-round path, the decisions that are required 
during these sequenced processes were also identified. Any decision within one of 
these supporting turn-round processes interacts with other supporting processes, 
especially during time-critical turn-round management.  
During the three focus group meetings between aircrews from the German Regional 
Carrier, Lufthansa CityLine and turn-round controllers from Lufthansa German 
Airlines Control Centre, the specific order of the critical events during turn-round 
were determined and consensus reached on the sequence and responsibility of the 
processes. As already mentioned, not all turn-round processes take place during each 
turn-round. However, the proposed path includes all eventual decision making 
processes that can occur during turn-round. Different airlines might have alternative 
turn-round process models, but it was argued that the constraints are similar and do not 
affect the concept. The structure of the focus group discussions was modelled on a 
series of questions to gradually move the participants from an operational perspective 
of the turn-round processes to the control tasks that were necessary to perform the 
functions of these processes. The questions which were used for the discussions were: 
• Does the proposed critical path include all turn-round processes as they appear 
during turn-round in the correct order? 
• Who is responsible for each process: a single actor or multiple functions? 
• Where is potential for improvement of the critical path? 
• Who could contribute in improving the efficiency of each process? 
• What are the major challenges and what are the problems associated with these 
processes?  
• What are the control functions for each process? 
In a second step, the results were analysed during table-top discussions (Kirwan 
and Ainsworth, 1992). Overall, it was agreed conclusively that the impact of a 
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decision by only a single participant can have significant influence on the outcome of 
the overall turn-round because the outcome of the decision propagates throughout 
other processes. Therefore, a way of decision making has to be pursued that is able to 
coordinate the distributed decisions of participating functions into global decision 
making where all information is centralized for such control. Many airlines today have 
started to coordinate decision making in their operation centres. Decisions that cannot 
be transferred into a control room have to be regarded for the overall TOBT decision.  
The discussions were also aimed at finding an agreement on who should be 
responsible for the work function. Today, distinctive functions are in place to either 
perform the work function or solve a specific problem during critical turn-round path. 
This means that control tasks for most of the work function are shared among actors 
executing the work functions and those monitoring the critical turn-round path. For 
instance, during normal turn-round flow the actor who executes the work function is 
decision maker. However, during unexpected situations, the actor monitoring the turn-
round will take over the responsibility of deciding on a new target state.   
As a result of the CTA, Figure 23 shows now the turn-round processes with the 
functions that are responsible for the necessary decisions within the processes. 
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Responsibilities within Critical Turn-round Path 
Airport Operator • Availability of parking position 
• Availability of marshaller/ docking system 
• Provision of Passenger coach/bridge 
• Push-back environment  
Airline/ Ground Handler • Provision of pre-arrival information to the air crew 
• Ground handling equipment (GPU, stairs, truck...), 
handling personnel 
• Flight documents for next flight sector 
• Delivery at Aircraft (luggage) 
• Stairs 
• Passenger & cabin baggage de-boarding 
• Special de-boarding (WCH, UM, Load) 
• Crew change  
• Aircraft cleaning/ catering/ fuelling 
• Special catering/ other services 
• Special boarding (WCH, UM, Load) 
• Passenger & cabin baggage boarding 
• Baggage, cargo, Delivery at Aircraft loading 
• Loadsheet, documentation, and last passenger  
• Closing all doors 
• Removal of equipment & personnel 
• Provision of push-back & ground crew for engine start 
 
Air Crew • Crew change (cockpit & cabin) 
• Information on aircraft status 
• Cabin security check 
• Closing passenger doors 
Mechanics • Scheduling of turn-round maintenance  
 
 
 
FIGURE 23: RESPONSIBILITIES  WITHIN THE CRITICAL TURN-ROUND PATH (SNELLING, 2002) 
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4.5. Concluding Aspects  
The CWA unveils a number of environmental factors that influence A-CDM turn-
round management. It allows for deriving domain constraints of the A-CDM work 
system and operational information requirements of airline flight crews by means of a 
Work Domain Analysis. The results could be verified by mapping the data from the 
flight crew survey (See Chapter 5) onto the pilots’ information requirements extracted 
from the ADS. The analysis also revealed that a large quantity of information is lacking 
during day-to-day operation. Provision of such information could potentially aid in 
stabilizing the turn-round operation. This encourages its further application in 
identifying information requirements of other participating actors.  
It cannot be claimed that the ADS is able to cover all system constraints, but 
evidence could be given that a significant amount of operational information required 
by flight crews is not yet provided to them.  
As an essential part of successful turn-round management, the critical turn-round 
path could be derived from the CTA by using the contextual activity template. At a 
later stage of this project, the results of this analysis were used to model the turn-round 
scenarios and the design of a turn-round control mock-up in order to further investigate 
the influences on TOBT prediction accuracy (see Chapter 7).  
Since the critical path is now defined, the next step of the project should analyse 
how the critical path is affected by turn-round events that hamper reliable TOBT 
predictions. The following chapter describes how such events were identified by a 
flight crew survey.    
 Chapter 5: Flight Crew Survey on Turn-Round Constraints  
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5 FLIGHT CREW SURVEY ON TURN-ROUND CONSTRAINTS 
5.1 Aims and Objectives of the Survey 
The aim of the survey was to identify and describe critical situations for TOBT 
adherence seen from the perspective of flight crews. The underlying objectives thereby 
were not only to demonstrate how frequently turn-round problems occur, but also to 
identify information requirements of flight crews and actors on the ground during such 
problems. Even though flight crews are not primarily realized as airport partners during 
A-CDM, information from the cockpit is used for TOBT assignment decisions.    
If the information from the flight crew and their information requirements were 
known earlier, the influences on TOBT could be assessed systematically. As a 
consequence, such information would be useful in gaining insights for future TOBT 
decision making - especially during unexpected situations. Such information also yields 
benefits for a more efficient decision making with less tactical and strategic effort for 
all partners.    
A further objective of the investigation was to gain information from flight crews 
about the relevance of various problems during ground handling processes. I.e. how do 
delayed ground services or late passengers affect the overall turn-round duration and 
consequently the TOBT, seen from the perspective of flight crews as users of the 
system. This also included capturing air crews’ views on cooperative/ non-cooperative 
behaviour during such situations. Analogous to the definition of cooperation (see VI: 
Definitions), cooperative behaviour is viewed here as the synchronous and 
homogeneous sharing of information required for operational decision making or for 
the creation of situational awareness required among participating actors.   
5.2 The Design of the Survey  
First, information about the critical events during the turn-round situations that are 
relevant for an interaction analysis between flight crews and other operators were 
obtained during in-depth interviews with experienced flight crews from different 
airlines. Airline flight crews were asked to brainstorm all possible turn-round 
situations by using a checklist in order to identify interactions during turn-round that 
are relevant for operational information sharing. All turn-round situations were then 
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decomposed into elementary activities to identify where the behaviour of all 
participating can potentially be cooperative, antagonistic or indifferent (see also 
Chapter 3.2).  
Next, a self-administered on-line questionnaire was developed with questions based 
on the interactions identified as outlined between flight crews and other operators, 
using the interaction model adapted from Ferber (1995) that is outlined in Chapter 
3.2.5. The aim thereby was to identify the status of the relevant components aims, 
abilities, and resources in the interactions during the turn-round that were reported to 
be critical. 
Compatibility and incompatibility of aims: Incompatible aims can negatively affect 
cooperation. Therefore critical activities during turn-round were assessed to discover 
conflicting goals between flight crews and other operators. Since decision making 
power can also be a reason for conflicting goals, flight crews were also asked to assess 
whether the currently used mode of sharing responsibility for decision making is 
suitable in the relevant situations. Questions were then asked, whether the decision 
maker is accepted by the flight crews in term of responsibility and control or if 
decision making causes problems because the decision maker is seen as inappropriate. 
Availability of resources: Resources are limited; therefore conflicts can arise 
between all participating partners, if airport congestion increases or turn-round times 
are getting shorter. Shortage of resources may result in competition between operators. 
Questions were asked if resources - in terms of the time available for ground processes 
- are aligned with the operational requirements. An essential part of a CDM airport 
operation is to manage resource constraints through coordination of actions. Such an 
approach can be also beneficial in predicting conflicts (Ferber, 1995). Therefore, the 
survey also investigated how the current CDM approach is able to anticipate conflicts 
in order to resolve possible conflicting situations between flight crews and other 
operators. Conflicts should so be identified and quantified by occurrence and 
probability.  
Ability of operators in relation to their assigned task: It cannot be assumed that 
operators’ knowledge and abilities are always sufficient to execute assigned tasks. 
However, it is unlikely to get realistic results about abilities of other operators when 
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asking airline flight crews. It was questioned that flight crews judge whether a 
decision-maker has required competence to make a decision, if it is made physically 
away from the aircraft. Therefore, the question that were asked in this context were not 
aimed at identifying insufficient abilities of the relevant actor or function, but 
comparing the competencies of the responsible decision-makers within the different 
turn-round problems from the perspective of an experienced user of the system. Such 
comparison was seen as useful to find trends between the contemplated situations.      
Interviews with flight crews revealed numerous problems with information sharing 
that may have an effect on the turn-round process, and questions were therefore asked, 
whether there is a relation between failures in information sharing and off-block or 
turn-round process delay.     
Overall, the survey aimed at examining the flight crew’s perspective on current 
approach to A-CDM turn-round management. It described turn-round situations during 
A-CDM which entailed the risk to jeopardize flight punctuality by delayed turn-round 
processes caused by problems with information-interactions between aircraft cockpit 
and decision makers like airport partners at operation center or actors at the ramp. It is 
argued that homogeneous and synchronous information sharing enables all airport 
partners or actors to respond to the local context in real time: While some situations 
during aircraft turn-round operation can be pre-planned, decision makers at tactical or 
action level will always be faced with unanticipated situations resulting from unknown 
variables in the environment or technological capabilities. Therefore, each turn-round 
presents unique challenges for information sharing between all participating partners 
or actors.  
Flight crews were asked to report recent experiences of non-cooperative information 
sharing behaviour, how it affected turn-round process duration, and if it resulted in a 
departure delay (if applicable).  
Table 4 provides an overview of the different turn-round operation situations and the 
categories of questions which were posed to the flight crews. 
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  TABLE 4: CATEGORIES OF TURN-ROUND SITUATIONS  
 
TURN-ROUND 
COOPERATIVE 
COMPONENT 
FREQUENCY RELEVANCE 
Gate Assignment Aims/Resources/ Abilities Daily/Weekly /Monthly  Avoidable Delay  
Ground Handling/ 
Ramp  
Aims/Resources/ Abilities Daily/Weekly /Monthly Avoidable Delay  
ATC Related Delay Aims/Resources/ Abilities  Daily/Weekly /Monthly Avoidable Delay 
Operational Info From 
Cockpit 
Aims/Resources/ Abilities Daily/Weekly /Monthly Avoidable Delay  
Operational Info To 
Cockpit 
Aims/Resources/ Abilities Daily/Weekly/ Monthly Avoidable Delay  
 
After three 90-minute brainstorming sessions with 8 flight crews from Lufthansa 
CityLine, Air Berlin, and Deutsche British Airways (DBA) it was concluded that 
information sharing problems during turn-round can be manifold and each event can 
potentially be unique in a specific circumstance. However, a number of problems 
occur regularly and can potentially be attributed to a specific category of problem. 
Therefore, the questionnaire (See Appendix II) proposed to the flight crews included 
various situations with all partners and actors involved in operational information 
sharing. These are the airport operator, air traffic control, CFMU, airline company, 
ground handler, ramp agent, flight manager, check-in and boarding personnel, loaders 
for cargo, mail and baggage, and service providers like fuelling, catering, cleaning. 
5.3 Data Analysis  
For the data analysis, only situations were chosen where flight crews reported that 
an information-interaction problem has taken place with an impact on ground handling 
or on other service delivery during turn-round (Table 5). The problem must have taken 
place on a regular basis of at least once per month. The collected data was organised 
as follows:  
 The situations reported by flight crews that require information-interaction 
between cockpit and others were summarised in Table 5. 
 Actual events attributed to an information-interaction failure during turn-round 
are shown in Table 6, displaying the reported frequency of the four proposed 
turn-round situations of all flight crews and reported turn-round events. 
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 Descriptive data analysis was used to obtain measures of central tendency or 
dispersion about the delays that are avoidable seen from flight crews’ 
perspective. Data was collected via a Likert scale (Figure 24).  
 Correlation analysis was carried out between the turn-round process delay and 
the departure delay (Figure 25). 
Statistical Analysis was performed with SPSS 17.0 and Excel. An α level of .05 
was chosen as decision criterion. Non-parametric statistics were used with Spearman’s 
rho as a measure of correlation.  
TABLE 5: REQUIRED INFORMATION-INTERACTIONS DURING TURN-ROUND  
 
Turn-Round Problem Information Required 
Availability of Parking Stand Expected Delay /Reason of Delay for Parking 
Baggage Loading/ Unloading Delay: Expected duration, reason, No of baggage 
Ramp Transfer Bus (Passenger or Crew) Delay: Expected duration, reason 
Catering Delay: Expected duration, reason 
Cleaning Delay: Expected duration, reason 
Fuelling Delay: Expected duration, reason 
Check-In Delay: Expected duration , reason 
Security Delay: Expected duration, reason 
Boarding Delay: Expected duration, reason 
Airport Facilities Delay: Expected duration, reason 
Wheelchair boarding Delay: Expected duration, reason 
UM Boarding Delay: Expected  duration, reason 
Special Loading (e.g. musical instrument) Delay: Expected duration, reason 
VIP Boarding Delay: Expected duration, reason 
ATC Request Delay: Expected duration, reason 
CFMU Regulation Delay: Expected duration, reason 
Aircraft Change Reason and status of new aircraft 
Technical Repair Reason and expected duration of repair 
Crew Duty Change (new duty roster) Timely Provision of Information 
Crew Change (new crew member) Timely Provision of Information 
Crew Proposal: Connecting Passenger Response and expected action 
Crew Proposal: Necessary A/C repair Response and expected action 
Crew Proposal: Avoidance of A/C Change Response and expected action 
Other: No Flight documents delivered Response and expected delivery 
Other: No Ramp Agent available Status of Service Delivery 
Crew Proposal: Avoidance of A/C Change Response and expected action 
    Flight crews were asked to choose their level of agreement between two statements 
entailing one of the information provision problems from table:  
 I was informed of the problem in time (includes possibility to take appropriate 
action) 
 I learned about the problem by observing that the process was not executed or I 
received information too late. 
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For each turn-round situation, the flight crews were then asked to rate (on a scale 
from 1 = very unlikely to 4 = very likely), whether the delay of the turn-round process 
was avoidable or not, as seen from their own perspective.  
Additionally, the flight crews were asked to assess how many minutes of delay 
resulted from the turn-round process which deviated from established turn-round 
reference schedules, and how many minutes departure delay was encountered after 
that turn-round with this service failure. Only events reported to occur at least monthly 
were taken into account. 
Flight crews were also asked to assess the possible reasons for the cause of service 
failure analogous to a cooperation model by Ferber (1995). The category of 
cooperation was determined by three components - the aims, resources, and abilities of 
participating actors (see chapter 3.3). The level of agreement on each of the three 
components was measured with 1 = very unlikely to 4 = very likely. This data was 
then used to identify non-cooperative situations corresponding to his model.  
In all questions, multiple and equivalent choices were allowed, meaning that the 
flight crews could assign multiple causes of failures for each specific event.  
5.4 Results from the Survey  
5.4.1 Flight crews’ General Information 
The experience level of the flight crews participating ranged between 1 and 8 years 
(av. 6, 58; σ = 4, 40) for First Officers and for Captains additional flight experience 
between 1 and 20 years (av. 7, 37; σ = 5, 87) of experience. The average experience of 
the Captains includes First Officers’ plus experience reported as a Captain.  
5.4.2 Flight Crews’ Information Requirements 
The results concerning flight crews’ information requirements are shown as a 
function of ‘delays avoidable’. This means, if the information was provided to flight 
crews or received from flight crews, a turn-round delay could have been avoided (1 = 
very unlikely, 2 = unlikely, 3 = likely, 4 = very likely). Figure 24 shows the mean 
values of ‘information requirements’ that all received high ratings from the 
perspective of the airline pilots: 
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FIGURE 24: MEAN RATING ‘DELAYS AVOIDABLE’  
 
Highest ratings were assigned to the statement ‘need to take the information into 
account which was proposed by flight crews’, where flight crews see fewest options to 
avoid delays through ‘timely notification of problems with parking stand assignment’. 
However, the initial assumption that ‘reliable provision of operational information 
to the flight crews is correlated with ‘delays avoidable’ did not show statistical 
significance.  
Flight crews were also asked to report about events of information sharing failures that 
they experienced; however, most of the flight crews used the proposed events in the 
questionnaire that were identified as critical for information sharing during focus 
group meetings. Table 6 shows the reported frequency of the five proposed turn-round 
situations and events from all participating flight crews as frequency in percentages. 
Only turn-round events were proposed between milestone 7 and 15; all other events 
are attributed to the concept element A-CDM in Adverse Condition (e.g. de-icing):  
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TABLE 6: CRITICAL TURN-ROUND EVENTS AS REPORTED BY FLIGHT CREWS  
TURN-ROUND PROBLEM FREQUENCY OF REPORTS 
 
SITUATION I:  Availability of Parking Stand    (Totally Reported by 95.1% of Participants) 
Availability of Parking Stand 95.1% 
SITUATION II: Delay of Ground Services   ( Totally Reported by 100% of Participants) 
Baggage Loading/ Unload 47.1 
Ramp Transfer Bus (Passenger or Crew) 11.8 
Catering 1.0 
Cleaning 2.9 
Fuelling 4.9 
Check-In 1.0 
Security 2.0 
Boarding 13.7 
Airport Facilities 4.9 
Wheelchair boarding 3.3 
UM Boarding 0 
Special Loading (e.g. musical instrument) 1 
VIP Boarding 5.9 
Missing Flight Documents 2 
SITUATION III: Operational Changes (Totally Reported by 95.1% of Participants) 
Aircraft Change 63.1 
Crew Duty Change (duty roster updates) 18.4 
Crew Change (new crew member) 1.9 
Technical Repair 7.8 
Other 3.9 
SITUATION IV: Proposals by Flight Crew (Totally Reported by 95.1% of Participants) 
Connecting Passenger 5.8 
Necessary Aircraft Change 33 
Avoidance of Aircraft Change 47.5 
Other 5.8 
 
5.4.3 The Aircraft Cockpit as Information Source 
The information that should be shared from cockpit via standardized status alarms 
with turn-round controller was also identified. Issues to create status alarms included: 
 Technical: if a maintenance action is required at destination, mechanics should 
be employed to assess the expected duration of the necessary inspection or 
repair. 
 Catering: Incorrect catering service (e.g. incorrect quantities or catering items 
planned for another flight) or additional required items. 
 Fuelling: Required extra fuel due to route or flight plan changes.  
 Cleaning: special cleaning required. 
 Crew request: rest time requirements or health related problems. 
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 Cruising Speed: Due to technical reasons, cruising level changes or weather, 
speed changes may be necessary; (because flight updates are only calculated 
with standard speeds). 
 Passenger requests emerging during flight (Pick-up request, health problems, or 
others). 
 Bulk cabin loading: requires extra time for un-loading. 
 MTTT or less: crew agreement to shortened MTTT. 
This information together with the information held by the turn-round controller 
should feed into the decision making about the length of turn-round required at 
destination, e.g. is MTTT acceptable, and finally the decision about the TOBT.     
5.4.4 Flight Crews’ Strategies for Creating Situational Awareness  
A number of strategies which are used by flight crews to create a situational 
awareness for operational issues occurring at the aircraft could be identified. While the 
majority of flight crews (70% of all participating flight crews) still argue in favour of 
more cockpit involvement in operational decision making, the novel approach to turn-
round decision making is increasingly taking place at airline operation centres, 
however different airlines use different approaches to turn-round management (see 
Chapter 6.3). 
A. Knowledge-Based Situational Awareness (SA) 
Flight crews frequently engage in knowledge-based approaches to create SA of the 
turn-round. Rather than merely reacting to stimuli from turn-round processes, flight 
crews actively seek specific information, as a function to the given situation. Examples 
include: 
 In-flight, flight crews actively sought status alarms that they communicate to 
turn-round control. Confirmation from turn-round controller for TOBT adaption 
is normally expected in this case. 
 On the ground, flight crews contact turn-round controller to update/ confirm 
about passenger or turn-round process status. This is used to increase SA of 
turn-round manager and flight crews. This can be viewed as a way to 
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compensate for the non-existent standard information exchanges previously 
mentioned.   
B. Facilitating Activities of Flight Crews 
• Creating interference during standard procedures of the turn-round, like 
initiating a halt of passenger boarding: if flight crews observe unanticipated 
demand for extra turn-round time due to any reason, they can halt passenger 
boarding process and resume own responsibility for the length of turn-round. 
This requires exact tuning between cockpit and turn-round controller, because 
new TOBT has to be proposed based on cockpits’ assessment of the situation.  
• Requiring TOBT be adapted: if flight crews see reduced/increased demand for 
turn-round time, they propose TOBT adaption to the turn-round controller. 
This reflects the variables inherent in every turn-round process (e.g. amount of 
passengers, catering/ fuelling requirements…) and contradicts the initial A-
CDM concept where air crews are not realized as A-CDM partners.  
• Creating a new status alarm: often issues arise during the critical turn-round 
path that are not foreseeable. This status alarm will be shared with the turn-
round controller who will then adapt the TOBT accordingly. Process planning 
gets more demanding, if alarms arise in the last minutes before TOBT and this 
requires exact coordination between all partners and actors. Failures to adapt 
TOBT often arise during this last minute coordination process where last 
minute problems were reported by airlines to vary between 8 and 15% on all 
flights. 
5.4.5 Effect of Process Delay on Departure Punctuality 
Figure 25 provides an overview with  significant correlations that were identified 
between delayed turn-round processes (independent variable) from service processes 
in relation to the Off-block delay (dependant variable) which followed these delayed 
turn-round processes While the first column shows the amount of process delay in 
minutes, the second column shows the minutes that the flight left delayed from 
parking position. This indicates that the delays caused by these turn-round processes 
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directly affected by the delay and were physically present where the turn-round took 
place. 
5.4.6 Possible Failure Causes for Cooperation during Aircraft Turn-Round 
Error! Reference source not found. provides flight crews’ assessment of possible failure 
causes expressed in three components aims, resources, and abilities. Even though it was 
questioned whether it is possible for flight crews to identify or understand such failure 
causes objectively (See Chapter 5.2), the usefulness of the results for providing a 
meaningful comparison between different turn-round failures is likely for the following 
reason: flight crews have operational experience from a home base airport with which 
they are familiar. Since all participating flight crews fly for airlines having a large 
network operation, flight crews can easily compare turn-round services from other 
airports with their home base airport. Error! Reference source not found. therefore 
compares the different ratings of the three components aims, resources, and abilities as 
possible failure causes like reported by the flight crews: 
 
FIGURE 26: POSSIBLE FAILURE CAUSES DURING TURN-ROUND EVENTS 
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crews’ perspective and analogous to Ferber’s cooperation model is the assignment of 
parking stands.  
Flight crews were also asked to report about possible other reasons for turn-round 
failures (Figure 27):  
 
FIGURE 27: OTHER REASONS FOR TURN-ROUND PROBLEMS  
 
The main reason reported refers to the turn-round time that is too short: If this is the 
case, there is not sufficient time to compensate any process delay.  The second 
reported was the responsibility for decision making that was reported to be 
inappropriately shared. Further reasons mentioned were reason related to important 
information that is hidden among an overload of information provided to the flight 
crews, and also the inappropriate communication facilities that do not allow 
addressing concerns during turn-round.   
Flight crews also had the possibility to mention other causes of problems in free 
text. Although some reported results correspond to the causes proposed in the 
questionnaire, they were stated explicitly using the free text option. Table 7 presents 
these responses. 
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   TABLE 7: POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR TURN-ROUND FAILURES  
Possible Causes No of Reports 
Not sufficient ground personnel 7 
Motivation and competence of ground personnel 6 
Lack of competent ramp agent 5 
No situational awareness of airport partners and actors 3 
Too many different decision makers 3 
Not enough training of ground personnel 2 
No clear sharing of responsibilities 1 
No or inappropriate use of communication devices 1 
Bad coordination of ground handling processes 1 
Unrealistic scheduling of processes 1 
Decisions outside of captain's assessment 1 
Inappropriate delay code assignment falsifies real causes 1 
Too much time pressure during turn-round 1 
Information sharing with service providers 1 
 
A further question to be answered aimed at identifying the flight crews’ perspective 
to decision making during turn-round was: 
“Do you think it would be an advantage if the flight crew were more involved in 
decision making on operational issues during turn-round?” 
From 93 flight crews who answered this question, 65 answered with “Yes” 
(representing 70 % of all valid answers) giving the following reasons (n = 28 or 30.1 
% were against more flight crew involvement) listed below in Table 8. 
 
   TABLE 8: REASONS FOR COCKPITS’ INVOLVEMENT IN DECISION MAKING  
Reasons in Favour of more Flight Crew Involvement No of Reports 
Situational Awareness best placed at aircraft 34 
Earlier detection of problems and so earlier solutions possible 5 
More information in hand 5 
Crew has final responsibility for the flight 5 
Dispatch too far away from action level 3 
Fastest possible response + solution to arising problems 3 
Better evaluation of possibilities in hand and time required 2 
Captain should be place where information gather 2 
Last minute problems only present at the cockpit 2 
Often other decision makers do not have sufficient time in hand 2 
Less mental stress through avoidance of 'surprises' 1 
More experiences with similar situations 1 
More flexibility 1 
Dispatch not always competent enough 1 
For specific situations, e.g. aircraft change, technical 1 
Only, if decision making is defacto made by flight crew 1 
Better teamwork instead of debating with dispatch 1 
Only for decisions where judgement is better possible from cockpit 1 
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Flight crews who are against more involvement in decision making argue (Table 9): 
TABLE 9: REASONS AGAINST COCKPITS’ INVOLVEMENT IN DECISION MAKING 
Reasons against Cockpits’ Involvement  No of Reports 
Crew has other tasks 4 
Work load already too high 6 
Against Flight Safety 2 
Not sufficient Situational Awareness at Aircraft 12 
Only shifting of responsibilities to cockpit 1 
Not enough time 3 
Not necessary, if appropriate processes are in place 2 
If necessary, information can be forwarded  1 
Too many different opinions 1 
5.5 Concluding Aspects    
Having identified the constraints framing A-CDM and turn-round management, 
the survey as designed to find the situations where these constraints occur during 
turn-round operation and result in service failures, process delays, and TOBT 
inaccuracy. Given the rising number of stakeholders and participants involved in 
even for a single turn-round only, it was assumed that a number of turn-round 
process failures could result from non-cooperative behaviour among participants. 
Therefore, an investigation was pursued that utilises qualitative data of aircrews 
because they are normally not blamed for failures during turn-round. However, seen 
from the perspective of the airline flight crews, the overall collaboration during day-
to-day turn-round operation was perceived as cooperative. The only example that 
was captured as being non-cooperative is the assignment of parking stands (Chapter 
5.4), if following the theoretical model of cooperation as proposed by Ferber (1995).  
According to Ferber (1995) a cooperative situation is the prerequisite for 
successful collaboration and cooperation depends on aims, abilities and resources 
(see Chapter 3.2). In the context of turn-round operation, information was viewed as 
one of the resources that have to be provided to the TOBT decision maker. However, 
another result from the survey reveals that turn-round operation is limited by failures 
to share timely and relevant information with the airline flight crews, and also by not 
using the information that is provided by the flight crews. At the same time, the study 
was also used to identify which information is finally required to predict turn-round 
process duration and which can so be used for calculating TOBT predictions. Which 
information is already available that would allow making earlier and more accurate 
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TOBT updates was also analysed. These findings were later used to design the 
experiments (see Chapter 7).   
The initial assumption that timely provision of information about turn-round 
service problems to aircrews could be beneficial in avoiding a turn-round process 
delay was not provable. However, the effects of information sharing failures on 
TOBT predictability could be demonstrated by comparing the delay caused by turn-
round process failures with the overall delay of the turn-round: the relation between 
the turn-round delay and the process delay showed significantly higher values for the 
turn-round delays. This result was compared with the inaccuracy swing effect 
(bullwhip effect) as an analogy from the production industry where the network of 
service providers can oscillate in very large swings - if the process takes place within 
the critical path of turn-round events.  
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6 FIELD OBSERVATION DURING A-CDM TURN-ROUND   
6.1 Aims and Objectives of the Analysis   
The aim of this study was to develop a better understanding of how operators 
monitor the complex, dynamic aircraft turn-round operation and to identify the 
influences of the monitoring strategies on TOBT prediction accuracy. It outlines the 
currently used practice of turn-round monitoring of flights preferably having only 
minimum turn-round time available for the turn-round process. The analysis is 
expanded to consider:  
• aspects of situational awareness required for turn-round management; 
• problems identified in achieving an accurate and reliable TOBT; 
• cognitive aspects that have influence on the turn-round process and TOBT 
prediction; and 
• current modes used for information sharing among airport partners. 
The underlying aim was also to identify whether TOBT predictions are influenced by 
the current approach to turn-round monitoring and whether TOBT predictions can be 
improved so that less updates are required and deviations from first assigned TOBT 
remain small.   
6.2 Method 
While some turn-round situations can be pre-planned, decision makers will always 
be faced with unanticipated situations resulting from unknown variables in the 
environment or technological capabilities. These situations can affect time estimates of 
turn-round processes resulting in an inaccurate TOBT prediction.  However, since 
ATC uses the TOBT as a reference for building the pre-departure sequence, deviations 
from TOBT may interfere with the stability of the departure sequence. To 
counterbalance this unreliability, ATC has to build in extra buffers between TSAT and 
Target Take-Off Time (TTOT) with the consequence of poor TTOT prediction for the 
airlines and the overall network.  
Therefore, field observations were conducted to capture how airline operators 
monitor the complex, dynamic turn-round process of aircraft, passengers, and cargo in 
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normal operation in situ for a total of 122 hours. The observation time was different 
between airlines a, b,c,d, and e (a = 82h, b = 14h, c = 10h, d = 8h, e = 8h) because of 
the large differences among the airlines in managing the turn-round process. 
Observations took place in five different operation centres from Lufthansa German 
Airlines, British Airways, Air France, KLM, and Brussels Airlines. Focus was applied 
placed on monitoring turn-rounds with only minimum turn-round time available.  
According to Su et al (2005), visualisation, situational awareness, proactive/reactive 
monitoring, and interactive capabilities are the four core elements necessary for 
effective human monitoring of complex systems. If one of these elements is missing, 
decision making will always involve handling uncertainties. The control room 
observations at the airline operation centres were carried out with focus on these core 
elements while keeping in mind that decision making is never fully predictable 
because of the imponderability from environment or operators intentions.       
Turn-round operation is getting increasingly complex, because of interdependencies 
between third party ground handling service providers, the number of participating 
parties for each turn-round, size and dimension of airports, and the decreasing time 
available for each individual turn-round. How human operators monitor the quality of 
these networks not only has a great impact on the efficiency of the turn-round 
operation, but also flight punctuality and passenger satisfaction depend highly on a 
reliable turn-round process.   
The method used for analysis evolved from this given situation. Observations 
(preferably with minimal interruption to activities) were carried out with the following 
questions as key drivers: 
• What are the tasks of the turn-round controller and what does the practice of 
TOBT assignment look like? 
• What are the current modes used for monitoring the turn-round?  
• What are the monitoring and facilitating activities used by the turn-round 
controllers? 
• What technological configurations are available for turn-round monitoring? 
• What cognitive challenges are inherent in the turn-round monitoring task? 
• What strategies do turn-round controllers use? 
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To organize the results, a model analogous to that of Vicente (1999) was applied 
that is able to capture the cognitive, monitoring, and the facilitating activities of the 
controller that he applies during turn-round. A detailed description of his model can be 
found in Chapter 6.3.8 that also provides the reason for its relevance for turn-round 
monitoring. High importance was assigned to the findings and therefore detailed 
results from control room observations are given in Chapter 6.3. They were also used 
as basis for designing the experiments.  
6.3 Results  
6.3.1 Current Modes of Turn-round Monitoring 
For the benefit of the ATM network, the airline company is responsible for 
predicting an accurate TOBT. This task is usually delegated to the turn-round 
controller who monitors the turn-round process closely. Different modes of turn-round 
monitoring, based on airlines’ individual requirements and operational concepts could 
be identified.   
Monitoring activities during turn-round process control very much depend on the 
actual situation and turn-round controllers’ strategies for responding to the local 
context. Controllers are often required to monitor multiple turn-rounds simultaneously, 
with the effect that the time available for each individual turn-round event can be very 
limited. In general, two different modes of monitoring the turn-round process were 
observed: 
• Local Turn-round Management (LTM): a turn-round controller is assigned to an 
individual flight and is physically present at the aircraft where he directly 
controls the turn-round process. He can either prepare turn-round processes 
based on requirements of the airline, his own experiences and knowledge-based 
strategies, or simply react to problems arising. Local turn-round monitoring was 
traditionally used by the majority of airlines until cost pressure caused airlines 
to pursue less labour intense modes of monitoring.    
• Remote Turn-Round Management (RTM): a turn-round manager controls turn-
round from an operation centre typically at the airport, but remote from the 
aircraft. He is using automated data and inputs from different agents, e.g. flight 
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crews, loaders, flight managers. This approach is less labour-intensive and 
increasingly being used by airlines.   
Which approach can most accurately predict TOBT (thus making it more reliable 
for the ATM network) has not yet been demonstrated. There are also other approaches 
to turn-round monitoring, e.g. like flight crew controlled turn-round monitoring, which 
were not observed during this study. 
6.3.2 Current Practice of TOBT Assignment    
The role of a turn-round controller can be described as monitoring the turn-round 
process while being responsible chief executive for all turn-round events assigned to 
him via coordination of all ground handling related processes aimed at achieving 
highest punctuality possible. If punctuality is a factor or turn-round processes cannot 
be handled as specified by airlines, he actively intervenes in the ground handling. The 
task of the turn-round control can be either performed by the airline operator directly 
or any contracted ground handling company. The main partners the turn-round 
controller interacts with are: 
• cockpit crew (coordinates aircraft processes); 
• ramp agent (coordinates ramp processes); 
• airline representative (coordinates flight schedule, e.g. flight cancellations or 
equipment changes); 
• gate manager ( coordinates passenger flow); 
• gate employee ( coordinates passenger check-in and boarding); 
• airport representative (coordinates parking position and ramp services); 
• one or several external coordinator(s) ( coordinates third party service 
deliveries). 
The turn-round controller deals with all irregularities. He also coordinates the turn-
round process with other controllers or coordinators responsible for the affected sub-
processes. His responsibility is also to inform partners or actors involved about 
irregularities known to him and decision about possible strategies in case of arrival 
delays with consecutive turn-round having only MTTT available, e.g. initiate quick 
turn-rounds with special attention or leave baggage/ passengers behind.  
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The underlying aim of turn-round control is to dispatch the flight as close as possible 
to the SOBT. 
Differences in assigned tasks exist between turn-round controllers during Local 
Turn-round Management and Remote Turn-round Management (see Chapter 6.3.1). 
While turn-round controllers at the ramp (Local Turn-round Management) are able to 
derive information for coordination of turn-round processes by observing real-time 
events, the controllers at the control room have to use available data displayed on 
computer screens as main information source, or initiate interactions via telephone, 
radio, or ACARS. 
It was observed that Remote Turn-round Management controllers often have 
additional tasks compared to Local Mode Turn-round controller. One of the major 
tasks is monitoring data that may have consequences on flight punctuality because of:  
• positioning crew delays or crew schedules changes; 
• published CTOTs; or  
• assigning delay codes to the airport partner who is responsible for causing the 
process delay.  
A number of working processes are defined for Remote Turn-round Management 
controllers, but they differ depending on airline policies. These tasks include:  
• loading of all required IT systems; 
• preparing individual roster with assigned turn-rounds; 
• checking for crew rotation; 
• processing telexes received; 
• creating movement messages; 
• answering or forwarding data or voice messages; 
• work the required aircraft changes in the schedule; and 
• delegating operational tasks to participating actors.  
Only a few processes have predefined procedures designed for necessary deviations 
from standard procedures, e.g. if delay is greater than a certain threshold value or 
aircraft/equipment changes.  
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However, for the ATM network and all Airport Partners, the most critical output of 
the Turn-round Process is the Target Off-Block Time (TOBT), because TOBT defines 
not only the coordination and controlling of all operational processes related to ground 
handling, but it is used as a reference time for ATC to issue the TSAT. TOBT is the 
mandatory time for all participating actors, where aircraft loading has to be completed, 
doors closed, and all ground handling equipment removed. If it becomes necessary 
that TOBT cannot be maintained, the turn-round controller is responsible for updating 
TOBT depending on the given conditions and considering of all logical requirements. 
Regardless of turn-round controllers’ strategies, the process of TOBT assignment 
depends on local procedures defined by participating airport partners. 
6.3.3 Monitoring and Facilitating Activities used by the Turn-round Controller   
Now, turn-round controllers’ actual monitoring activities – from indication of 
pieces of data to proactive acquisition of information are described here. The 
following list is a comprehensive set of resources that were provided by airlines during 
the observed modes of turn-round control, either at the ramp or in the control rooms. 
Not all airlines use all of the resources described, but those procedures and tools 
corresponding to their own requirements. 
• Actively conducted field monitoring: as described earlier, different modes of 
turn-round monitoring are possible. In some cases, turn-round controllers were 
always physically present at the aircraft. 
• Monitoring turn-round status using cameras: controllers obtain visual turn-
round status information via cameras; while some controllers prefer to monitor 
individual aircraft parking stand, others used a more apron oriented camera 
perspective. 
• Monitoring aircraft status using displayed data: controllers use data about 
aircraft status to obtain information of planned aircraft arrival times.   
• Monitoring turn-round status using displayed data: controllers use displayed 
turn-round status data to obtain information about landside and airside turn-
round status. 
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• Monitoring passenger/baggage status using displayed data: controllers use data 
about passenger check-in/boarding status and baggage location data to obtain 
information about airside and landside turn-round status. 
• Communication with field operators: controllers communicate by phone or 
radio with actors at all relevant locations in the terminal building as well as on 
the ramp to obtain an indication of information about the turn-round status. 
• Communication with other airport partners: controllers communicate via phone 
or face-to-face with other airport partners to obtain indications of information 
about the status of resources e.g. availability of parking position, manpower, 
equipment, and whereabouts of proceeding crews. 
• Monitoring alarm panels: controllers obtain alarm messages automatically (by 
pop-up windows) for some missing indications of turn-round status data or 
critical crew proceedings - which in some cases- should be provided by 
participating partners. 
• Monitoring other turn-rounds: controllers use status information about non-
assigned turn-rounds in order to obtain information about resources that may be 
awaited, e.g. manpower or equipment.  
• Monitoring data link messages: controllers use indications made available by 
flight crews to obtain information about operational processes at the aircraft. 
• Reviewing log records: controllers use printed information with turn-round 
overviews and turn-round reference models to log or initiate 
actions/information required by participating partners.  
A number of activities could be identified that are used by controllers to make 
monitoring more efficient. These activities reveal useful insights for analysing 
procedures or tools for future turn-round monitoring. Facilitating activities used by the 
controller to make monitoring more efficient include: 
• creating external support by using their own strategies adopted from 
experience, training, or knowledge; 
• initiating interactions with other partners or actors, e.g. via phone, radio, or 
ACARS; 
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• creating external reminders for monitoring including personal notes or 
coloured stickers; 
• ignoring pop-up alarms, because situational awareness could be established 
earlier; and 
• creating shared situational awareness with other participating actors through 
initiation of interactions.  
Controllers also adjust their tasks in order to make monitoring more manageable. 
They achieve this by setting priorities, scheduling jobs, and allocating tasks to 
participating actors. Activities identified at this stage are very much knowledge-driven 
and the success of the turn-round depends on decisions made at this level. Su et al 
(2005) claim that controllers who are able to regulate their workload in order to make 
it well calibrated to their cognitive capabilities are less susceptible for failures or 
errors.  
6.3.4 Technological Configurations Available for Monitoring  
A number of data and information sources are available at airline operation centres 
depending on the airlines’ requirements and the purpose of its intended usage.  
During turn-round management, human-information interactions are established via 
human-human and human-machine interactions. These interactions require 
standardisation to accomplish turn-rounds defined by airline companies’ pre-sets like 
the reference turn-round procedures models. However, during various key stages of 
the turn-round process, no standardised or automated process of information sharing 
could be observed, e.g. via procedural working standards or mandatory data exchange, 
so as to facilitate human-information interactions especially required during 
unanticipated turn-round process steps.   
If e.g. unknown variables are encountered, predefined data has to be shared 
between actors like flight crews, turn-round managers, or mechanics. However, only 
rough guidelines exist about who should be informed and when. If standardisation is 
not used to the maximum possible extent, failures to share data, knowledge, or 
information during such situations can result in an inaccuracy swing of the turn-round 
delay (see Chapter 5.4). 
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Although these information interactions are often required across organisational 
boundaries involving airport partners and service providers, but so far they only take 
place spontaneously, depending on the actors involved and their information 
processing behaviour.  
A. Human-Human Interactions during CDM Turn-round 
Modes used for human information interactions among operators include telephone, 
two-way radio facilities, or face-to-face communication: 
• Telephone facility: allows participating partners to call each other in order to 
exchange data/information and time estimates, data sharing with cockpit only 
between actual on-block time and actual off-block time.  
• Radio facility: allows participating partners to contact each other in order to 
collect or forward data and time estimates already before actual on-block time. 
• Face-to-face communication: allows participating partners to contact each other 
in order to collect or forward data and time estimates during turn-round. 
• Typed Messages: flight crews and other participants can access computer 
terminals to download flight related data/information. 
A.1 Interactions between Turn-round Manager and Cockpit: 
During direct turn-round management, human-human interactions usually take 
place via face-to-face communication between the turn-round manager and flight 
crews. Whereby proactive behaviour by both turn-round manager and cockpit 
contributes not only to avoid turn-round process delay, but helps to avoid turn-round 
process delay and enables other partners to take appropriate actions by establishing a 
distributed situational awareness. Local Mode of turn-round management is also 
influenced by skill, rules, and knowledge-based behaviour by the turn-round manager. 
During remote turn-round management, all interactions between cockpit and 
control centre take place in order to assure that situational awareness is shared 
between the turn-round manager and flight crew for standard and non-standard turn-
round processes. However, the distance between the cockpit and turn-round manager 
creates a physical hurdle that has to be overcome by means of telephone or two-way 
radio communication. Hence, it is important that interactions are initiated because not 
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all required data or knowledge is automatically shared between the turn-round 
manager and flight crews.   
A.2 Interactions between Cockpit and Other Actors: 
The flight crew possess the most knowledge relevant to the aircraft status. 
Therefore, operators involved at the ramp communicate directly with flight crews, 
while operators at the terminal usually communicate with the turn-round controller. 
Turn-round process coordination is provided by a turn-round manager or in some 
cases established as an automated process, e.g. boarding process starts at a predefined 
time before TOBT.   
A.3 Interactions between Turn-Round Manager and Other Actors: 
The number of interactions depends on the complexity of the specific situation (e.g. 
passenger numbers or composition, baggage volume etc) or inherent constraints (e.g. 
MTTT or resources available).  
A.4 Human-Machine Interfaces during Turn-round 
The specific configuration used for turn-round monitoring is determined by airlines’ 
individual requirements and the emphasis it puts on turn-round management. Various 
software tools for turn-round monitoring exist; however, airlines use similar tools in 
different ways. As a consequence it is necessary that beside technological 
requirements also the user-specific requirements including cognitive demands are 
taken into account for the design of the communication and monitoring tools. The 
following list shows the HMIs that are available for turn-round control in the control 
rooms, aircraft cockpit, and at the ramp: 
B. HMIs available at the Turn-Round Control Rooms: 
• Airlines’ operation control systems: can be accessed and updated with new 
information from all stations served by the airlines’ network a level of detail 
depending on individual airlines’ requirements. Examples of data usually 
received automatically by airlines’ operation control systems include AOBT, 
ATOT, EOBT, ALDT, AIBT, EIBT. Movement and Delay messages are sent 
by interactions from outstations.   
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• ACARS Messages for communication with aircraft and flight crew (See also 
Chapter 7.4); 
• fax/telex: electronically and automatically received messages from all partners; 
• ARR/DEP overview of all flights, additionally stand number, TOBT, ELDT, 
and ALDT can be obtained; 
• real-time baggage tracking information; 
• real-time passenger processing information; 
• real-time ramp processes tracking information; 
• cameras for aircraft status monitoring; 
• sequence planning tool with TSAT from ATC; 
• CFMU interface for CTOT, FUM, and DPIs; and   
• specific passenger information. 
HMIs at the Cockpit: 
• ACARS: sending and receiving data to and from turn-round partners. Turn-
round information requirements can be communicated via ACARS, two-way 
radio, or telephone.  
HMIs at the Ramp:  
• Sending and receiving data from and to the airline operation centre. HMIs used 
here have real time capabilities and attempt to increase situational awareness as 
well as the proactive capabilities of actors at the ramp or terminal building. 
6.3.5 Factors Contributing to Monitoring Difficulty 
The remote mode of turn-round management is a relatively new approach to turn-
round control; the factors that contribute to monitoring difficulty are now discussed:  
• Number of turn-rounds: the total number of turn-rounds assigned to an 
individual controller determines the time available for monitoring each single 
turn-round process. A great difference could be observed in the number of 
turn-rounds which were assigned simultaneously to an individual controller 
among the different airlines where turn-round monitoring was observed, 
varying between 3 and 15 turn-rounds. It is questioned whether sufficient 
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attention can be maintained to each individual turn-round, if the number of 
turn-rounds monitored by one controller in parallel exceeds a specific value 
and workload, whereat the workload again depends on a number of issues that 
have require attention (See chapter 2.5).   
• Multiple parties with differing goals involved: Multiple parties responsible for 
the various supporting turn-round processes during a single turn-round process 
with each party having its own resource constraints and inherent intentional 
goals. However, understanding individual actors’ goals is necessary to 
establish a global goal among all participating actors and airport partners. It is 
also unlikely that in case of individual goal sets different from a global goal, 
actors will share their goals with others. Individual actors’ goals can range 
from personal interests to achieving advantages for the own company. 
Therefore, in order to enable successful monitoring, it is necessary to identify 
the inherent goals and motivations of all participating operators and the 
constraints within the different domains during A-CDM. This information 
should then be used to identify and apply cooperation-building factors to day-
to-day turn-round practices.   
• Reliability of information: information provided by supporting actors is not 
always as available as required because of the different approaches and 
procedures towards information sharing established by the individual 
operators. Even when required, operational information from the action level is 
not necessarily available at the monitoring level due to the failure to establish 
standardised processes of information sharing, e.g. information about boarding 
status is not shared or actors forget to feed their data into the tools established 
for monitoring the flight/turn-round progress. 
• Incomplete process status data: due to the complexity of the handling 
processes at some major airports, operators’ resource constraints or companies’ 
internal regulations, not all turn-round processes can be tracked automatically 
yet. As a consequence, required data for monitoring is not provided and turn-
round controllers have to make decisions based on an incomplete picture of the 
situation. 
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• Degree of automation support: ‘Self-procurement’ of data e.g. via telephone or 
radio is not only time-consuming, there is high risk of missing key indicators 
or focusing on minor items, while critical data is hidden within turn-round 
complexities.  
• Cognitive demands: cognitive workload of controllers depends on the level of 
automation, individual knowledge, and workload regulation activities. While 
cognitive capabilities vary among controllers, workload regulation activities 
are used very much by controllers and so determine turn-round success. If the 
workload is too high, the possibility for controllers to develop their own 
regulation strategies is reduced.   
• Feedback from actors: controllers require feedback from actors and operators 
on the ramp or terminal building for monitoring, e.g. about execution of 
services or availability of resources. No standardised feedback processes could 
be observed because actors’ individual goals do not necessarily correspond to 
the controllers’ need for feedback.   
• Number of third-party providers: an increasing number of participating service 
providers also increases monitoring complexity. This in turn imposes a 
challenge for the turn-round controller to identify the service provider or actor 
who is involved in an individual turn-round process. As a consequence, the 
controller is not always aware who provides the turn-round service. If he 
requires process related data, he may have to contact several companies in 
order to identify the assigned actors.  
• System complexity and reliability: Airport size, technological level, and 
cultural diversities also contribute to system complexity and monitoring 
difficulties. Monitoring solutions have to be adapted to local needs.  
• Alarm system design: some monitoring tools have an automatic pop-up alarm 
for e.g. delays of flights with proceeding crews on board or delayed ground 
handling start. However, in all observed cases, the timing of the alarm was too 
late in order to initiate a corrective action able for avoiding a delay. Again, 
cognitive workload adjustment is applied by controllers and so far the only 
solution available to solve such problems. 
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• Display and control design: The standard workplace of the turn-round 
controllers has five screens with functionalities selectable by controllers. The 
workplace also includes telephones with short dial-up options to all airport 
partners involved. However, controllers often have to switch between different 
scenarios or displays and a view of the overall turn-round process information 
showing all required data is not available.   
• Sharing of Responsibilities: different actors have different levels of 
responsibilities for decision making. This information is not always shared 
with turn-round controller and therefore he has to contact multiple actors to 
identify the responsible function. 
• Delay Code assignment: the turn-round controller assigns delay codes for the 
function that he considers to be responsible for the delay. However, this 
practice of delay code assignment challenges the whole ATM network 
philosophy of the A-CDM approach. Even though the turn-round controller 
often has to rely on information provided by third parties, this procedure is still 
seen as a punishment for operators’ behaviours and fosters the perception of a 
blame culture among participating actors. This however is counter to the idea 
of creating a cooperation building culture with mutual trust among operators.  
Some of the challenges in turn-round monitoring mentioned here could be 
overcome through process reengineering, cultural change or technological progress. 
As a next step in the research process, focus group discussions between turn-round 
controllers and other functions will be carried out to identify the potential for such 
alternative approaches towards turn-round management.  
6.3.6 Cognitive Challenges for Turn-round Monitoring 
A number of challenges for turn-round monitoring arise due to cognitive 
vulnerabilities while on-task. Examples include:  
• Monitoring requires visual sampling and selective attention: this involves turn-
round controllers being vulnerable to missing critical events or information 
because of breakdowns in the serial scanning process. When scanning turn-
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round processes, controllers face information overload, time constraints, and 
may not be able to detect unanticipated events at the time required.  
• Data exchange between partners across functions has to be established 
throughout distributed locations and also via different modes. Data exchange 
between turn-round controllers and other actors takes place with external 
functions often having unknown goals and mindsets. Where competing 
interests are likely to exist, required communication, e.g. between turn-round 
controller and flight crews is not always pursued as needed and as a 
consequence, situational awareness cannot be created.  
• During peak hours, interactions are initiated from multiple sides: telephone, 
supervisor, colleagues, incoming ACARS messages, or requests via radio. 
Prioritising and selective problem solving skills are required. 
• Insufficient data from turn-round service providers or about the aircraft turn-
round status are available for a reliable TOBT decision making, therefore 
TOBT has to be assigned without having real data on hand.  
• Situational awareness depends on the ability of the turn-round manager to use 
the tools, data and displays given to create a mental strategy. Prior experience 
and long-term knowledge in turn-round management can greatly contribute to 
monitoring success. E.g. how to detect events requiring attention and now to 
find solutions for these events. 
• Information representation on displays themselves can be the cause of a 
problem. Is it possible to extrapolate the information required to tackle turn-
round problems from the screens or does essential data have to be acquired by 
initiating interferences with other actors?  
• Some systems are available which create alarms in the form of displayed 
messages about, e.g. a process that has not started or crew arriving delayed 
from an inbound flight. Turn-round controllers often ignore these because the 
mental strategy for solving the problem is different from the solution proposed 
by the system logic. Moreover, the high amount of false alarms results in 
controllers tending to disregard them completely.   
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• Data overload versus insufficient data: a major reason for cognitive 
vulnerabilities reported by turn-round controllers includes the composition of 
provided data. The large amount of data available does not represent the 
information format required for operational decision making as well as the way 
it is made available entails the risk to overlook essential information which is 
hidden among other data. More importantly, decisions made by other airport 
partners or the results of such decisions are not automatically available.  The 
reasons for non-data sharing could be cognitive factors, avoidance of blame, or 
other not yet identified hurdles having the effect that updates of controllers’ 
situational awareness is not always possible as required.  
• Data filtering: by using the large amount of data available, Remote Turn-round 
Management controllers have to create a visualisation of the turn-round 
without being able to inspect the situation with their own eyes.  This poses a 
high risk of missing necessary signs indicating process delays that would be 
obvious during DTM. 
• Network data or status information from ramp/terminal processes: data about 
the status of sub-processes from all participating actors during turn-round are 
not automatically shared, but this is required in order to create a situational 
awareness especially during the critical path of all sequential turn-round 
processes. Furthermore, data about participating actors is presented in various 
formats (e.g. visual, numerical, or interactive). Even through a single source 
format, visualisation has been proven to be the most effective way to create 
necessary situational awareness it is not yet available for turn-round 
management.   
• Proactive versus reactive monitoring: A major challenge arises from the 
current practise of reactive turn-round controlling behaviour. Tools with 
predictive capabilities for the turn-round processes during critical path enable 
controllers to create a situational awareness via proactive monitoring of turn-
round with determination of current state followed by predicting the trajectory 
of the future state of the turn-round. However, controllers today have to track 
turn-round in real-time, react to alarms created by the system, or respond to 
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interactions created by participating actors. Such monitoring only permits 
reacting to the problem occurring by following an official process – not 
assessing the future state of the turn-round.  In contrast proactive monitoring 
would enable prediction and result in increased reliability for the network and 
passengers.    
6.3.7 Strategies Used by Turn-round Controllers for Monitoring   
Airline companies provide working strategies and modes for monitoring turn-round 
flows to the controllers. These strategies differ significantly among airlines observed.  
The turn-round controllers themselves again adopt their own strategies for monitoring 
the turn-round depending on the given working procedures, situations, knowledge, and 
tools available. However, it has never been demonstrated which strategy used by the 
airlines results in the most reliable turn-round processes needed to make TOBT 
prediction as accurate as possible. Flight crews argue in favour of the traditional mode 
of turn-round monitoring like the local mode turn-round monitoring, because new 
modes established are so far not able to replace the benefits that are available during 
local mode turn-round monitoring. The new remote turn-round monitoring was 
generally accepted, but many difficulties during turn-round are still attributed to the 
new mode of monitoring. 
The major concepts used by turn-round controllers will now be described: 
A. ‘Situational Model’ Driven Monitoring 
One major finding witnessed in the observation was to see that regardless of the 
mode of turn-round control or the tools available, turn-round controllers were trying to 
build and maintain their own situational model which in turn directed their attention 
and set their expectations during monitoring activities. This situational model 
however, is greatly different depending on the mode of turn-round control. For 
example the turn-round controllers at the aircraft could already anticipate problems 
arising with de-boarding or loading and consequently initiated required actions 
proactively. Turn-round controllers at remote positions had to be updated about such 
situations by the ramp agents or the flight crews in order to establish the required 
situational awareness.   
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One key aspect of this observed behaviour is the difference between local turn-
round management and remote turn-round management which emerges through the 
technologies and the cognitive driven approaches used. While during local turn-round 
management controllers use their eyes to observe events which may require predictive 
analysis of the situation, turn-round controllers at the operation centres have to rely on 
the information displayed on their monitors, the incoming calls from actors at the 
airport terminal or the ramp, and the cameras facing towards the aircraft parking 
positions. This induces that predictive behaviour required for turn-round control is not 
possible in the operation centre because of the missing information visually perceived 
by the ramp agent at the aircraft. Situational analysis is therefore only possible based 
on information received via human-human and human-computer interactions. This 
simple example shows that the task goals are the same in all modes of turn-round 
monitoring, but the situational manifestations between the of direct and remote 
monitoring locations shaped the behavioural manifestations of turn-round control 
between proactive at the ramp and reactionary at remote.   
B. Rule- And Knowledge Driven Monitoring 
It was observed during local mode of turn-round management that turn-round 
controllers usually engage in rule- and knowledge-driven monitoring of the processes 
at the ramp for estimation of the TOBT. Rather than merely reacting to stimuli from 
process failures, turn-round controllers seek out specific information of the current, 
but often - unfamiliar situation. Examples of this type of behaviour include:  
 Already before the aircraft arrives at parking position, turn-round controller re-
confirms availability of personnel and required equipment with participating 
actors. 
 Not only normal turn-round processes were coordinated, but also special ground 
handling issues were prepared with confirmation calls to participating actors. If 
a problem arose during pre-arrival phase, a possible solution was already 
analysed to avoid failures during the critical chain.  
 Problems forwarded from flight crews after landing were analysed directly after 
AOBT. 
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 Actual passenger numbers are used to make estimates of boarding/de-boarding 
times.  
Therefore it is proposed to engage in further analysis about the possibility of also 
establishing proactive behaviour as it was observed during direct turn-round 
monitoring at remote operation centre.  
It is hypothesized that reliable TOBT prediction also depends on the number of 
turn-rounds which the turn-round controller has to monitor simultaneously. Great 
differences exist among the observed airlines about the number of turn-rounds being 
monitored in parallel. In some cases, it was observed that turn-round controllers have 
to monitor up to 15 turn-rounds at the same time. It is argued that sufficient time is not 
on hand to proactively prepare each turn-round as observed during local mode turn-
round monitoring – particularly if unanticipated events are encountered during the 
critical path of turn-round processes. 
Nonetheless, advantages could also be observed during RTM stemming from tools 
and information sources available at the operation centre which allow turn-round 
controllers to use other forms of monitoring using activities they are able to apply or 
the information sources at the working position.  
Turn-round controllers adopted strategies like: 
 Proactive telephone calls: As the most frequently observed mode of 
communication turn-round controllers used the direct-dial functions on their 
telephones to check with actors at the ramp about the availability of personnel 
and equipment. Needless to say, the number of proactive calls very much 
depends on the number of turn-rounds being monitored at the same time. The 
difference observed in the number of turn-rounds being monitored 
simultaneously ranged from three and 15 turn-rounds. While during turn-round 
monitoring of only three turn-rounds at the same time, proactive behaviour was 
applied as prevailing turn-round strategy of the controllers, larger turn-round 
numbers allow only to react to requests from incoming calls of other actors or 
to focus on the discrepancies already known by the controller.   
 Reducing MTTT: While some operators also use different acronyms for the 
TOBT, large differences could be observed during current practices of TOBT 
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assignment. It is in the interest of the airlines to reduce MTTT even further, if 
AIBT is delayed more than SOBT – MTTT, and as a consequence, a departure 
delay has to be faced. To prevent delays from becoming too long, turn-round 
controllers use two different strategies: either they reduce the MTTT by 
applying a special turn-round procedure (e.g. increase support via additional 
ground personnel), or they only reduce the MTTT by a certain margin without 
taking any other information or factors into account. During some observed 
cases, turn-round controllers used only the MTTT as a core reference for 
TOBT assignment; if TOBT deviations from original SOBT were greater than 
a predefined value, the new TOBT had to be approved by the airline dispatch 
or flight crews.   
 Creating indicators or alarms: Quite a number of examples of turn-round 
controllers exploiting the flexibility and functionalities of the available tools 
and functions could be observed. For turn-round monitoring, most airline 
operators provide the controllers with five displays and different tools for 
flight, turn-round, or process monitoring. Turn-round controllers can choose 
display scenarios and tools depending on their own preferences. The strategies 
used here also depend on the knowledge level of controller and the ability to 
extract information as required.   
 Difference in creating an overview of displayed information which turn-round 
controllers were using for day-to-day monitoring: While some controllers used 
their displays dedicated to individual turn-round events as a detailed depiction 
of all turn-round processes, others used a more flight status oriented tool where 
all monitored flights are visible at the same time on a time axis. The detailed 
turn-round depiction allows them to follow up each turn-round process in real-
time, while the flight status oriented tool only depicts an overview of all 
monitored flights. This tool however requires additional information on the 
turn-round status to allow real-time monitoring of the critical turn-round chain.   
• Setting Rules: The adopted strategies used also depend on the rules and 
policies defined by the individual airline. The most prominent example is the 
definition of the length of a MTTT: For the same type of aircraft, comparable 
 Chapter 6: Field Observation During A-CDM Turn-Round  
 
          Matthias Groppe                Influences on Aircraft TOBT Prediction Accuracy                    146                 
type of turn-round and size of airport, the MTTT during one Turn-round 
Process differed up to 20 minutes.  
• Other rules set by the airlines include the amount of turn-rounds monitored in 
parallel. Here, large differences in turn-round numbers were observed because 
of the different policies among actors involved. In some cases, turn-round 
controllers are not permitted to contact the flight crew during turn-round, 
however during other observations the flight crews were contacted by phone up 
to thirty times.  
 Creating external reminders for monitoring: to reduce the demand on their 
memory, turn-round controllers frequently create external reminders for 
monitoring. Several examples of this type of facilitating activity were 
observed, with differences existing between LTM and RTM. During LTM, 
controllers used e.g. turn-round cards or written notes to add process 
information related to the assigned flight. Remote Turn-round controllers 
however, use scratch pads and lists with all assigned turn-rounds. A common 
practice during monitoring is to take notes during incoming calls onto 
notepads. When monitoring turn-round, flight status, or incoming messages via 
data link, discrepancies arise or particular service requirements become 
necessary which have to be arranged. Some of them are not time critical and 
notes were written onto the turn-round lists. This strategy was particularly 
observed, when the notes taken were used to brief the next shift.  
 Shifting turn-rounds: During peak hours, turn-round control does not allow 
leaving working position because observed work demand is very high. To 
allow breaks or to react to schedule changes due to weather, turn-round 
controllers can shift assigned turn-rounds to other controllers who have the 
capacity to handle additional turn-rounds.  
 Employ additional turn-round controllers: some airlines observed have 
designated personnel available during peak hours allowing controllers to 
maintain the same amount of turn-rounds for monitoring - even during high 
traffic demand. These ‘spare’ controllers can either handle excess traffic or 
turn-rounds with high monitoring demand due to extra service requirements. 
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6.3.8 Organizing the Results in a Qualitative Cognitive Model 
Given the high number of cognitive challenges identified during turn-round 
monitoring, the findings from airline control room observations were organized in a 
qualitative cognitive model that allowed making conclusions and giving 
recommendations. Therefore, a model was applied – analogous to that of Vicente et al 
(2004) who developed this model specifically for operators monitoring a nuclear 
power plant under normal operation. The qualitative cognitive model of monitoring 
can be generalized across other domains, because of the general types of activities and 
cognitive functions used when monitoring complex dynamic systems (Vicente et al 
2004). Similarities of such systems include the vast number of interactions and the fact 
that time and pace of external events determine the mental workload. While failures 
during nuclear power plant monitoring may result in threats to public and 
environment, failures during turn-round monitoring has financial and inconvenience 
impact only.  
The model (Error! Reference source not found.) includes four major elements: 
initiating events, cognitive activities, facilitating activities, and monitoring activities.  
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FIGURE 28: MONITORING MODEL ANALOGOUS TO VICENTE (SOURCE: VICENTE, 2004)  
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• Data-driven events: not actively sought by operators, but rather prompted by 
changes in the environment, e.g. alarms by the system, interaction creation 
from system or other partners/ actors.  
• Standard controller practices, policies, or procedures: events in this category 
are designed to ensure controllers’ periodical and knowledge-driven working 
practices.   
• Scheduled tasks and activities: have to be carried out during normal shifts, e.g. 
close the flights after monitoring is completed.  
Most of the triggers result from periodical events, e.g. flight movement messages, 
but many triggers also relate to specific events, e.g. incoming calls from participating 
actors. Alarms automatically created through the monitoring system are not usually 
used as triggers for monitoring events, because the late provision of the alarm requires 
an action from turn-round controller already much earlier. Once monitoring is 
initiated, it may result in a specific path of actions and coordination with other airport 
partners or actors. Also, multiple initiating events may be in effect at the same time, 
requiring the controller to time-share several activities, especially during time-
constrained turn-round situations.    
The initiating events result in cognitive activities by the turn-round controllers. 
These are formed and influenced by interactions with control room interfaces/ other 
personnel, or knowledge which is held by the respective turn-round controller. The 
major element that drives cognitive activities however is the situational model 
developed by the controller as an incomplete mental representation integrating his/her 
current understanding of functional turn-round aspects, and the automated control 
system. Applying this situational model to turn-round monitoring, encompasses a 
number of general cognitive processes: 
• Developing turn-round controller’s knowledge of the turn-round’s physical 
processes, their characteristics and interfaces; 
• supports controller in developing a cause-and-effect relationship for analysing 
turn-round failures and participating actors’ process delays; 
• supports controller in integrating separately received or automatically created 
data to account for all data; 
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• supports controller in developing a turn-round description that captures a 
process state at a level higher than individual actor perception; 
• it allows the controllers to create a mental simulation of the turn-round to 
anticipate future states of turn-rounds, or evaluate turn-round performance 
under various configurations.   
According to Vicente (2004), training and experience allows operators to evolve 
their inherent mental model into a somewhat idealized design and a mirror on the 
actual operation. The situational model being used for monitoring can so be adjusted.  
 At a higher level of description, all controllers’ cognitive activities can be split into 
Situation Assessment (SA) and Response Planning (RP). However, situation 
assessment refers to the process of ‘constructing an explanation to account for 
observations’ plus consequences and future system state, and studies show that 
operators actively develop a coherent understanding of the current state. This in turn 
emphasizes the need to provide reliable indications for situation assessment. Any 
failure to provide essential turn-round data from participating actors may stall the 
assessment process due to missing key indicators. During turn-round, controllers not 
only monitor, but often proactively retrieve information required for situation 
assessment via automated systems or interaction creation. However, the often 
constrained time available during turn-round does not allow controllers to get updates 
as needed. Different types of situation assessment (SA) were identified:  
• Confirm expectations about the flight/turn-round progress (SA1): based on the 
given data, e.g. Flight Update Messages (FUMs) or movement messages, 
controllers develop expectations about actual in-block or off-block time. Based 
on these expectations, turn-round controllers develop strategies as a response to 
the actual situation. During this arrival phase of flight, monitoring the status of 
the flight serves either to maintain the current strategy or adapt it to the actual 
situation.  
• Pursue unexpected situations (SA2): a controller often encounters situations that 
are not expected, but response is required, e.g. aircraft change, crew change. In 
these cases, the controller will actively direct monitoring to identify 
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complementary data that might help him better respond to the unexpected 
situation.  
• Check for problems considered to be likely (SA3): the controller is best placed 
to identify problems likely to arise during turn-round. The controller 
understands that certain processes create the potential for particular problems to 
be solved, e.g. coordination of sequential processes within the critical chain and 
needs to be vigilant. Therefore, monitoring is actively directed to indications 
that can reveal the occurrence of a likely problem.  
• Validate initial indications (SA4): in general, control room and interface 
technologies are not perfectly reliable nor do they always provide an 
appropriate visualisation of the situation. Therefore, controllers often mistrust 
received information and have to validate it by creating interaction (e.g. phone, 
ACARS, radio). 
After assessment of the actual turn-round situation, a response is usually required. 
This involves decision making on the necessary course of action. In general, response 
planning involves identifying goals, generating, evaluating, and selecting response 
plan that best meets the goals identified (Hoc, 2000). Since there are only a few formal 
written procedures that guide response, controllers use their own assessment of the 
situation and evaluate whether the actions they are taking can help to achieve their 
goals. This may include deviation from formal procedures. Five types of 
actions/monitoring were identified that support response planning (RP). 
• Assess goal achievement (RP1): controllers’ actions are taken in order to 
achieve their own or airline operators’ goals. However, current procedures 
within A-CDM require weighing operators’ interests against ATM network 
benefits. This becomes necessary since TOBT assigned by turn-round controller 
can only be updated three times after TSAT has been issued by air traffic 
control. Otherwise the flight being re-sequenced by air traffic control and 
departure time may be delayed. Therefore, the controller has to monitor the 
progress towards achieving the target off-block time and actively monitor 
indications that can support the assessment of this goal.  
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• Other duties while on-task (RP2): turn-round control comprises variety of 
situations: while some turn-rounds require only little attention, others are time-
constrained (e.g. if MTTT or even less is available due to arrival delays) and 
have a high monitoring demand. During these situations, controllers proactively 
initiate interactions with other airport partners or actors for duties like 
information forwarding, e.g. inform ramp agents about direct transfer of 
passengers, follow up late crew arrivals, or identify solutions to resource 
constraints. Coordination with others is usually required during these situations.    
• Assess potential delay effects of contemplated actions (RP3): a key activity of 
controllers is to ensure that their activities and those of other airport partners 
and actors do not produce a delay, or if unavoidable, to ensure that the delay 
remains as short as possible. While airlines have established reference models 
for standard turn-round flows, controllers are often faced with events resulting 
from uncontrollable variables in the environment or variables identified late. 
This requires adapting the reference turn-round flow to the actual situation with 
necessary assignment of IATA delay codes to actors causing the deviation from 
standard procedures.  
• Assess means for achieving goals (RP4): As a consequence of a turn-round 
process delay, the controller needs to consider that the process could fail and an 
alternative process would be required (e.g. aircraft change).  Thus, active 
monitoring is needed to support the evaluation of resource availability. Due to 
the large number of actors and partners involved, this remains a difficult task. 
• Obtain feedback on actions (RP5): after completion of turn-round, controller 
needs to obtain feedback about how the processes were carried out (departure 
time or time required for alternate courses of actions). Feedback has usually to 
be actively sought -although in some cases, actors call.  
• Assess pre-condition for action (RP6): for all sequential turn-round processes, a 
certain pre-condition is necessary for the next step of turn-round. This requires 
that the controller actively monitors status of turn-round and informs partners or 
actors if problems arise at one stage. Due to the high workload required 
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therefore, response planning RP6 at some operation centres only marginally 
takes place so far.    
6.4 Concluding Aspects 
This step of the research was aimed at focusing more closely into such problems 
of information sharing and applying focus on information that is beneficial for TOBT 
prediction and able to avoid a inaccuracy-swing-effect of delay duration as identified 
during the survey. Therefore, field observations were undertaken to study the 
emergence of such information deficiencies. The investigation should also identify 
the different modes of turn-round monitoring and how this monitoring affects TOBT 
prediction accuracy. Procedural differences between a traditional mode of turn-round 
management at the aircraft and the increasingly applied approach towards remote 
turn-round management in a control centre were identified. Moreover, different 
strategies of the turn-round controller for creating or extracting required information 
were observed.  
Rasmussen’s terminology was applied to classify the various strategies of how 
turn-round controllers monitor the turn-round and predict its outcome via TOBT 
assignment as it could be observed at various airline operators’ turn-round 
operations. Differences between rule-, data-, and knowledge driven turn-round 
monitoring were found as well as their effect on TOBT predictability.  
It was concluded that turn-round management is largely influenced by the 
strategies of turn-round controllers that they apply for coordinating turn-round 
processes and the availability of resources necessary for predicting the TOBT. Turn-
round strategies are not only determined by individual controllers’ knowledge-, rule-, 
or skill-based behaviour, but also by the mode of turn-round monitoring that airlines 
have established based on their requirements. Hereby, reference models are used to 
define the milestones of the turn-round and process times required for the overall 
CDM turn-round process.  
Based on the results of a cockpit survey and the observations in various airline 
operators’ control rooms, it is argued that available data for the controller are 
insufficient to make reliable TOBT predictions: missing inputs from participating 
actors, poor monitoring capabilities, and unavailability of predictive turn-round 
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information results in TOBT estimates which allow only assessment of a TOBT rather 
than reliable TOBT decision making based on facts.  
It was found that little attention is placed on supporting turn-round processes with 
the effect that critical path of turn-round events are not sufficiently monitored and 
necessary data required for updates to TOBT is not available when required. For the 
benefit of the network however, exact TOBT assignment should be done as early as 
possible with minimum updates required.  
Finally, certain pieces of information available from participating actors like flight 
crews or ramp agents are not sufficiently taken into consideration for TOBT 
assignment - consequently making TOBT updates necessary.  
6.5 Discussion  
It is questionable whether the mutual trust required for the exchange of all 
information in order to make reliable TOBT predictions is possible with the current 
practice of delay code handling. Since the turn-round controller has to assign the delay 
via a code to the function, which she/he estimates as causing the delay, actors or 
operators involved at action level will not be keen on sharing data revealing their 
failures. This delay code assignment procedure is usually combined with bonus-mal 
practices where actors identified as being responsible for the delay have to expect 
financial penalties (Groppe et al., 2008). Therefore, problems with service delivery 
will not automatically be communicated to the turn-round controller with a negative 
effect on his ability to make reliable TOBT predictions (Tempelaar, 2009).  
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7 TOBT PREDICTION ACCURACY EXPERIMENTS  
The A-CDM concept requires that operational information is shared between all 
participating partners in order to establish sufficient situational awareness for 
operational decision making. It has been shown earlier that as a part of this decision 
making the Target Off-block Time TOBT is an important trigger for all ATM decision 
makers and CFMU for the status of the flight.  
This Chapter describes the experimental design and analysis of human-in-the-loop 
simulations where the TOBT assignments for turn-rounds were compared under 
different information sharing conditions. The experiments targeted turn-round 
operation situations under adverse conditions and were aimed at evaluating the 
influence of cooperative information sharing on TOBT prediction accuracy. During 
three simulated turn-round scenarios the participants were asked to monitor the 
progress of 15 aircraft in parallel and determine the Target-Off Block Time (TOBT) 
ten minutes prior to Estimated Aircraft In-block Time (EIBT) and five minutes after 
Actual In-block Time (AIBT). While for a number of turn-rounds the turn-round 
controllers received simulated information from flight crews or ramp agent 
automatically which was required for TOBT updates (cooperative information 
sharing); for other turn-rounds the turn-round controllers had to call an interlocutor 
representing the flight crew/ramp agent by themselves  in order to get the required 
information for TOBT updates (non-cooperative information sharing).   
7.1 Introduction 
Throughout the course of daily operations, an airline is often faced with unexpected 
situations developing from adverse conditions like weather patterns or industrial 
actions that may result in substantial deviations in its planned operations. As a result, 
decisions often have to be made few hours before the actual schedule. These decisions 
can have significant impact on the overall operation of the airline for the rest of the 
day affecting all aspects of the airline’s operation, but most detrimental to the hub-and 
spoke schedules for basic resources such as aircraft, flight crews, and turn-round 
equipment.  
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As a consequence, turn-round controllers are constantly faced with operational 
problems that emerge from adverse conditions like flight cancellations or changing 
aircraft equipment. Turn-round times are so becoming increasingly constrained with 
aircraft arriving delayed from outstation. Often not even the minimum turn-round time 
is available for the turn-round.  
Because each individual turn-round can have up to 35 supporting processes, early 
coordination of these turn-round processes with TOBT updates is required. Such 
updates need to be accurate enough to provide the ATM network and CFMU with 
reliable TOBT predictions. Therefore, all participating actors have to share their 
information because a single turn-round process failure that is not communicated can 
have dramatic impact on TOBT reliability and thus affect the entire network.  
Failures to update the TOBT correctly can often be traced back to information that 
is not automatically available for TOBT decision making. Since such information is 
usually obtained by distributed actors like flight crews or ramp agents, a more 
standardised form of situational awareness has to be created that encourages 
cooperative information sharing by participating actors.  
During three experimental conditions the influence of various information 
availabilities and information dispositional factors on TOBT prediction accuracy was 
analysed.  
7.2 Aims, Objectives and Hypotheses of the Study 
The over-arching objective of this research phase was derived from the previous 
phases. After describing the influences on TOBT accuracy, the aim is now to capture 
these influences and whether they can be measured or quantified in controlled 
laboratory scenarios. A number of variables were included that might be relevant for 
TOBT accuracy and which were assumed to have influence on TOBT. As a result of 
this study, a concept for the design and analysis of decision support functionalities for 
TOBT decisions should be produced. Such concept is so based on the results of a 
comparison between standardised and cooperative information sharing between turn-
round controllers and distributed functions like flight crews or ramp agents via 
ACARS/HMI, with the currently used baseline data and functionalities available to the 
turn-round controller today. The experimental setting was designed to obtain 
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quantitative measures of the influence of information that is cooperatively shared 
between turn-round controllers and flight crews/ramp agents on the TOBT 
assignments at two measurement points. Such a set-up should allow sharing 
information in a more standardised form that creates situational awareness and 
encourages information forwarding. Therefore, the focus applied for the turn-round 
laboratory scenarios was set to factors related to information disposition and 
information accuracy that have not been investigated before.   
Hypothesis I: Information required for TOBT updates (independent variable) which is 
cooperatively shared between flight crews and turn-round controller before |EIBT - 10 
Minutes| increases the accuracy of TOBT, i.e. reduces |TOBT - AOBT| (Dependent 
Variable).  
Hypothesis II: Information required for TOBT updates (independent variable) which 
is cooperatively shared between flight crew, ramp agent and turn-round controller 
before |AIBT + 5 Minutes| increases the accuracy of TOBT, i.e. reduces |TOBT - 
AOBT| (Dependent Variable).  
 
Constraints that were considered included: 
• How does the level of workload influence the interactions that are created 
between turn-round controllers and flight crews/ramp agents? 
• Can lack of trust between turn-round controller and flight crews/ramp agents 
resulting from past experience influence TOBT decision making? 
• How does established working procedures of turn-round controllers influence 
TOBT decision making (See also Chapter 6)?  
7.3 The Participants 
The participants (N = 6) were recruited from the very small group of turn-round 
controllers with operational A-CDM experience at Lufthansa Hub Control Centre at 
Munich Airport.  All turn-round controllers at Munich airport have been performing 
turn-round control for a minimum of three years. The age of the turn-round controllers 
ranged between 35 to 52 with 2 females and 4 males in each condition. Munich 
Airport is the first airport in Europe that has emerged as an operational CDM airport 
from prior trials, while other European airports either still have trial status only or 
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handle only smaller amounts of traffic. Due to the local environment, Munich airport 
is a representative example of adverse weather conditions and therefore has experience 
with such operational restrictions. Participants are trained in handling more than 15 
turn-rounds in parallel.  
Problems realized with the selection of such participant group include: 
• Established working procedures may interfere with new turn-round 
functionalities like the proposed experimental design. 
• Inherent refusal to use or mistrust of new functionalities perceived as a threat 
to existing working practices.  
• Inherent mistrust towards other participating actors like ramp agents or flight 
crews based on prior experience.  
The method used was a within-participant experimental design that offered advantages 
like: 
• Intra-operator comparisons increase statistical strength by eliminating 
between-subject variability. 
• The rare existence of the participating group requires fewer subjects to be 
recruited. 
7.4 Experimental Design 
A. Concept of the Experiments: 
The TOBT prediction accuracy experiments built on the design requirements as 
identified during the Cognitive Work Analysis. With the starting point Turn-round 
Control Centre, representing the A-CDM workspace today, a concept for an 
information sharing concept was created that provides a prototype of a cooperative 
environment. It should be able to deliver more accurate and earlier TOBT predictions 
and so avoid CTOTs being made, that cannot be used because the flight is not ready 
for dispatch (see Chapter 1.3). While the Turn-Round Control Mock-up (TRCM) 
provides decision support for TOBT decisions, the improvements for A-CDM as 
pursued by the experiments should result from the increased cooperation that emerges 
from the way of working together. This means that information that is available by 
stakeholders, is proactively shared with A-CDM decision makers compared to 
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information that is shared via request or by accident only. As this is a significant 
change of cooperating during daily working practices, such approach might be able to 
change existing working practices via creation of an awareness where information is 
available or needed and can so used to improve decision making.  
 
 
B. The Turn-round Scenarios: 
The scenarios used for the experiment incorporated real flight data as recorded from 
actual operation at Munich airport. First, an extract was chosen from a daily flight 
schedule of Lufthansa CityLine flights where a peak was observed and all flights 
arrived delayed from outstation due to adverse weather condition (Table 10). During 
the consecutive turn-rounds of these flights, various events were encountered that 
resulted in additional delays of the following outbound flights. The delay causes of 
these turn-round events were then given to experts from other airports who were asked 
to estimate the delay duration of various turn-round events independent from the real 
time duration of the turn-round data from Munich in order to get mean values of the 
turn-round delay events that should be used for building the scenarios. The expert 
assessment was needed to avoid variations of the delay events that should be used for 
the experiments being too large or too small.  
 
TABLE 10: DATA SET AS RECORDED FROM ACTUAL OPERATION (SOURCE: LUFTHANSA, 2009) 
 
FLIGHT DEP EIBT ARR A/C REGT STTT 
 
FLIGHT DES EOBT 
LH 5590 ZAG 11:30:00 MUC AR8 DAVRF 00:35:00 LH 3744 BCN 12:05:00 
LH 7200 GOT 11:35:00 MUC CR9 DACKG 00:35:00 LH 3402 BEG 12:10:00 
LH 4100 BRU 11:50:00 MUC CR9 DACKE 00:35:00 LH 4364 MRS 12:25:00 
LH 5432 BRE 11:50:00 MUC CR7 DACPN 00:35:00 LH 3084 CPH 12:25:00 
LH 4549 BIO 11:55:00 MUC CR7 DACPO 00:35:00 LH 4700 AMS 12:30:00 
LH 5610 FMO 11:55:00 MUC CR2 DACJD 00:30:00 LH 3828 BSL 12:25:00 
LH 4861 MAN 12:00:00 MUC AR8 DAVRB 00:35:00 LH 3314 WAW 12:35:00 
LH 4153 NCE 12:05:00 MUC CR9 DACKA 00:35:00 LH 3334 KRK 12:40:00 
LH 3313 WAW 12:05:00 MUC AR8 DAVRK 00:35:00 LH 4250 CDG 12:40:00 
LH 3083 CPH 12:10:00 MUC CR7 DACPT 00:35:00 LH 4916 BHX 12:45:00 
LH 3685 GVA 12:15:00 MUC AR8 DAVRQ 00:35:00 LH 1072 DRS 12:50:00 
LH 3333 KRK 12:15:00 MUC AR8 DAVRL 00:35:00 LH 3558 TIA 12:50:00 
LH 4345 BUD 12:20:00 MUC CR2 DACJE 00:35:00 LH 5448 VIE 12:55:00 
LH 7564 LHR 12:20:00 MUC CR7 DACPA 00:35:00 LH 3698 DUS 12:55:00 
LH 8342 BEG 12:20:00 MUC AR8 DAVRE 00:35:00 LH 6678 BIO 12:55:00 
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As a next step, only the turn-round events with inherent delays were chosen that are 
highly likely to be known to the pilot or ramp agent before the flight arrives at the 
parking position. Therefore, the flight crew or ramp agents are able to estimate the 
amount of delay caused by this event that has to be reckoned with. The assumption 
was that if this information had been cooperatively shared with the turn-round 
controller either on flight crews’ or ramp agents’ initiative (cooperative information 
sharing), a more accurate TOBT prediction could have been made. All turn-round 
events chosen could be allocated to a specific IATA delay code event.  
Table 11 shows measured operational delay data together with the delay range in 
minutes that actually occurred on from Lufthansa CityLine flights between March and 
September 2009. The event types were used for building the experimental scenarios. 
Thereby it was assumed that all these turn-round events were known to the flight crew 
and such knowledge could be used to cooperatively share it with the turn-round 
controller. Today however, the information about these events and the expected 
duration of delay is not shared in a standardised way. While some flight crews are 
using the ACARS or some ramp agents are using their mobile phone to update the 
turn-round controller about such turn-round events, other flight crews/ ramp agents do 
not forward this information.  
 
TABLE 11: MEASURED OPERATIONAL DELAY DATA I  (SOURCE: LUFTHANSA, 2009) 
 
 
 
 
DELAY CODE 9 15 15 32
∆t in Minutes [3-15] [3-29] [3-29] [3-45]
EVENT TYPE  ADD FUEL  ADD PAX ADD DEBOARDING ADD BULK
Event No 1 2 3 4
Description High Fuel Load Heavy Carry on Luggage 
increases deboarding 
time/ Other related PAX 
Additional WCH or UM 
have to be picked up
Cello or other cabin bulk
DELAY CODE 15 41 18 15
∆t in Minutes [3-29] [2-70] [4-15] [3-29]
EVENT TYPE ADD BOARDING  ADD TEC  ADD LOAD  ADD DEPU 
Event No 5 6 7 8
Description Pre-boarding of WCH, 
UM
Technical Repair Large Amount of DAA 
Baggage  
DEPU on Board
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Keys 
Delay Code Number according to IATA Delay Coding 
∆t in Minutes Delay range in minutes from CLH flights between 
March and September 2009 
CLH Lufthansa CityLine 
Event Type Nature of the delay 
ADD Indicates that the problem was additional to normal 
UPDD Deviation from MTTT due to Updates from Ramp 
PAX Passenger 
WCH Wheel Chair 
UM Unaccompanied Minor 
TEC Technical Issues 
DAA Delivery at Aircraft 
DEPU Deported Passenger 
 
Table 12 shows measured operational delay data together with the delay range in 
minutes that also occurred on these flights with events that were assumed to be known 
to the ramp agent. These event types were additionally used for building the 
experimental scenarios and could be used for cooperative information sharing initiated 
by the ramp agent:  
 
TABLE 12: MEASURED OPERATIONAL DELAY DATA II (SOURCE: LUFTHANSA, 2009) 
 
 
Thereafter, the turn-round events were distributed within the turn-rounds of table 10 
and used for the different experimental scenarios.  
B. The Independent Variables: Different Information Sharing Conditions 
Three different information sharing conditions C0, C1, and C2, used as independent 
variables were embedded within three experimental scenarios A, B, and C. In this 
DELAY CODE 39 35,36,37 32 33,34
∆t in Minutes [5-34] [3-41] [3-45] [3-21]
EVENT TYPE UPDD TEC UPDD SERVICES UPDD LOAD UPDD PERSONNEL 
Event No 10 11 12 13
Description Ground Crew updates 
about changes of 
unavailable services 
(Parking, Air Starter, 
Bridge…)
Service needs 
longer/shorter than 
expected
Loading takes 
longer/shorter than 
scheduled
Missing personnel results in 
delayed turn-round services 
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way, different information was available to the turn-round controller during each 
monitored turn-round: 
• Condition C0 or Baseline Information as the way of information sharing today: 
During condition 0 turn-round scenarios, the turn-round controller was able to 
use information required for TOBT updates which was provided via incoming 
telephone calls and/or by making self-initiated telephone calls with the ramp 
agent or flight crew in order to get the required information. 
• Condition C I included Cooperative Information from Flight crew shared with 
the Turn-round Controller via ACARS: 
During condition C I turn-round scenarios, the effect on TOBT prediction 
accuracy was identified which resulted from flight crew-induced information 
sharing between aircrews and turn-round controller before the first TOBT 
assignment. The turn-round controller was therefore additionally provided with 
information from cockpit via simulated ACARS messages containing 
information required for TOBT updates.  
• Condition C II included Cooperative Information from flight crew and ramp 
agent shared with the turn-round controller via ACARS and HMI:  
During condition C II turn-round scenarios, the effect on TOBT prediction 
accuracy was identified which resulted from flight crew and ramp agent 
induced information sharing between aircrews/ramp agent and turn-round 
controller before second TOBT assignment. The turn-round controller was 
therefore provided with information from cockpit via simulated ACARS 
messages and information from ramp agent via simulated HMI messages 
containing information required for TOBT updates. 
C. The Experimental Scenarios A, B and C: 
The sample group included six turn-round controllers that participated in all three 
experimental scenarios A, B, and C. Each setting included 15 turn-rounds with 
different information sharing conditions (15 turn-rounds represent one 
experimental scenario A, B, or C). All scenarios included a similar amount of such 
information inputs that had an effect on the duration of the turn-round (5- 6 inputs 
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per turn-round).All scenarios included also a similar amount of information that 
did not have an effect on the duration of the turn-round (1-2 inputs per turn-round). 
Randomisation between scenarios was done with a Latin-square 
design.Additionally, each of the experimental scenarios included 100 incoming 
pre-recorded telephone calls from participating actors like flight crews, ramp 
agents, or airport. 
A one-factorial design type of experiment with three information conditions as 
independent variables and TOBT prediction accuracy as dependent variable (Two 
dependent variables as timely scheduled TOBT predictions).  
The three information sharing conditions (C0/CI/CII) were embedded in the three 
experimental scenarios (A/B/C) with sharing the conditions between the turn-
round scenarios as equally distributed as possible. Thereby, the experimental 
scenarios A/B/C had a similar structure. A total of 15 different turn-rounds based 
on the conditions C0, CI, and CII were used from actual recorded operations of the 
Lufthansa CityLine flights. They were randomly distributed within the 
experimental scenarios A, B, and C   in order to minimise the order effect.  
A total of 15 turn-round delay sets were built from Table 11 and Table 12, each 
represented by a number. The delay sets were randomly distributed within the turn-
rounds in order to minimize the order effect.   
The following tables (Table 13- 15) show detailed information about the experimental 
scenarios A, B, and C:  
While the first column shows the turn-round number and the second number (in 
brackets) indicates the turn-round delay event number that was used for the turn-
round, the second column shows the different information sharing conditions that 
were used in the turn-round. 
The third column has the flight number that was not changed during the different 
experimental scenarios and the last three columns show the information that is 
available to the flight crew or ramp agent. If the cell is highlighted in yellow, this 
information was cooperatively shared between flight crew and turn-round 
controller, respectively between flight crew, ramp agent and turn-round controller. 
The white cells indicate that only baseline information was available to the turn-
round controller and represents the information sharing as it is established today. 
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The content of these cells gives the cause of delay analogous the measured 
operational data in Tables 11 and 12. The time indicates the duration of the 
average delay in minutes that has been validated by the SMEs from other airports, 
independent from the measured operational data. 
The cells highlighted in yellow indicate cooperative information sharing 
conditions (C1/C2), while the white cells indicate that only baseline information 
(C0) was available to the turn-round controller: 
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TABLE 13: TURN-ROUND EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIO A: DELAY EVENTS 
TR/ 
SET 
No 
CONDT. 
INBOUND 
FLIGHT 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM FLIGHT CREW (ACARS) 
OUTBOUND 
FLIGHT 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM RAMP AGENT (HMI) 
1 (14) C2 
LH 5590 
ZAG 
UM De-boarding 
+4 Minutes 
Musical 
Instrument 
+4 Minutes 
DAA De-
loading 
+4 Minutes 
LH 3744 
BCN 
Late Fuelling 
+3 Minutes 
WCH De-
boarding 
+5  Minutes 
Late Loading 
Personnel 
+2 Minutes 
2 (10) C2 
LH 7200 
GOT 
Crew Change 
+5 Minutes 
Carry-on Lug 
+3 Minutes 
Cabin Baggage 
+3 Minutes 
LH 3402 
BEG 
Security 
+1 Minutes 
WCH Pick up 
Delay 
+26 Minutes 
React. Fuelling 
+7 Minutes 
3 C0 
LH 4100 
BRU 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+5 Minutes 
High Fuelling 
+3 (No ADD) 
Tec (Oven) 
+12 Minutes 
LH 4364 
MRS 
De-boarding 
delay 
+3 Minutes 
Amount 
Luggage 
+2 Minutes 
Spec. Cleaning 
+5 Minutes 
4 (2) C2 
LH 5432 
BRE 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+7 Minutes 
De-loading 
+4 Minutes 
--- 
LH 3084 
CPH 
Loading 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
Heavy Luggage 
+3 Minutes 
Air Starter 
Delay 
+2 Minutes 
5 C0 
LH 4549 
BIO 
De-boarding 
+5 (NO ADD) 
Tec (TIRE) 
+49 
------ 
LH 4700 
AMS 
Reactionary 
Ramp Agent 
+7(NO ADD) 
De-boarding 
+3 (NO ADD) 
Loading 
+2 (NO ADD) 
6 (4) C1 
LH 5610 
FMO 
Flight crew 
Request 
+6 Minutes 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+3 Minutes 
----- 
LH 3828 
BSL 
Cleaning Delay 
+1 Minutes 
Conveyor INOP 
+26 Minutes 
Late Loading 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
7 (13) C1 
LH 4861 
MAN 
DAA De-loading 
+5 Minutes 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+3 Minutes 
Musical 
Instrument 
+5 Minutes 
LH 3314 
WAW 
Late WCH 
Pickup 
+1 Minutes 
Late Crew 
+6 Minutes 
No Loading 
Person 
+7 Minutes 
8 C0 
LH 4153 
NCE 
Crew Change 
+5 Minutes 
DAA De-Loading 
+4 Minutes 
De- De-
boarding 
+3 Minutes 
LH 3334 
KRK 
No Loading 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
No Pick up for 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
No Push-Back 
+2 Minutes 
9 C0 
LH 3313 
WAW 
Extra Fuelling 
+3 (NO ADD) 
De-boarding 
+5 (NO ADD) 
Tec (NAV) 
+12 Minutes 
LH 4250 
CDG 
Late Fuelling 
+5 (NO ADD) 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+3 (NO ADD) 
Late Loading 
Personnel 
+2 Minutes 
10 (7) C2 
LH 3083 
CPH 
De-boarding UM 
+2 Minutes 
Musical 
Instrument 
+4 Minutes 
DAA De-
loading 
+4 Minutes 
LH 4916 
BHX 
Loading Time 
+2 Minutes 
Late Catering 
+9 Minutes 
No Cleaning 
Personnel  
+7 Minutes 
11 C0 
LH 3685 
GVA 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+12 (NO ADD) 
Tec (COMP.) 
+39 Minutes 
----- 
LH 1072 
DRS 
Late Technician 
+7 Minutes 
Tec Repair 
+3 Minutes 
React PAX Bus 
+2 Minutes 
12 (6) C1 
LH 3333 
KRK 
Cabin Luggage 
+5 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
Refuelling 
+3 Minutes 
LH 3558 
TIA 
Late Crew 
+23 Minutes 
Fuelling Block 
+2 (NO ADD) 
WCH Pick-up 
Delay 
+5 (NO ADD) 
13 
(12) 
C2 
LH 4345 
BUD 
Carry-on Baggage 
+3 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
Refuelling 
+3 Minutes 
LH 5448 
VIE 
No Air Starter 
+23 Minutes 
Crew Change 
+2 Minutes 
Reaction Push 
B 
+5 Minutes 
14 (1) C1 
LH 7564 
LHR 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+6 (NO ADD) 
Tec. (TIRE) 
+38 Minutes 
---- 
LH 3698 
DUS 
No Loading 
Personnel 
+4 Minutes 
No DEPU Pick 
up 
+3 Minutes 
No Push back 
+2 Minutes 
15 
(15) 
C2 
LH 8342 
BEG 
Carry On Luggage 
+3 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
Refuelling 
+3 Minutes 
LH 6678 
BIO 
Late Cleaning 
+4 Minutes 
Conveyor INOP 
+6 Minutes 
No Loading 
Person 
+3 Minutes 
 
 
TABLE 14: TURN-ROUND EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIO B: DELAY EVENTS 
TR/  
SET 
CONDT. 
INBOUND 
FLIGHT 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM  FLIGHT CREW (ACARS) 
OUBOUND 
FLIGHT 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM  RAMP AGENT (HMI) 
1 C0 
LH 5590 
ZAG 
De-boarding WCH 
+6 (NO ADD) 
Tec. (TIRE) 
+38 Minutes 
---- 
LH 3744 
BCN 
No Loading P 
+4 Minutes 
No DEPU BGS 
+3 Minutes 
No Push back 
+2 Minutes 
2 C0 
LH 7200 
GOT 
De-boarding WCH 
+7 Minutes 
De-loading 
+4 Minutes 
--- 
LH 3402 
BEG 
Loading 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
Heavy Luggage 
+3 Minutes 
Air Starter Delay 
+2 Minutes 
3 (11) C1 
LH 4100 
BRU 
De-boarding WCH 
+12 (NO ADD) 
Tec (COMP.) 
+39 Minutes 
----- 
LH 4364 
MRS 
Late Technician 
+7 Minutes 
Tec Repair 
+3 Minutes 
React PAX Bus 
+2 Minutes 
4 (9) C1 
LH 5432 
BRE 
Extra Fuelling 
+3 (NO ADD) 
De-boarding 
+5 (NO ADD) 
Tec (NAV) 
+12 Minutes 
LH 3084 
CPH 
Late Fuelling 
+5 (NO ADD) 
De-boarding  
WCH 
+3 (NO ADD) 
Late Load 
Personnel 
+2 
5 (3) C2 
LH 4549 
BIO 
De-boarding WCH 
+5 Minutes 
High Fuelling 
+3 (No ADD) 
Tec (Oven) 
+12 Minutes 
LH 4700 
AMS 
De-boarding 
delay 
+3 Minutes 
Amount 
Luggage 
+2 Minutes 
Spec. Cleaning 
+5 Minutes 
6 C0 
LH 5610 
FMO 
Cabin Luggage 
+5 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
Refuelling 
+3 Minutes 
LH 3828 
BSL 
Late Crew 
+23 Minutes 
Fuelling Block 
+2 (NO ADD) 
WCH Pick-up 
Delay 
+5 (NO ADD) 
7 (7) C1 
LH 4861 
MAN 
De-boarding UM 
+2 Minutes 
Musical 
Instrument 
+4 Minutes 
DAA De-loading 
+4 Minutes 
LH 3314 
WAW 
Loading Time 
+2 Minutes 
No Flight  
Documents 
+9 Minutes 
No Cleaning 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
8 (10) C1 
LH 4153 
NCE 
Crew Change 
+5 Minutes 
Carry-on Lug 
+3 Minutes 
Cabin Bag 
+3 Minutes 
LH 3334 
KRK 
Security Check 
+1 Minutes 
WCH Pick up 
Delay 
+26 Minutes 
React. Fuelling 
+7 Minutes 
9 (4) C2 
LH 3313 
WAW 
Flight crew 
Request 
+6 Minutes 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+3 Minutes 
----- 
LH 4250 
CDG 
Cleaning Del 
+1 Minutes 
Conveyor INOP 
+26 Minutes 
Late Loading 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
10 (5) C1 
LH 3083 
CPH 
De-boarding 
+5 (NO ADD) 
Tec (TIRE) 
+49 Minutes 
------ 
LH 4916 
BHX 
Reactionary 
Ramp Agent 
+7(NO ADD) 
De-boarding 
+3 (NO ADD) 
Loading 
+2 (NO ADD) 
11 
(13) 
C2 
LH 3685 
GVA 
DAA De-loading 
+5 Minutes 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+3 Minutes 
Musical 
Instrument 
+5 Minutes 
LH 1072 
DRS 
Late WCH Pick-
up 
+1 Minutes 
Late Crew 
+6 Minutes 
No Loading 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
12 C0 
LH 3333 
KRK 
Carry on 
+3 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
Refuelling 
+3 Minutes 
LH 3558 
TIA 
No Air Starter 
+23 Minutes 
Reactionary 
Ramp Agent 
+2 Minutes 
Reaction Push B 
+5 Minutes 
13 (8) C1 
LH 4345 
BUD 
Crew Change 
+5 Minutes 
DAA De-
Loading 
+4 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
LH 5448 
VIE 
No Load. 
Person 
+7 Minutes 
No BGS DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
No Push-Back 
+2 Minutes 
14 C0 
LH 7564 
LHR 
UM De-boarding 
+4 Minutes 
Musical 
Instrument 
+4 Minutes 
DAA De-loading 
+4 Minutes 
LH 3698 
DUS 
Late Fuelling 
+3 Minutes 
WCH De-
boarding 
+5  Minutes 
Late Loading 
Personnel 
+2 Minutes 
15 C0 
LH 8342 
BEG 
Carry On Luggage 
+3 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
Refuelling 
+3 Minutes 
LH 6678 
BIO 
Late Cleaning 
+4 Minutes 
Conveyor INOP 
+6 Minutes 
No Loading 
Person 
+3 Minutes 
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TABLE 15: TURN-ROUND EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIO C: DELAY EVENTS  
TR/ 
SET 
CONDT. 
INBOUND 
FLIGHT 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM FLIGHT CREW (ACARS) 
OUBOUND 
FLIGHT 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM  RAMP AGENT (HMI) 
1 (15) C1 
LH 5590 
ZAG 
Heavy Carry On 
Luggage 
+3 Minutes 
De boarding of  
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
Refuelling 
+3 Minutes 
LH 3744 
BCN 
Late Cleaning 
+4 Minutes 
Conveyor INOP 
+6 Minutes 
No Loading Person 
+3 Minutes 
2 (3) C1 
LH 7200 
GOT 
De-boarding WCH 
+5 Minutes 
High Fuelling 
+3 (No ADD) 
Tec (Oven) 
+12 Minutes 
LH 3402 
BEG 
De-boarding 
delay 
+3 Minutes 
Amount 
Loading 
+2 Minutes 
Spec. Cleaning 
+5 Minutes 
3 (8) C2 
LH 4100 
BRU 
Crew Change 
+5 Minutes 
DAA De-
Loading 
+4 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
LH 4364 
MRS 
No Load. 
Person 
+7 Minutes 
No Pick up for  
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
No Push-Back 
+2 Minutes 
4 C0 
LH 5432 
BRE 
Flight crew 
Request 
+6 Minutes 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+3 Minutes 
----- 
LH 3084 
CPH 
Cleaning Del 
+1 Minutes 
Conveyor INOP 
+26 Minutes 
Late Loading 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
5 (12) C1 
LH 4549 
BIO 
Carry on 
+3 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
Refuelling 
+3 Minutes 
LH 4700 
AMS 
No Air Starter 
+23 Minutes 
Crew Change 
+2 Minutes 
Reaction Push B 
+5 Minutes 
6 (5) C2 
LH 5610 
FMO 
De-boarding 
+5 (NO ADD) 
Tec (TIRE) 
+49 
------ 
LH 3828 
BSL 
Reactionary 
Ramp Agent 
+7(NO ADD) 
De-boarding 
+3 (NO ADD) 
Loading 
+2 (NO ADD) 
7 C0 
LH 4861 
MAN 
De-boarding UM 
+2 Minutes 
Musical 
Instrument 
+4 Minutes 
DAA De-loading 
+4 Minutes 
LH 3314 
WAW 
Loading Time 
+2 Minutes 
No Catering 
+9 Minutes 
No Cleaning 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
8 (11) C2 
LH 4153 
NCE 
De-boarding WCH 
+12 (NO ADD) 
Tec (COMP.) 
+39 Minutes 
----- 
LH 3334 
KRK 
Late Technician 
+7 Minutes 
Tec Repair 
+3 Minutes 
React PAX Bus 
+2 Minutes 
9 (2) C1 
LH 3313 
WAW 
De-boarding 
(WCH) 
+7 Minutes 
De-loading 
+4 Minutes 
--- 
LH 4250 
CDG 
Loading 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
Heavy Luggage 
+3 Minutes 
Air Starter Delay 
+2 Minutes 
10 C0 
LH 3083 
CPH 
Crew Change 
+5 Minutes 
Carry-on Lug 
+3 Minutes 
Cabin Bag 
+3 Minutes 
LH 4916 
BHX 
Security Check 
+1 Minutes 
WCH Pick up 
Delay 
+26 Minutes 
React. Fuelling 
+7 Minutes 
11 (6) C2 
LH 3685 
GVA 
Cabin Luggage 
+5 Minutes 
De-boarding 
DEPU 
+3 Minutes 
Refuelling 
+3 Minutes 
LH 1072 
DRS 
Late Crew 
+23 Minutes 
Fuelling Block 
+2 (NO ADD) 
WCH Pick-up Delay 
+5 (NO ADD) 
12 (9) C2 
LH 3333 
KRK 
Extra Fuelling 
+3 (NO ADD) 
De-boarding 
+5 (NO ADD) 
Technical  
(NAV) 
+12 
LH 3558 
TIA 
Late Fuelling 
+5 (NO ADD) 
De boarding 
WCH 
+3 (NO ADD) 
Late Load Personnel 
+2 Minutes 
13 C0 
LH 4345 
BUD 
DAA De-Loading 
+5 Minutes 
De-boarding 
WCH 
+3 Minutes 
Musical 
Instrument 
+5 Minutes 
LH 5448 
VIE 
Late WCH Pick 
up 
+1 Minutes 
Late Crew 
+6 Minutes 
No Loading 
Personnel 
+7 Minutes 
14 (1) C2 
LH 7564 
LHR 
De-boarding WCH 
+6 (NO ADD) 
Tec. (TIRE) 
+38 Minutes 
---- 
LH 3698 
DUS 
No Loading P 
+4 Minutes 
No DEPU BGS 
+3 Minutes 
No Push back 
+2 Minutes 
15 
(14) 
C1 
LH 8342 
BEG 
UM De-boarding 
+4 Minutes 
Musical 
Instrument 
+4 Minutes 
DAA De-loading 
+4 Minutes 
LH 6678 
BIO 
Late Fuelling 
+3 Minutes 
WCH De 
boarding 
+5  Minutes 
Late Loading 
Personnel 
+2 Minutes 
 
 
D. Experimental Setting Overview 
Experimental Design: Figure 29 illustrates the factorial structure of the 
experiments. Aircraft pilots were participating as interlocutors for the turn-round 
controllers and were placed in a separate room. They were advised to take either the 
role of the flight crew or ramp agent, depending on the kind of contact that the turn-
round controller requested from the interlocutor. 
Counterbalancing: Figure 29 also illustrates how the experimental scenarios were 
counterbalanced. A Latin-square design was used to control this effect as well as a 
switch between the different conditions throughout the experiments. The design was 
counterbalanced for 3 pairs of scenarios with a total of 18 pairs of scenarios. 
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FIGURE 29: FACTORIAL STRUCTURE AND LATIN SQUARE DESIGN 
 
 
E. Measurement Points 
Measurement Point I:  
As part of the underlying aim of getting earlier and more accurate TOBT 
predictions, the first measurement point was recorded at a time representing Milestone 
5 of the A-CDM information-sharing concept. This point represents the inbound 
aircraft at the final approach and TOBT predictions are currently only available via 
Separate Room with Pilots/Ramp Agents
Pilots as interlocutors for the 
turn-round control lers could take
the role of a pilot or ramp agent
Pilot 1 Interlocutor for Particiapant 1
Pilot 2 Interlocutor for Particiapant 2
Pilot 3 Interlocutor for Particiapant 3
Pilot 4 Interlocutor for Particiapant 4
Pilot 5 Interlocutor for Particiapant 5
Pilot 6 Interlocutor for Particiapant 6
Experiment Room 
Turn-round Controller 1 Turn-round Controller 2
Setting A: 5x C0/4x C1/6x C2 Setting A: 5x C0/4x C1/6x C2
Setting B: 6x C0/6x C1/ 3x C2 Setting B: 6x C0/6x C1/ 3x C2
Setting C: 4x C0/ 5x C1/ 6x C2 Setting C: 4x C0/ 5x C1/ 6x C2
Turn-round Controller 3 Turn-round Controller 4
Setting B: 6x C0/6x C1/ 3x C2 Setting B: 6x C0/6x C1/ 3x C2
Setting C: 4x C0/ 5x C1/ 6x C2 Setting C: 4x C0/ 5x C1/ 6x C2
Setting A: 5x C0/4x C1/6x C2 Setting A: 5x C0/4x C1/6x C2
Turn-round Controller 5 Turn-round Controller 6
Setting C: 4x C0/ 5x C1/ 6x C2 Setting C: 4x C0/ 5x C1/ 6x C2
Setting A: 5x C0/4x C1/6x C2 Setting A: 5x C0/4x C1/6x C2
Setting B: 6x C0/6x C1/ 3x C2 Setting B: 6x C0/6x C1/ 3x C2
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automated calculation of the remaining flight time plus EXIT and MTTT. On average, 
this milestone is ten minutes prior to AOBT and time deviations between Milestone 5 
and Milestone 7 (AIBT) are relatively infrequent. This does not apply at airports with 
parallel runways because waiting times may have to be expected on the second 
runway due to arriving aircraft. However, for the experiments, an adherence to the 
predefined variable taxi time was assumed. Therefore, Milestone 5 is proposed as a 
first predictable TOBT to be assigned by the turn-round controller and also used as the 
first measurement point during the experiments.  
Measurement Point II: 
The second measurement point was also determined using the underlying 
assumption that the majority of unpredictable events during turn-round can be 
captured by the ramp agent during the phase between AIBT and five minutes after 
AIBT. This presumes that all turn-round service providers cooperatively share updates 
to their estimated service delivery time with the turn-round controller between 
Milestone 5 and Milestone 8. Upon arrival of the flight at the parking position, the 
ramp agent captures the remaining irregularities and forwards these to the turn-round 
controller. During the experiments, this procedure was simulated via a HMI message 
sent by the ramp agent. The second measurement point for TOBT updates was 
therefore chosen at AIBT plus five minutes.   
At both Measurement Points, the turn-round controllers had to insert their predicted 
TOBT into a spread sheet. These TOBTs had to be determined by (1) using their prior 
experience with turn-round control, (2) the possible support from the proposed TOBT 
of the TRCM and (3) the information received via telephone. It would have been 
possible that the turn-round controller uses only the TOBTs that are proposed by the 
TRCM, because GUI II and TOBT on GUI I were automatically updated with 
information inserted by the controller. In this case the results of the experiments would 
have been compromised by the fact that in one condition the controller accepts a 
machine-generated proposal that would have been available to him, hence the 
experiments would have reproduced the accuracy of the machine generated 
predictions. However, it has been shown that in only in 12% of all turn-rounds the 
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turn-round controller inserted exactly the time [-1; +1 minute] as proposed by the 
TRCM.  
7.5 Experimental Apparatus 
A. The Turn-round Control Work Station and the Turn-round Control Mock-up 
TRCM: 
The experimental apparatus as well as the simulation software were specifically 
developed for these experiments. The aim thereby was to reduce the functionality of 
the turn-round control system that is used during day-to-day operation as far as 
possible down to the basic functions that are required to allow a control of the 
variables relevant for the study. The equipment provided included: 
•  A Turn-round Control Mock-up TRCM as a basic functional station of the turn-
rounds’ controllers working position having two dynamical Graphical User 
Interfaces (GUI). The first GUI showed all flights represented by rectangular 
symbols during the period of an experimental setting. The flights were moving 
horizontally from the inbound phase of the flight until reaching the turn-round 
phase and the outbound phase of the flight. The simulation started 15 minutes prior 
to Estimated In-block Time EIBT and lasted until the last flight reaches its’ 
outbound phase (AIBT + 10 minutes). The second GUI could be accessed by 
clicking on each flight symbol, showing the critical path of turn-round events of 
the flight together with the related turn-round process times and process 
completion times including the turn-round completion time in form of a TOBT. 
Only one screen was available to display both GUIs. Turn-round updates to each 
of the turn-round processes could be inserted into a defined column resulting in an 
automated calculation of a TOBT update. 
• A telephone with short-dial function to reach the interlocutor.  
• A headset for receiving the incoming pre-recorded telephone calls. 
• A spreadsheet with the turn-round experimental setting having two columns to 
insert the TOBT updates at the pre-defined times (EIBT – 10 minutes; AIBT + 5 
Minutes). 
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FIGURE 30: THE EXPERIMENTAL TURN-ROUND CONTROL MOCK-UP 
B. Requirements for the Simulation Software: 
The software used was also specially developed for the experiments, because the 
following conditions should be met: 
• The experimental environment should be comprehensible for an experienced 
turn-round controller. 
• It should not duplicate turn-round controllers working environment exactly, but 
have the functionalities required for analysing the variables of concern. 
Therefore, the environment should not be too realistic in order to alleviate turn-
round controllers’ resistance to something they perceive as competing with their 
current working environment.  
• The experimental environment should allow for making TOBT predictions 
based on available data. 
Since no other system exists that provides these requirements, a Turn-round 
Control Mock-up (TRCM) was specially developed for this purpose with a set of 
design criteria for the software. 
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C. Development of a Software Application for the Turn-round Control Mock-up: 
Before the experiments, a project was initiated aimed at developing a software tool 
that is able to support the experimental TRCM with TOBT predictions based on 
information or data provided to the system. BeOne Hamburg GmbH, a company with 
more than ten years experience in airport management and process design was asked 
to develop the required software application for the TRCM. The required 
specifications were outlined as follows:    
Software Specifications: 
• The software consists of two GUIs.  
• The first GUI application looks like the picture just below (Figure 31). 
 
 
 
 
      FIGURE 31: GUI I SPECIFICATION FOR THE TRCM  
 
 
Depicted aircraft can be divided in four different categories: 
• approaching aircraft (orange); 
• delayed aircraft during approach or turn-round (flashing red); 
• aircraft during turn-round process (mint); and 
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• departed aircraft (blue).   
Any aircraft encountering a EIBT deviation greater or equal 3 minutes starts 
flashing. The turn-round controller can confirm flashing aircraft by mouse click; 
thereafter the flashing stops.The maximum number of aircraft that can be depicted 
is 15. Aircraft are depicted as moving bars with following information directly 
available: 
• flight number;  
• departure and arrival airports according to IATA codes; 
• SIBT (Scheduled In-block time); 
• MTTT (Minimum Turn-round Time). 
• TOBT (Target Off-Block Time); and 
• EIBT (Estimated In-Block Time). 
Arriving aircraft automatically appear on the screen approximately 15 minutes 
before EIBT according to the flight plan or actual flight status. When the aircraft 
has completed the turn-round, the turn-round controller can shade the aircraft after 
sending a movement message. 
The TOBT is calculated automatically using MTTT, but can be updated at any 
time by inserting relevant values into GUI 2. The middle line (the thick red dashed 
line in Figure 31) describes the time of the beginning of the turnaround process 
and is named AIBT (Actual In-Block Time).  
To support the experiments, two time stamps were defined and depicted in the GUI 
application:  EIBT-10; AIBT; AIBT +5. The left line (left red line in Figure 31) 
describes the time stamp used as Measurement Point I (MP I) 10 minutes before 
the beginning of the turnaround process and is labelled EIBT -10 (Estimated In-
block Time -10). The right line (right red line in Figure 31) describes the time 
stamp used as Measurement Point II (MP II) 5 minutes after the beginning of the 
turnaround process and is labelled AIBT +5 Min (Actual In-block Time + 5 
Minutes). Each aircraft are inserted into the simulation 15 minutes before EIBT 
and stay until the simulation ends, but TOBT updates are only possible until AIBT 
+ 5 Min.  
The second GUI application can be activated by clicking on an aircraft being in the 
1st main GUI as depicted in Figure 32. It shows all turnaround processes that the 
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aircraft is passing through. The 2nd GUI application looks like the picture below 
(Figure 32):  
 
 
 
     FIGURE 32: GUI II SPECIFICATION FOR THE TRCM  
 
Each aircraft runs through different turnaround processes (see the left column). The 
alternating solid and light pink colour indicates the next step in the critical path of 
turn-round processes while all processes either in solid or light pink that are in the 
same sequence can take place at the same time. For each turnaround process, the 
following information is depicted in a separate column: 
• Scheduled starting and finishing times normal duration with regard to MTTT; 
• Process Deviation time (Changes), Scheduled Service Delivery Time (SSDT) and 
Scheduled Service Completion Time (SSCT); 
• Time elapsed with defined TOBT + predicted deviation from SSDT; 
Target Service Delivery Times (TSDT) that can be inserted by turn-round 
controller and automatically updates the TOBT in GUI 1; the Target Service 
Completion Time (TSCT) will be calculated automatically by using the Duration 
Time in column 1.  
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STATUS: Each turn-round process is coloured depending on process status. There 
are four turn-round process states (see status column in Figure 32): 
o Planned; 
o Confirmed; 
o Started; and  
o Finished. 
TSDT updates by turn-round controller automatically shift the start and completion 
times of the other turn-round processes within the critical path with the ‘end- result’ 
being an updated TOBT on GUI 1.Appropriately adjusted TOBT is calculated 
automatically and GUI 1 is updated automatically as well by showing the new TOBT. 
The number of processes are defined analogous to the critical path of turn-round 
events (see Chapter 4.4), but can be adjusted by the operator. If a delay arises within 
the critical path, a TOBT deviation is predicted as indicated in red and the subsequent 
critical processes within the chain change their colour in order to indicate that an 
additional confirmation by the service provider about the TSDT/TSCT is required. 
The last column TOBT gives an indication how the entries under ‘Changes’ affect the 
TOBT, e.g. processes which take place in parallel to the critical path do not 
necessarily change the TOBT. This is seen as an essential part of the decision support 
functionality of the TRCM. 
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7.6 Method 
A. Pre-Trials 
Experimental trials were executed three weeks before the main experiments as a 
dry-run for the experimental set-up and scenarios. The aim was also to evaluate the 
following factors: 
• To simulate the day-to-day workload of the turn-round controller as closely as 
possible. 
• The number of incoming telephone calls represents the average number of calls 
during peak hours (approximately 100 incoming calls per hour). 
• The number of turn-rounds represents an average number of turn-rounds 
during peak hours (approximately 15 turn-rounds in parallel). 
• Any specific information from ramp agent or flight crew that is not included in 
the experiments but should be added, because it is essential for TOBT 
prediction. 
• The experimental set-up can be used and understood after a 40 minute 
introduction, followed by 20-minute individual testing of the TRCM by the 
participants. 
After the trials with two turn-round controllers, some fundamental changes had to 
be made that reflected turn-round controllers’ perception of the TRCM. Major 
resistance to the TRCM from turn-round controllers was observed against the TRCM 
because they viewed this tool as a replacement for their established working 
procedures rather than as a mock-up designed for the sake of the experiments alone. 
To counteract this resistance, statements and power point slides were used during the 
introduction of the main experiments to stress the TRCM’s function as an aid to TOBT 
decision making.   
Some minor refinements to the wording in the ACARS/HMI messages were also 
made.   The content was adapted to the wording on the GUI based on trial participants’ 
input in order to better identify the cell where the change has to be inserted. Other 
minor changes also included changes to the GUIs (i.e. the letters were too small). 
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B. Distribution of Instructions and Experiment Run  
The duration of the experiments was settled for one working day and took place in 
a room having all backup functionalities of the standard turn-round control room. 
After the participants took their seats in one of the three rows with the 
workstation/TRCM, the instructions for the experiment were given that had already 
been made available to the participants for home study. A 40-minutes introduction was 
given to the participants on how to use the workstation/TRCM and how to perform 
turn-round control using the telephone, pre-recorded messages, and the TRCM. The 
instructions were also available in printed form. However, the real objectives of the 
study were undisclosed to the participants. This introduction was followed by a 20-
minute individual testing of the TRCM functionalities.  
Airline pilots, employed as interlocutors for the participants, had also received the 
instructions of their tasks two weeks before the experiments in order to have time 
available for home study. A separate 20-minute briefing before the start of the 
experiments was provided to the flight crews as well as a printed form of the 
instructions.  
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Instructions for the participants: 
The following list (Figure 33) shows the instructions and guidelines that were 
available to the participants before the study: 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS 
 
• Three experimental scenarios, each lasting for 55 minutes are proposed that consist of 15 
incoming flights with subsequent turn-rounds. 
• All flights arrive delayed from outstation due to adverse weather in Munich. 
• During each turn-round a number of events occur that have an effect on the length of the 
turn-round. A number of events arrive via simulated ACARS/HMI messages on the turn-
round control Mock-up, other event information arrive via telephone calls or have to be 
asked from the flight crew/ramp agent.  
• Each of the event information that arrives via ACARS/HMI requires a TOBT update by the 
participant, if ADD TIME is indicated; no update if NO ADD TIME is shown. 
• The turn-round control Mock-up as well as the information given does not replace the day-
to-day environment by 1:1. Therefore, the incoming information has to be evaluated by using 
own experience with turn-round control. 
• Two times during each turn-round you will be asked to determine the TOBT for a subsequent 
departure. Please directly insert this TOBT in the spreadsheet on your Table.  
• Additionally you will receive a number of telephone calls and ACARS messages that do not 
require a TOBT update. You can either take the call directly or delay it. The call will then be 
repeated one minute later. Information from telephone calls or other arriving information 
should support getting the required situational awareness about the turn-round status.  
• After the experimental setting is completed you will receive a message: ‘End of 
Experimental Setting - Many thanks for your participation’ 
 
FIGURE 33: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PARTICIPANTS 
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Instructions for the interlocutors: 
The following list (Figure 34) shows the instructions and guidelines that were 
available to the interlocutors before the study. Only airline flight crews were used as 
interlocutors because they are familiar with the turn-round procedures of airlines. All 
flight crews had a minimum experience of three years as airline flight crew:  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INTERLOCUTORS 
 
General 
• The participants (turn-round controllers) receive three experimental scenarios, each having 
the duration of 55 minutes.  
• Each experimental setting consists of 15 incoming flights with subsequent turn-rounds. 
• All flights arrive delayed so that the participants may want to keep the turn-round time short. 
• During each turn-round a number of events occur that have an effect on the duration of the 
turn-round.  
• While some events are shared with the participants via simulated ACARS/HMI messages 
from cockpit/ramp agent (cooperative information sharing), other events are only available to 
the participant, if he calls the flight crew/ramp agent for the flight/turn-round of concern 
(baseline information sharing). 
• Each of the event information that arrives via a simulated ACARS/HMI requires a TOBT 
update by the participant, if ADD TIME is indicated; no update if NO ADD TIME is shown. 
Confidential 
• The baseline information that is handed over to the flight crews before the start of the 
experiments also includes TOBT update proposals which are only given to the 
interlocutors/flight crews. 
• These update proposals are necessary to make TOBT predictions that are required for the 
TOBT accuracy pursued. 
• The flight crews should play the role of the flight crew/ramp agent and forward the event 
information to the participant, only if he participant calls and asks for turn-round status. 
• Each of the information given to the participants has to be noted in the adjacent column.  
 
FIGURE 34: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FLIGHT CREWS 
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Examples of Cooperative Information: 
Figure 35 shows an example of an ACARS message that was provided to the 
participants for condition C1 and required TOBT updates to be inserted into GUI 2: 
 
FIGURE 35: COOPERATIVE INFORMATION SHARED FROM FLIGHT CREWS 
 
 
Figure 36 shows an example of an HMI message that was provided to the 
participants during condition C2 and required TOBT updates to be inserted into the 
GUI2: 
 
FIGURE 36: COOPERATIVE INFORMATION SHARED FROM RAMP AGENTS 
 
Figure 37 shows an example of additional information that was provided to the 
participants during condition C0/C1/C2 and did not require a TOBT update. This 
message represents information from the working position of a Connex Controller 
who is in charge of managing transfer passengers, if the inbound or the connecting 
flight has a delay: 
 
 
FIGURE 37: TURN-ROUND INFORMATION FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING ACTOR 
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Figure 38 shows an example of additional information that was provided to the 
participants during condition C0/C1/C2 and did not require a TOBT update. This 
message represents an update received from CFMU about a CTOT for the affected 
flight: 
 
FIGURE 38: TURN-ROUND INFORMATION FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING ACTOR 
 
Figure 39 shows an example of an incoming pre-recorded telephone call. The 
participant could either take the call directly (ja) or delay it by one minute (nein): 
 
 
FIGURE 39:  MESSAGE FOR INCOMING PRE-RECORDED TELEFON CALL 
 
Training phase: 
After the instructions were given, the participants had 20 minutes to familiarise 
themselves with the TRCM functionalities they were required to use.  
No questions remained open after this training phase, which included a demonstration 
of all interactions used during the course of the experiments.  
Experimental Conditions: 
Each experimental setting lasted for 55 minutes. After each experimental scenario, 
the participants were allowed to take breaks as necessary. A feedback sheet was 
handed out with questions on the experiments in order to assure that the workload 
perceived by the participants did not exceed day-to-day demand and that the 
participants felt well treated during the day.  
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FIGURE 40: THE PARTICIPANTS & THE EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 
 
7.7 Data Analysis and Results  
A. Analysis Software 
The collected data was depicted in Excel Tables and SPSS Statistics Version 18.0 
was used to analyse the results using descriptive statistics and inferential statistics via 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Friedman test, Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests, Bonferroni 
adjustments, and Games-Howell test on the results. 
B.Selection of Statistical Method 
The nature of the experimental design relies heavily upon non-parametric statistics, 
since a pre-test with Kolmogorov-Smirnov showed that the DV is not normally 
distributed (see Table 17).  
Box plot diagrams were used to analyse and visualize the data. The main statistical 
analysis was done via a Friedman test as such is able for non-parametric testing of 
differences between variables with the dependent variable that is measured being 
ordinal. It is based on the following assumptions: 
• One group is measured on three or more different occasions. 
• The group is a random sample from the population. 
• One dependent variable is either ordinal, interval or ratio and 
• The sample does not need to be normally distributed. 
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A post-hoc test was required in order to identify where the differences between the 
different information sharing conditions exactly occurs. A Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test 
was chosen for this purpose. As a second post-hoc test, the Games-Howell test was 
used to test for the homogeneity of the variance between the participants. The Games-
Howell test is able to identify single differences between the heterogeneity of 
variances and does not rely on homogeneity of variance. 
C. Inducing Statistical Significance: 
The following difficulties were assessed before conducting the analysis on the data 
obtained by the experiments: 
• Carry-over Effect: the participants transfer something from one scenario to 
another. Due to the small amount of participants, the carry-over effect could be 
assessed from each participant individually. No major changes in behaviour 
during the course of the experiments could be observed from all participating. 
• Order Effect: the order of the conditions has an effect on the dependent 
variable. This effect was avoided by counterbalancing the information sharing 
condition within the three experimental scenarios using Latin-Square tables for 
experimental scenarios A/B/C.  
• Imparity Effect: Some turn-round scenarios may be more difficult to handle 
than others. This effect was reduced by maintaining the amount of information 
almost constant for each turn-round condition and scenario. 
D.Data Analysis 
All TOBTs received by the participants in the spreadsheet were organized as 
follows: 
Based on the EIBT of each flight, the turn-round time estimated by the participant 
was calculated via |TOBT I - EIBT| and |TOBT II - EIBT|. This was used to compare 
the deviations from MTTT and get an understanding about the different ways of 
participants’ TOBT assignment behaviour. A significance level of P = 0.05 was 
chosen.  
Then, |TOBT I - AOBT| and |TOBT II - AOBT| were calculated and used in order to 
perform the Friedman test. The Friedman test is able to handle non-parametric data 
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distribution as it is received for the values of the DV ‘expected deviation from MTTT’ 
at the two test points (measurement points) under the three information sharing 
conditions C0/C1/C2. The DV were labelled as (Table 16):  
 
      TABLE 16: LABELING CONVENTION OF TEST VARIABLES 
Mode of Test Variables Label of Test Variables 
No cooperative Information Sharing C0/ Measurement Point I C0 MPI 
Cooperative Information Sharing C1/ Measurement Point I C1 MPI 
Cooperative Information Sharing C2/ Measurement Point I C2 MPI 
No cooperative Information Sharing C0/ Measurement Point II C0 MPII 
Cooperative Information Sharing C1/ Measurement Point II C1 MPII 
Cooperative Information Sharing C2/ Measurement Point II C2 MPII 
Table 17 shows the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test: 
      TABLE 17: KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST 
 
The KS-Test reports that the relative distribution of the data from the DV is non-
parametric.  
 
 
 
Turn-round Time Actual  
at MP I 
Actual at 
MP II 
Predicted 
at MP I 
Predicted  
at MP II 
Predicted 
at MP I 
Predicted  
at MP II 
Predicted 
at MP I 
Predicted  
at MP II 
Condition C0 C0 C0 C0 C1 C1 C2 C2 
N 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Parameter of the 
standard 
distribution 
Mean 48,66 57,73 38,50 41,30 45,19 45,48 44,88 52,98 
Standard 
Deviation 
11,20 13,03 10,82 12,68 10,61 11,63 10,43 12,38 
Most extreme 
differences 
Absolute ,359 ,213 ,316 ,269 ,252 ,228 ,251 ,140 
Positive ,359 ,213 ,316 ,269 ,252 ,228 ,251 ,140 
Negative -,153 -,179 -,229 -,188 -,168 -,162 -,172 -,102 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Z 3,407 2,018 2,995 2,555 2,386 2,166 2,380 1,330 
Asymptotic  Significance 
 (2-tailed) 
,000 ,001 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,058 
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E. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 18 shows the deviations of the predicted TOBT from actual off-block time at the 
different measurement points while applying the different conditions C0, C1, and C2 
in minutes: 
TABLE 18: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM EXPERIMENTS 
Measure/ Test 
Point*  
Measurement 
Point 1/C0 
Measurement 
Point 2/C0 
Measurement 
Point 1/C1 
Measurement 
Point 2/C1 
Measurement 
Point 1/C2 
Measurement 
Point 2/C2 
Mean |TOBT- AOBT| 21,21* 20,39 12,74 14,59 12,86 5,00 
Max |TOBT- AOBT| 59 47 38 44 38 26 
Min |TOBT- AOBT| 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Median |TOBT- 
AOBT| 18,00 18,00 10,00 12,00 11,00 3,00 
Standard Deviation 14,01 12,41 10,95 11,62 10,42 5,27 
*All units in minutes 
 
Figure 41 shows a box-and-whisker diagram with the deviation of the predicted 
TOBT from the actual turn-round time at measurement point I and II during conditions 
C0, C1, and C2 in minutes. While the middle of the box represents the median 
assigned TOBT, the bottom and the top of the box represent the 25th percentile 
(bottom) and the 75th percentile (top) of all assigned TOBTs. While the upper end of 
whisker at C0MPII and the lower end of the whisker at C1MPI, C2MPI, and C2MPII 
represent the maximum, respectively the minimum value of all assigned TOBTs, the 
lowest/ highest ends of the other values are still within 1.5 Inter-Quartile Range (IQR) 
of the lower/upper quartile, but as indicated by the dots/stars there are some weak 
outliers (dots) and some strong outliers (stars). 
 Chapter 7: TOBT Prediction Accuracy Experiments   
 
          Matthias Groppe                Influences on Aircraft TOBT Prediction Accuracy                    185                 
 
FIGURE 41: PLOT OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PREDICTED TOBT 
  
x-axis: measurement points with different information conditions 
y-axis: +/- deviation from actual TOBT in minutes 
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Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics of the Friedman Test at Measurement Point I: 
TABLE 19: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AT MEASUREMENT POINT I 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
N 
Percentiles 
25. 50. (Median) 75. 
C0 MPI 90 10.00 18.00 35.25 
C1 MPI 90 4.00 10.00 17.00 
C2 MPI 90 4.75 11.00 19.00 
 
There was a statistically significant difference in TOBT assignment accuracy 
depending on which information was provided to the participants whilst assigning the 
first TOBT update for the turn-rounds,  χ²(2) = 71,514, P = 0.003. 
Table 20 shows the descriptive statistics of the Friedman Test at Measurement Point II: 
 
TABLE 20: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AT MEASUREMENT POINT II 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
N 
Percentiles 
25. 50. (Median) 75. 
C0 MPII 90 10.00 18.00 30.00 
C1 MPII 90 5.00 12.00 19.25 
C2 MPII 90 1.00 3.00 8.00 
 
 
There was a statistically significant difference in TOBT assignment accuracy 
depending on which information was provided to the participant whilst assigning the 
second TOBT update for the turn-rounds,  χ²(2) = 90,875, P = 0.003. 
F.Post-hoc Tests 
In order to examine the differences of |AIBT - TOBT| between the related information 
sharing conditions C0/C1/C2 that actually occur, a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test was 
used that is able to identify the differences without making assumptions about their 
distribution and the participants or repeated measurements can be from the same 
sample group.   
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     Table 21, 22 and 23 show the Rank Scores at Measurement Point I: 
TABLE 21: TEST 1 RANK SCORES BETWEEN C0 AND C 1 AT MEASUREMENT POINT I 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
C1 MPI - C0 MPI Negative Ranks 73a 43.45 3171.50 
Positive Ranks 11b 36.23 398.50 
Ties 6c   
Total 90   
a. C1 MPI < C0 MPI 
b. C1 MPI > C0 MPI 
c. C1 MPI = C0 MPI 
 
 
TABLE 22: TEST 2 RANK SCORES BETWEEN C0 AND C 2 AT MEASUREMENT POINT I 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
C2 MPI - C0 MPI Negative Ranks 72a 40.79 2937.00 
Positive Ranks 8b 37.88 303.00 
Ties 10c   
Total 90   
a. C2 MPI < C0 MPI 
b. C2 MPI > C0 MPI 
c. C2 MPI = C0 MPI 
 
 
TABLE 23: TEST 3 RANK SCORES BETWEEN C1 AND C 2 AT MEASUREMENT POINT I 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
C2 MPI – C1 MPI Negative Ranks 40a 40.01 1600.50 
Positive Ranks 41b 41.96 1720.50 
Ties 9c   
Total 90   
a. C2 MPI < C1 MPI 
b. C2 MPI > C1 MPI 
c. C2 MPI = C1 MPI 
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Table 24, 25 and 26 show the Rank Scores at Measurement Point II: 
 
TABLE 24: TEST 4 RANK SCORES BETWEEN C0 AND C 1 AT MEASUREMENT POINT II 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
C1 MPII - C0 MPII Negative Ranks 60a 45.28 2717.00 
Positive Ranks 23b 33.43 769.00 
Ties 7c   
Total 90   
a. C1 MPII <  C0 MPII 
b. C1 MPII  > C0 MPII 
c. C1 MPII = C0 MPII 
  
 
  TABLE 25:TEST 5 RANK SCORES BETWEEN C0 AND C 2 AT MEASUREMENT POINT II 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
C2 MPII - C0 MPII Negative Ranks 80a 43.33 3466.00 
Positive Ranks 3b 6.67 20.00 
Ties 7c   
Total 90   
a. C2 MPII < C0 MPII 
b. C2 MPII  > C0 MPII 
c. C2 MPII = C0 MPII 
 
TABLE 26: TEST 6 RANK SCORES BETWEEN C1 AND C 2 AT MEASUREMENT POINT II 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
C2 MPII – C1 MPII Negative Ranks 73a 49.35 3602.50 
Positive Ranks 16b 25.16 402.50 
Ties 1c   
Total 90   
a. C2 MPII < C1 MPII 
b. C2 MPII  > C1MPII 
c. C2 MPII =  C1 MPII 
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Test 7: The Games-Howell-Test identified only two significant differences among all 
data sets of the turn-round controllers (see Appendix VII). 
G.Test Statistics of Post Hoc Tests 1 – 7 
Post-hoc analysis with Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests and Bonferroni correction 
applied resulted in a significance level set at P < 0.017. Median (IQR) assigned 
differences in TOBT prediction accuracy for the C0, C1, and C2 information sharing 
condition were 18.0 minutes (10 to 35.25), 10.0 minutes (4 to 17) and 11.0 minutes 
(4.75 to 19), respectively.  
Test 1 (significant): At measurement point I, there were significant differences 
between C0 information sharing and C1 information sharing condition, if information 
was cooperatively shared between flight crews and turn-round controller. The 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test showed that cooperative information shared between 
flight crews and turn-round controllers elicited a statistically significant change in 
TOBT prediction ten minutes prior estimated aircraft in-block time (Z = -6,188; P = 
0.003). The median between the different TOBT prediction scores was 8.00.  
Test 2 (significant): At measurement point I, there were significant differences 
between C0 information sharing and C1 information sharing condition, if information 
was additionally provided by ramp agent. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test showed 
that cooperative information shared between flight crews/ramp agents and turn-round 
controllers elicited a statistically significant change in TOBT prediction ten minutes 
prior estimated aircraft in-block time (Z = -6,320; P = 0.003). The median between the 
different TOBT prediction scores was 7.00.  
Test 3 (not significant): At measurement point I, there was no significant 
difference between C1 and C2 information sharing condition despite the overall 
deviation from AOBT, if information is cooperatively shared between flight crews, 
ramp agents, and turn-round controllers. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test showed 
that cooperative information shared only between flight crews and turn-round 
controllers compared to cooperative information sharing between flight crews/ramp 
agents and turn-round controllers did not elicit a statistically significant change in 
TOBT prediction ten minutes prior estimated aircraft in-block time (Z = -2,83; P = 
0.777). The median between the different TOBT prediction scores was 1.00.  
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Test 4 (significant): At measurement point II, there were also significant 
differences between C0 information sharing and C1 information sharing condition, if 
information were cooperatively shared between flight crews and turn-round 
controllers. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test showed that cooperative information 
shared between flight crews and turn-round controllers elicited a statistically 
significant change in TOBT prediction five minutes actual aircraft in-block time (Z = -
4,426; P = 0.000). The median between the different TOBT prediction scores was 
6.00.  
Test 5 (significant): At measurement point II, there were also significant 
differences between C0 information sharing and C1 information sharing condition, if 
information were additionally provided by the ramp agent. The Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test showed that cooperative information shared between flight crews/ramp 
agents and turn-round controllers elicited a statistically significant change in TOBT 
prediction five minutes actual aircraft in-block time (Z = -7,825; P = 0.000). The 
median between the different TOBT prediction scores was 15.00.  
Test 6 (significant): Comparing measurement point I and II, there were also 
significant differences, when comparing cooperative information sharing between 
flight crews and turn-round controllers or additional information provided by the ramp 
agent. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test showed that cooperative information shared 
only between flight crews and turn-round controllers compared to flight crews/ramp 
agents and turn-round controllers elicited a statistically significant change in TOBT 
prediction five minutes actual aircraft in-block time (Z = -6,551; P = 0.000). The 
median between the different TOBT prediction scores was 9.00.  
Test 7 (significant): The Games-Howell Test showed that there was no significant 
difference between the turn-round controllers throughout all experimental conditions 
C0, C1, and C2; p < .05. Therefore it is statistically significant that the results of the 
controllers’ assessment are valid.    
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H. Distinctive Features of the Experiment Results 
• A total of 540 TOBT assignments were noted during the experiments (90 per 
participant) 
• Out of all 540 TOBTs which were assigned during the experiments, only 34 
TOBTs were assigned with Estimated TOBT (+/- 1 minute) > AOBT (6.30 %).  
• Out of all 540 TOBTs, only 65 TOBTs (12.0%)  were assigned using the 
TOBT that was proposed by the Turn-round Control Mock-up [-1; +1 minute].  
• Out of all 180 Scenarios where no cooperative information was provided, 25 
TOBT assignments were based on turn-round times short than MTTT (13.9%) 
• The second column of Table 26 shows the number of TOBT updates that 
participants inserted into the ‘change’ column on the TRCM in GUI 2. This 
was part of the experiment instructions; however, only one participant 
occasionally (12.0%) used the TOBT proposal from the TRCM, but denoted 
the information from the ACARS/HMI messages and calculated the TOBTs on 
the spreadsheet. Table 27 also shows the number of outgoing telephone calls, 
where the participants contacted the interlocutor during the experiments. 
Column three are the number of calls that were used by the participants to 
actively acquire information; whereas column four are the number of telephone 
calls without any specific information request by the controller.  
 
TABLE 27: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM EXPERIMENTS 
 
Participant 
No of TOBT Updates 
during Experiment 
No I/II/III 
Telephone Call with 
Information Request 
Telephone Call without 
Information Request 
1 41/46/42 21 20 
2 57/56/59 9 11 
3 36/31/40 18 23 
4 56/48/52 6 12 
5 31/32/42 5 20 
6 4/5/4 3 11 
 
• Two Participants used the spreadsheet to calculate TOBT predictions. 
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• Three participants denoted the CTOT time that was provided for a number of 
flights next to the TOBT column. Then they used the CTOT to determine 
TOBT estimates.   
• All participants denoted the known major delays from technical aircraft status 
or crew delay next to the TOBT column.  
• Table 18/ Figure 41 show a significant decrease in TOBT deviation and 
decreasing range from actual turn-round time, when comparing the TOBT that 
was assigned at measurement point I with the different information sharing 
conditions C0, C1, and C2.  
• Table 18/ Figure 41 show also a significant decrease in TOBT deviation and 
decreasing range from actual turn-round time, when comparing the TOBT that 
was assigned at measurement point II with the different information sharing 
conditions C0, C1, and C2. 
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I. Distinctive Features from the Participants Feedback 
 
TABLE 28: QUALITATIVE DATA FROM EXPERIMENTS  
 
Statements  
Fully 
Agree 
Rather 
Agree 
Rather 
Disagree 
Fully 
Disagree 
Content of the experiments was relevant to my 
day-to-day work 
4* 2   
The workload during experiments was comparable 
to my day-to-day work 
2 4   
The cooperative information received was useful 
to increase Situational Awareness for the turn-
round control  
 4 2  
Generally I was satisfied with operation of the 
Turn-round Control Mock-up  
 4 2  
The cooperative information from cockpit were 
useful for TOBT prediction 
 5 1  
The cooperative information from ramp agent was 
useful for TOBT prediction 
 5 1  
Too much information was depicted 2 4   
Additional information is required  4 2  
If additional information is required, please give 
examples 
Crew Delays, Technical Info, TSAT, Transit 
Passengers (RDS), Ready for Boarding Messages 
*All units are No of participants 
7.8 Limitations, Control and Validity of the Experiments 
Two issues concerning the TRCM, in particular, require further discussion. First, 
there was a concern whether the TOBT assignment was based on the TRCM proposal 
or personal experience with turn-round control.  It would have been possible that the 
participants adopted a strategy of just ‘playing the game’ or devoted cognitive 
resources from their own experiences for turn-round monitoring. The high workload 
condition could be an indication that the participants had to prioritise tasks and 
therefore used a lower-level-effort strategy. Thus, it would not be surprising that the 
participants were too busy using their telephones to get required information from the 
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ramp or flight crew directly. However, a strong indication that the participants used 
their own strategy based on experience is the small number of TOBT predictions that 
were based on the TOBT proposed by the TRCM (See also Chapter 7.8).    
Second, a methodological limitation could have resulted from the design of the 
study: information provided via pre-recorded telephone calls or ACARS messages 
included also generic information related to Munich airport operation. Although 
participants were instructed to not use such information for TOBT updates, feedback 
after the study revealed that participants were somehow confused by some of this 
information. It is therefore not possible to assess the extent that such information 
influenced overall turn-round control.  
The scenarios included also a greater number of delayed and hence critical turn-
rounds than in reality. Therefore, the benefits of information sharing will not be 
quantitatively the same in reality.  
Control and Validity  
Control of experiments with human participants is difficult to achieve because of 
the different personalities, intelligence and experience level of the participants. The 
control for this study was therefore maximised by the nature of its design. Measures 
taken included avoiding non-equivalent control groups by using the participants as 
control group and counterbalancing the experimental scenarios. Effects resulting from 
history, maturation, instrumentation, mortality, and diffusion of treatment were 
neglected due to the design of the experiments. While a testing effect could not be 
observed, a possible experimenter effect was avoided by predefined instructions given 
to the participants before the experiments as well as a single –blind experimental 
design where the participants were not informed of the manipulation of the provided 
variable. The participant effect was avoided by signalising a different aim of the 
experiments than the manipulation. The participants thought that the focus of the 
experiments was on cooperation between interlocutors and participants rather than on 
TOBT accuracy. Only one participant could be observed using such imagined demand 
characteristics during the experiments: the participant used his telephone in order to 
share the information that he received via ACARS with the interlocutor instead of 
using the information from the interlocutor.  
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A number of measures was undertaken to keep the external validity high. This 
includes the selection of turn-round controllers as participants (See Chapter 7.3) and 
the design of the Turn-round control Mock-up (See Chapter 7.5). Therefore, the 
external validity of the experiments that allows a generalisation of the results is seen 
as very high. Despite the artificiality of the situation, the experiments can be applied to 
other A-CDM airports, assuming that the workload of the turn-round controllers, as 
well as their workplace scenarios remain comparable. A systematic replication of the 
experimental setting at other CDM airports is therefore recommended to further 
elaborate the findings of this study.  
7.9 Concluding Aspects  
By using non-parametric statistics it could be demonstrated that there was a 
statistically significant difference in TOBT assignment accuracy depending on which 
information was provided to the participant.  Interpretation of these results indicates 
that there is a strong indication (Test 1/2/4/5/6) that cooperative information provided 
from cockpit and ramp can significantly improve TOBT predictions. As indicated by 
measurement point I, not only can predictions be more accurate, they can also be 
available at an earlier stage of the flight/turn-round than today.  
Results from Test 3 are not surprising, because before measurement point I no 
cooperative information was provided from ramp agent that may have influenced the 
TOBT assignment.  
Even though the participants stated that the workload level was realistic compared 
to day-to-day business, they complained of information overload during the 
experiments. This could be an indication that the workload during adverse conditions 
exceeds the level acceptable to the participants. In these cases, there is an inherent risk 
of losing situational awareness at a level that is required for monitoring turn-rounds.   
The controllers almost always underestimated the duration of the turn-round (See 
Chapter 7.8). This indicates also the intentions of the controllers to keep the turn-
round delay short.  
Overall, during experimental studies with turn-round controllers as participants and 
airline flight crews as interlocutors, it was possible to influence TOBT decision 
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making positively to achieve more accurate predictions of the estimated turn-round 
end. As postulated in Hypothesis I and II, the cooperative information from the 
cockpit and ramp not only improved turn-round completion predictability, the 
cooperative aspect of the experimental setting also seemed to have influenced the 
cooperative attitude of the participants. As indicated in the questionnaire directly 
following the experiments, the participants welcomed the opportunity to cooperatively 
share information among the distributed participants of the turn-round and their 
workplace.  
Therefore Hypothesis I, Information required for TOBT updates which is 
cooperatively shared between flight crews and turn-round controller before |EIBT - 10 
Minutes| increases the accuracy of TOBT, and Hypothesis II Information required for 
TOBT updates (independent variable) which is cooperatively shared between flight 
crew, ramp agent and turn-round controller before |AIBT + 5 Minutes| increases the 
accuracy of TOBT, i.e. reduces |TOBT - AOBT|, could be validated.         
However, while the participants appreciated the cooperative attitude of the 
participating flight crews, they had to cope with an information overload condition 
comparable to their day-to-day working environment. All participants agreed that the 
information overload and workload in general during the experiments was similar to 
their actual working situations.  
7.10 Discussion  
The approach chosen requires asking about the validity of a laboratory approach for 
complementing field observations. The underlying question here was how the 
laboratory setting could be used to gain insights into or contribute to the design of 
field studies that would further increase the credibility of the field observations. 
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that more control can be gained in the 
laboratory than in the field studies. This approach also includes the assumption that the 
laboratory cannot substitute field investigations.  
It is argued however that a discussion about comparability of lab and field scenarios 
is not relevant for this research for several reasons. Firstly, all phases of the project 
were seeking practical significance and are therefore applied type research questions. 
Secondly, the first, second, and third phases of the research highlights the constraints 
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to TOBT assignment, while the last phase sought potential solutions. The research 
setting in this final phase was designed as closely as possible to reality which is, 
according to Skraaning (2003), the only possibility for combining laboratory and field 
studies. Such an approach entails conducting simulator studies in complex operational 
environments as they can be found during turn-round management. Thirdly, all phases 
of the research had their own objectives that were addressed at the relevant stages. 
Different aspects were centred in each study approach to grasp the specific aspects that 
were identified for the TOBT assignment problem, starting from a broad ecological 
perspective to a view focused on individual cognitive aspects towards TOBT 
prediction. As an analogy, this approach can be compared with the task of building the 
shortest, most suitable road from A to B in a fairly unknown terrain. This will not be 
possible, if the topological or surface factors remain unknown. As for the TOBT, it 
can only be determined successfully, if the factors influencing the adherence are 
known and then regarded.   
A key message for the still inherent constraints on cooperation revealed during the 
feedback from turn-round controllers after the experiments is the little amount of 
awareness that the airline company itself places on the need for reliable TOBT 
predictions: Instead of increasing mutual trust and understanding of other participating 
CDM partner’s operation, the reality is shaped by increasing pressure and high 
workload levels, also affecting available options for successful turn-round control and 
so also TOBT accuracy. One major issue here is the uncertainty about other partners’ 
behaviour, e.g. ‘what happens exactly if the CTOT or TSAT is lost?’ ‘Isn’t it better to 
first give the earlier departure a try?’ Such continuing mistrust among partners fosters 
the focus on the advantages of the airlines’ own operation instead of establishing a 
broader view onto the network benefits.  Additionally, given the high work load, 
adherent to turn-round controllers’ jobs, emphasis can barely be placed on establishing 
cooperation with other participants or information gathering for TOBT predictions, 
when focus has to be placed on minimising delay or keeping pace with the other duties 
on task. Such pressure also explains the reduction of turn-round time below MTTT 
that was surprisingly often applied by turn-round controllers instead of getting a 
realistic picture of the required turn-round duration. E.g. hardly any TOBT prediction 
exceeded the actual turn-round time (see Chapter 7.7).  
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An example was provided by the participants and the flight crews, which revealed 
to be useful in illustrating this chain of constraints during daily routine operations: 
Starting situation is any turn-round event with a confirmed duration of the estimated 
delay by a SME: either the still existing possibility that the delay could actually be 
also shorter than predicted or the option to compensate the delay by accelerating other 
turn-round processes, together with the underlying pressure to keep delays short, 
causes the turn-round controller to predict a TOBT that does not incorporate the full 
process duration of all turn-round processes. Experiences with such situations in the 
past have confirmed that for a certain amount of turn-rounds this strategy was 
successful and TOBT could be maintained. At the same time, the number of flight 
crews expressing dissatisfaction or declining to accelerated turn-round has to be put up 
with the advantage having minimised the delay at least for a certain number of turn-
rounds. In the majority, however, this strategy doesn’t work when comparing the cost 
of missing a CTOT versus cost of reassigning a later CTOT, thus resulting in network 
benefits from improved TOBT prediction accuracy.  
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8 SUMMARIES, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Conclusion on the Methodological Framework Chosen  
The framework chosen as well as the methods used for the analyses revealed being 
able to account for the environmental constraints affecting TOBT prediction and the 
cognitive factors influencing the human-information interactions of the participants. A 
Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) was used which was aimed at identifying the 
constraints shaping these interactions during turn-round, grasping the information 
behaviour of the actors at the various distributed locations, and also the reason for their 
actions. Tools proposed by the CWA and conceptual constructs provided the structure 
for the design of this human-information interaction analysis. The results were then 
applied to specific turn-round situations, and used as a guide for designing the 
experiments that simultaneously included facets from social, technological, and 
organisational aspects of the contemplated situations.    
A set of research activities was proposed to answer the research questions presented 
as outlined in Chapter 1. The Chapter here summarizes these methods and discusses 
the advantages and disadvantages of the applied research procedures. Generally, three 
research methods were used to investigate the problems of TOBT inaccuracy. First, a 
formative analysis was chosen based on document analysis, stakeholder discussions, 
and SME interviews. In contrast to a normative approach, this form provided a 
structure for analysing how things could rather than should be done. Second, a 
descriptive form of analysis was chosen with data collection via survey and field 
studies. Even though this form has reduced controllability, it offers high external and 
ecological validity. Finally, an explanatory method was used via experimental studies 
in a controlled setting with human-in-the-loop, allowing for a full control of the 
influencing variables and keeping the internal validity high.    
To control the advantages and disadvantages of each method, a combination of all 
approaches was chosen to arrive at a comprehensive description of the influencing 
factors and possible strategies to mitigate the current problem with TOBT prediction. 
This combination of methods not only allowed a logical and iterative zoom-in from 
the turn-round environment to the specific problem of TOBT assignment, but is also 
seen as a complementary approach to the problem. 
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8.2 Data Organization, Hypothesis Testing, and Statistical Analysis 
The first two phases of the project were aimed at identifying descriptive 
information. The qualitative data that was gained from these phases was organized in 
class interval frequency distributions. Descriptive data analysis was applied to obtain 
measures of central tendency via a Likert scale, e.g. from various critical turn-round 
situations or the dispersion of possible delay avoidance. Even with the restriction in 
mind that the survey with flight crews acquired qualitative data only, correlation 
analysis was carried out, e.g. between the turn-round process delay and the departure 
delay of the consecutive flight by using Spearman’s rho as a coefficient to measure 
two variables on an ordinal scale. As an alternate-forms reliability test, moderate to 
strong relationship could be demonstrated by using equivalent questions. Equivalency 
was assured by using the same difficulty level, instructions and format of test. 
The data gained during the third phase via field observations was organized in a 
qualitative cognitive model that could be used to analyse the mental models of the 
turn-round controllers and their data requirements. 
The basic issues from the final phase of the research are related to the specific 
experimental setting of a correlated groups design: originated from the rare existence 
of the participants, an experimental condition showed advantageous which allows 
serving the experimental as well as the control condition. Since all participants served 
all conditions, randomisation was not necessary. The greatest benefit however was 
gained from statistical power, because individual differences could be minimised 
under the applied conditions. Variability between the three conditions under analysis 
came from the manipulation of the independent variable ‘information sharing’ and 
according to Jackson (2008) has the potential to provide a purer measure of the true 
effects of this variable. 
The focus of the analysis was to validate the specific information distribution in the 
contemplated environment, but not the specific details of the information. Therefore, 
only a small number of hypotheses was used that account for the problems related to 
information distribution between the turn-round controllers and the flight crews/ramp 
agents. Inferential statistics were used to draw the conclusions about the participants 
under analysis based on the data collected through the experiments. The hypotheses 
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testing chosen was valid for the proposed one-tailed hypotheses with an alpha level of 
.05 statistical significance. Such a 5% risk of Type I error is common in social and 
behavioural scenarios and is so seen as also acceptable for the proposed experiments.   
Since the characteristics (µ) or deviation (ơ) of the analysed population revealed to 
be non-standard distributed, a non-parametric test was used that does not require m 
and s parameters. The Friedman Test, also called a two-way analysis on ranks, was 
suitable because it did not require a standard distribution of the analysed data. It was 
used to detect differences in treatments (condition 0, I, and II) across multiple test 
attempts (scenarios) by modelling the ratings of n rows representing the different turn-
rounds on k columns as the different turn-round sets under analysis.  
The repeated measures ANOVA test however could not be used because it requires 
a normal distribution of the data and compared to the Quade Test, Friedman showed 
stronger significance with given sample size. As a post-hoc test, the Wilcoxon Signed-
Ranks Test with Boferroni adjustments on the chosen alpha level was applied.   
8.3 Conclusion from Cognitive Work Analysis  
The Cognitive Work Analysis as the overall framework chosen for the project 
revealed to be useful for the analysis of the A-CDM work system. It aimed at 
identifying the constraints from environmental factors that have an influence on TOBT 
prediction accuracy. The large number of turn-round participants being at distributed 
locations and therefore inherent constraints on decision making called for an analysis 
with an ecological perspective that can handle both the intentional and physical 
constraints on the actions of all participating. Since this form of analysis is not based 
on quantitative measures, an early validation of the results from such form of analysis 
was pursued to verify that the analysis was on track. Results from the survey were 
used to provide an independent source of information for the validation of the 
Abstraction-Decomposition Space (ADS) of the A-CDM work system.  
 While the ADS could be validated using results from the flight crew survey, 
neither the decision ladder as the proposed tool for the control task analysis nor the 
strategies, social worker and cooperation analysis could usefully be applied to the A-
CDM work system because of their inherent limitations of these tools. Thus, they 
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were perceived as being detrimental to the aim pursued by this project. Further 
details on identified limitations can be found in Appendix VI.  
However, the largest benefit gained with the CWA resulted from the information 
requirement analysis and the application of the contextual activity templates. These 
forms of investigation were able to provide the basis for the subsequent studies. By 
analysing all of the turn-round processes, the turn-round constraints resulting from 
the parallel turn-round events could be depicted in form of a critical path. This 
critical path analysis could also identify the responsibilities for decision making and 
the control tasks at the various stages of the turn-round. Additionally, the critical path 
could be used to unveil information requirements for the various processes that may 
influence TOBT prediction accuracy. Furthermore, the critical path provided the 
foundation for selecting the critical events that were used for the scenarios that made 
up the experiments on TOBT prediction accuracy. It was therefore concluded that the 
CWA was able to provide a valuable framework for modelling the A-CDM work 
domain, even though some of the proposed tools could not be used. It was able to 
identify a number of fundamental constraints that are imposed on TOBT decision 
making and to show the specific environmental factors that influence TOBT decision 
making.  
8.4 Summary and Conclusion from the Flight Crew Survey 
The Participants  
The second step of this project was a survey with airline flight crews aimed at 
identifying and describing critical situations for TOBT adherence. This measure was 
applied in order to identify how frequently the turn-round problems occur, seen from 
the perspective of the user. Airline flight crews were chosen as participants for the 
survey, because although they are initially not regarded as A-CDM partners and 
normally do not assign the TOBT, but they use the Target Start-up Approval Time 
(TSAT) which depends on accurate TOBT predictions and hence influences the time 
available for their turn-round tasks. The second major reason for using flight crews as 
participants was because they are the only users who can compare A-CDM at various 
airports and usually do not have to expect negative consequences from delayed turn-
rounds; while other participants have to expect pay actions from delayed services. 
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Therefore, they are seen as the group with the lowest bias possible and the descriptions 
obtained from them were used to prioritise the most critical turn-round processes. This 
survey complements the CWA and provides a means of investigating the distinctive 
characteristics of the A-CDM turn-round process. 
Critical Situations for TOBT Adherence  
The most important result from the survey was captured by the high agreement 
among flight crews that information sharing is a root cause for failures during turn-
round as well as their remarkable consensus on the frequency of the reported events. 
Statistically noticeable results from the survey could be gained by comparing process 
delays and departure delays with the limitation that the data was acquired via 
qualitative assessment only: a significant relation was identified between the delay 
from a service or information provision failure and its’ effect on the departure 
punctuality of the following flight for all contemplated situations.  
Strikingly high results were reported from delays caused by failures to provide 
operational information to and from the cockpit. Such findings give an idea about the 
flight crew’s view of the problem of how the airlines manage operational turn-round 
processes. Contemplated operational problems included e.g. changes of equipment, 
parking position, or crew, re-booking or direct transfer of connecting passengers. 
Operational reliability for such events requires pre-planning with other airport partners 
in order not to jeopardise TOBT adherence. However, the initiative for such pre-
planning has usually to be taken by the airline company or their representatives.  
No correlation could be observed between the effect of providing information to the 
flight crew and therefore subsequently preventing ground handling delay. Several 
reasons are possible for this result: either the flight crews are not aware of the 
possibility of avoiding an arising problem by using the information provided in order 
to allow the flight crew to take appropriate actions (e.g. arranging alternative ways of 
ground handling). Alternatively, a real lack of resources, capabilities, aims, or other 
reasons yet to be identified can be responsible for service delays.  
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The TOBT Inaccuracy-Swing-Effect: Failing to Share Information during Turn-Round 
Additionally, it could be observed in almost all reported events that the departure 
delay after turn-round following the information provision failure shows higher values 
than the delay values caused by the service provision failure. A possible reason is the 
so-called phenomenon of a inaccuracy-swing-effect where the network of service 
providers can oscillate in very large swings as each organisation in the supply chain 
(critical path of turn-round events) seeks to solve the problem from its own 
perspective and so raising the outcome of the problem (here the outcome is the 
departure delay after passing the critical path of ground handling services). This is a 
very common problem in the supply chain management of production lines where 
many partners are involved and a typical phenomenon within complex systems. 
Although, the turn-round has characteristics of a supply chain, such a conclusion has 
to be validated via additional information because the delay following a service/ 
information provision failure could also be caused by other reasons not yet identified.  
Decision Making during Turn-Round 
In the context of the survey it was also analysed how the current approach to 
operational decision making is perceived by the flight crew, because it is unlikely that 
flight crews will forward operational information or accept operational decisions, if 
current approach to decision making is not satisfactory for flight crews. While the 
majority of flight crews is asking for more involvement in decision making (69,9%), 
because they see situational awareness for decision making is at higher level at the 
aircraft, the majority of flight crews who are against additional involvement by flight 
crews in operational decision making (30,1%) see situational awareness better 
established at places other than the aircraft cockpit. The high percentage of flight 
crews favouring increased involvement and the high number of reported delays can be 
seen as an indication of the high importance that flight crews attribute to the need of 
operational reliability. This was also recognized in the high number of free text 
answers where dissatisfaction with the current approach to ground handling was 
stated. Namely it was mentioned that ramp agents do not have the same training as 
they once did and only react to flight crew requests. Moreover, they are usually in 
charge of several turn-rounds at the same time and are not always directly accessible 
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to the cockpit crew. In cases of emerging problems, the flight crew has to forward the 
problem themselves or wait until the ramp agent comes back. Under these 
circumstances, discontent with the current approach is not surprising since it is often 
the air crew who has to manage turn-round problems directly. However, different 
approaches to ground handling are pursued at different airports and it was concluded 
that inside knowledge of the affected airport is required to identify best-practice 
solutions individually for each airport.  
Information Sharing and Cooperation 
In order to analyse cooperation during turn-round, the possible failure causes of 
turn-round processes were proposed to the flight crews analogous to Ferber (1995) 
who divides cooperation in the three components, competing aims, insufficient 
resources, or insufficient abilities. Ferber (1995) integrates these components in a 
cooperation model and argues that cooperative situations can be grouped either in 
indifferent, cooperative, or non-cooperative situations depending on the combination 
of these three components. Attention is required if a situation reveals itself to be 
structurally non-cooperative as it is the case, when actors have competing aims and 
either resources or abilities are not sufficient. Following Ferber’s theory, only one 
situation was reported by flight crews to be non-cooperative if following his theory: 
the assignment of parking stands. All other situations were reported to be cooperative 
and failure can be traced back to resource problems or inabilities of responsible 
function.  
In order to capture possible further causes responsible for turn-round problems also 
other reasons than outlined before were proposed as well as free text answers. In this 
context, 52,5 % of the flight crews view the short turn-round time, information 
overload (43,6 %) and sharing of responsibilities (45,5 %) as possible failure causes. 
Divergent aims, lack of competencies and resources were also seen as failure causes. 
Free text answers mentioned competency, motivation, and the decreasing availability 
of ground personnel as key issues for turn-round problems.  
Finally, it was concluded that the results of the survey could identify a number of 
situations that are critical for TOBT adherence and could so be used for the subsequent 
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studies. Additionally, the perspective of aircrews regarding cooperation of actors 
during turn-round could be captured.   
8.5 Summary and Conclusion from the Study via Field Observations 
After the survey, a qualitative study with field observations during turn-rounds at 
CDM airports was conducted which aimed at identifying the constraints to operational 
turn-round monitoring and the resulting influence on TOBT assignment. The critical 
situations identified in the first step of the analysis were also to be further investigated. 
The initial concept was to observe solely one operators’ approach to TOBT 
assignment. During this field research however the study concept changed from 
observing a single operators’ TOBT assignment to a comparison of five different 
operator’s approaches towards TOBT assignment because a comparison of different 
TOBT assignment processes would reveal a broader view of approaches currently 
applied to turn-round monitoring and TOBT assignment.     
The most important findings from observations of today’s turn-round management 
could be localized to two factors: (1) procedural differences between traditional local 
turn-round management monitoring and current approach towards remote turn-round 
management, and (2) the strategies of turn-round controllers for creating or extracting 
information.  
Procedural differences between traditional local turn-round monitoring and today’s 
remote turn-round monitoring are relatively straightforward: During traditional local 
turn-round monitoring, the turn-round controller identifies required information via a 
knowledge-driven form of monitoring turn-round events. Data is directly identified at 
the action level and used for developing a proactive strategy. Reliable TOBT 
prediction is based on the experience of the controller and only possible after the 
aircraft has arrived at the parking position and doors are opened. The turn-round 
controller enters the aircraft, visually assesses the time required for turn-round with 
confirmation from the flight crew and then initiates appropriate actions for 
coordinating the required turn-round processes. He continuously monitors current 
turn-round status and considers that updates are required to all actors involved. This 
was done by taking the given situation into account, e.g. number of passengers, 
baggage or specials. This approach is knowledge-driven because TOBT accuracy 
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depends on ability of turn-round controller to estimate process time required for all 
processes along the critical chain. It is also the most appreciated form of turn-round 
control for flight crew members, because all operational requirements are handled by 
the controller and crew members can focus on their own duties.   
During remote turn-round monitoring however, monitoring is more data-driven and 
depends on the information available via tools and telephone. Turn-round controllers 
have to rely on displayed information or updates via voice contacts in order to create 
situational awareness. The difficulty for the controller here is that he has to monitor 
several turn-round simultaneously and often the time available does not allow him to 
capture all information necessary to estimate a TOBT based on all given situational 
constraints.  As a result, simplified strategies were used for TOBT assignment instead 
of taking all available information into account. Updates to TOBT require interaction 
creation from participating actors with the turn-round controller or data received by 
actors. Therefore, this approach is data-driven, because it depends on data made 
available to the turn-round controller; any proactive strategy depends on this 
information. It is recommended to analyse how information available at the aircraft 
can be forwarded via automated procedures. During observations, only one operator of 
a major European airline was using a designated ramp person who precisely monitors 
turn-round process start/end of all processes during critical chain of turn-round and 
then transmits the data to the control room. All other airlines observed rely on 
automated systems or interactions received via phone, ACARS, or two-way radio 
communication. 
Overall it was concluded that an understanding could be captured of how the major 
European airlines actually assign the TOBT today and also how they deal with 
unexpected situations. 
8.6 Summary and Conclusion from the Experiments 
Since the previous phases of analysis allowed identifying the constraints imposed 
by the environment and cognition of all participating actors and operators, this step 
was now aimed at identifying countermeasures to those constraints. Therefore, small-
scale human-in-the-loop experiments were conducted to validate issues related to the 
specific constraints resulting from information sharing and cooperation. A within-
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participant experimental design was chosen and adapted to different turn-round 
situations having different information sharing conditions. The study design depicted 
situations experienced during turn-round operations under adverse conditions where a 
more standardised approach to information sharing was investigated. Order effects 
were counterbalanced with Latin squares and the extent of a possible carryover effects 
as well as demand characteristics were assessed by the analysis of the results.  
During the experimental studies with human-in-the-loop, the influence of 
cooperative information sharing from flight crews and ramp agents with the turn-
round controllers on TOBT prediction accuracy was analysed. Within three 
experimental scenarios in a Turn-round Control Mock-up, three different information 
sharing conditions were used to investigate the prediction of the turn-round controller 
on the duration of the turn-round. Starting point of the analysis was the assumption 
that cooperative information from cockpit and airport ramp could influence the turn-
round controllers’ TOBT decision making. Simulation with the TRCM allowed 
establishing such information sharing conditions.  
Hypotheses I and II could be validated via the statistical method of a Friedman Test 
together with post-hoc test of Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test and application of 
Bonferroni Adjustments. The Friedman test was able to show that differences between 
groups of data exist because the dependent variable having been measured was 
ordinal. The median values for measurement point I and II were also provided at this 
stage. The Friedman test was only able to show that differences exist somewhere 
between the influence of the three information sharing categories C0, C1, and C2. 
However, in order to know exactly where those differences are, a post-hoc test was 
required. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test could then show where the differences 
between information sharing condition C0 and C1, C0 and C2, and C1 and C2 actually 
occurred. Subsequent Bonferroni adjustments were required, because multiple 
comparisons were made and Type I error should be avoided where results are falsely 
declared to be significant. 
It could be concluded that there was a statistically significant difference in TOBT 
assignment accuracy depending on which information was provided to the participant 
whilst assigning the first TOBT update for the turn-rounds. Thereby, TOBT prediction 
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accuracy increased by a mean value of more than 8 minutes (See also Table 17). 
Applying post-hoc analysis with Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests and Bonferroni 
correction resulted in significant results: There were significant differences between 
C0 information sharing and C1 information sharing conditions, and between C1 and 
C2 information sharing conditions.  
There was no significant difference between C0 and C2 information sharing 
conditions despite the overall deviation from AOBT, but there was a statistically 
significant difference in TOBT assignment accuracy depending on which information 
was provided to the participant whilst assigning the second TOBT update for the turn-
rounds. Thereby, TOBT prediction accuracy increased by a mean value of more than 
15 minutes (see Table 17).  
It was concluded that the experiments were able to define countermeasures for dealing 
with unexpected situations and strategies for decision support that are able to increase 
TOBT prediction accuracy. The countermeasures and further recommendations for A-
CMD turn-round management are lined out in Chapter 8.7. 
8.7 Recommendations Resulting from this Project 
A number of measures were identified that are able to increase TOBT prediction 
accuracy. Recommendations and possible measures resulting from the descriptive 
analysis of this project include:  
1. Before changing established ways of turn-round monitoring, e.g. from direct turn-
round monitoring to remote turn-round monitoring, airline policy and decision 
makers should recognize the facilitating activities with the inherent predictive 
capabilities that are used by direct monitoring turn-round controllers. It is 
necessary to anticipate turn-round controllers’ monitoring needs comprehensively 
and create interfaces that systematically support such monitoring with reliable 
TOBT prediction rather than simply expecting controllers to adapt to a situation 
with poor data available.   
2. As a step towards designing monitoring and communication tools with 
functionalities required by controllers, valuable information can be collected by 
observing the facilitating activities that turn-round controllers are currently 
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engaged in during direct turn-round monitoring and remote turn-round monitoring 
under consideration of aspects from cognitive perspective.  
3. As a further step in this direction, the available tools for remote turn-round 
monitoring need to be better understood in order to allow facilitating activities 
with predictive behaviour being used for the design of new computer-based 
systems able to support decision making in such a complex and dynamic 
environment.   
4. This not only entails the need to analyse all  information required to estimate 
process time during all processes within the critical path, but also to establish 
functionalities allowing a mandatory assessment of Target Service Delivery Times 
(TSDT) for all partners and actors involved in service delivery during the critical 
path. As a result, the TOBT can be created based on predictive information from 
service providers, combined with the reference model, and the required 
adjustments to the reference model based on information provided by the crew.  
5. This also entails the need to take information from the flight crew emerging during 
flight into account or depending on flight progress and the information provided 
by actors on the ramp or terminal building. This recommendation could later be 
confirmed during an experimental study of turn-round situations.  
6. More attention should also be paid to basic human factors issues in the design of 
such supporting tools since control issues and responsibility sharing are involved, 
e.g. turn-round times shorter than MTTT should be in agreement with the flight 
crew; if flight crew does not favour using MTTT, not only may flight safety be 
affected, it is questionable whether MTTT can be performed without his or her 
consent.    
7. Examples for facilitating strategies of turn-round management should be compiled 
by innovative ATM network approaches to delay code management - namely away 
from assignment of the delay code onto a real-time situational analysis (reactive 
analysis) towards a delay code assignment based on non-adherent service 
prediction (proactive analysis). This gives a more realistic estimation of the 
responsible function without creating a blame culture. 
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Some further recommendations and measures resulting from the experimental results 
of this project are outlined next. 
1. Establishing realistic turn-round time predictions that are able not only to increase 
TOBT adherence, but also to improve pre-departure sequencing at the airport and 
thus allowing for reduced the buffer times for taxi.  
2. Increasing attention to accurate turn-round time planning is required, because 
service providers can so abide by the reference models established by the airlines. 
This allows them to execute their services within a coordinated chain of turn-round 
events, while reducing the pressure to omit necessary safety precautions due to 
time constraints.   
3. Further investigation is required for the ‘critical path’ processes of parallel turn-
round events. The critical path used during the experiments reflects the specific 
turn-round situation of the hub-and-spoke operation at Munich airport.  The 
TRCM that was developed for the experiments includes therefore additional 
functionalities that permit adding and removing processes depending on the 
specific turn-round situation of other airports. This functionality should be used to 
insert additional required processes and to investigate the given turn-round 
situation at other airports. 
8.8 Limitations of the Research Undertaken 
The work presented in this thesis is limited and cannot be generalised without 
considerations of its assumptions and shortcomings. 
With the introduction of the conceptual framework, there are assumptions underlying 
the analysis, and also a number of simplifications that had to be applied when 
compared to the real world. This allowed an investigation of the research objectives 
in a greater level of detail and so a greater contribution to knowledge. However, the 
limitations which should be kept in mind before applying the knowledge to the real 
world include:  
The survey undertaken only delivers the opinion and experience of one group 
among the numerous other participants. The advantage of using this group 
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specifically was outlined before; however a generalisation of the results is not 
possible. 
The data that produced the TOBT inaccuracy-swing effect originates from 
qualitative data. Using qualitative data with a correlational analysis method to 
describe behaviour is often questioned within the literature for not being able to 
deliver rigorous results. 
 The number of airports using A-CDM is still rather small and also size of airport 
varies. Comparison of turn-round monitoring in highly congested airports may differ 
significantly from airport to airport and also from turn-round duration that is used for 
planning. The presented results therefore only apply for turn-round operation at 
congested airports. The relevance increases, if a short turn-round time is a factor.  
8.9 Contributions to Knowledge 
Despite of its limitations the thesis aims to have contributed to the body of 
knowledge as follows:  
The relevance of this project for A-CDM could be recognized by the attention it 
received from both the industry and the A-CDM Coordination Team from 
EUROCONTROL Headquarters via repeated presentations and publications on this 
topic. (See also Chapter 9). An increased attention towards the importance of TOBT 
was realized by several stakeholders and industry partners based on paper 
presentations at EUROCONTROL Headquarters and various conferences (see 
Chapter 9.1) because it was realized that reliable TOBT predictions are crucial to 
successful airport operation.   
This is the first time that a CWA as an approach to Cognitive Engineering has 
been applied to turn-round management. It revealed some distinct characteristics and 
constraints in a work domain with characteristics of distributed decision making 
environment that have neither been identified nor investigated before.  
While within the framework of Cognitive Work Analysis, respectively during the 
phase II ‘Control Task Analysis’ and phase III ‘Social Organisation and Cooperation 
Analysis’, existing tools could not be used, other approaches to cooperation that have 
not been applied in such context so far were integrated into the CWA framework. 
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Finally, employing human-in-the-loop experiments to analyse cooperative 
information sharing is a novel approach to operational information sharing in the 
domain of turn-round management that has not been taken to date. Seeing the 
increasing complexity of turn-round management, such an approach revealed to be a 
viable option that can be used for analyses in environments or work domains with 
similar constraints.   
A concluding remark from the author referring to knowledge identified from the 
analysis that should be seen as a warning sign:  
Accurate turn-round time predictions also encompass concerns about flight safety: 
‘Caused by shortening of turn-round times below minimum process times as a 
procedure identified during field studies and experiments, flight safety could be at 
risk, if the time available especially for safety relevant procedures is getting 
increasingly constrained. This comprises the preparation of the flight crews for the 
next flight segment including document study, fuelling, de-icing, walk-around, cabin 
security checks, and loading’. If not sufficient time is available to thoroughly execute 
these duties because a pressure is placed from airline operation or inappropriate 
TOBT predictions, the risk of missing or neglecting relevant information can rise 
significantly.  
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8.10 Areas for Future Research 
This thesis could address only a few aspects of cognitive engineering and design 
criteria within the domain of turn-round management. The high relevance to 
operational day-to-day problems reveals opportunities for future research especially 
in:  
• Field studies about the practicability of the identified cooperative information 
sharing for operational application.  
• Investigations on how non-punitive elements during turn-round operation can 
enhance cooperative information sharing between partners without the mutual 
blaming which often stems from the current IATA Delay Code Assignment 
procedure.   
• Research on how additional measurement points for ground handling services 
can be introduced and monitored for more accurate service delivery time 
predictions.  
• Study on the accurate process times required for the turn-round services with 
focus on processes relevant to flight safety.  
Generally, the portion of research projects in turn-round management is relatively 
low compared to other ATM domains. A majority of research projects aimed at 
increasing airport throughput relate to investigations for the terminal side of the 
operation, although a number of problems can be attributed to the land-side 
operations. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I: Description of the A-CDM Milestones 
 
Milestone 1                                      ATC Flight Plan Activated  
Definition The ICAO flight plan is submitted to ATC. The Airport CDM 
Platform is initiated for this flight, and all available information is 
processed 
Origin and priority The ATC Flight Plan is submitted by the Aircraft Operator and 
distributed by the IFPS. All involved ATC units receive the flight 
plan, including departure and destination aerodromes. 
Timing Normally this takes place 3 hours before EOBT, however it may be 
later. In some cases a repetitive flight plan (RFPL) has been 
submitted, covering daily or weekly flights. 
Data Quality The ATC Flight Plan corresponds to the airport slot programme. 
Effect One aircraft turn-round normally includes an arriving and a 
departing flight, meaning that it will have two related flight plans. 
For coordinated airports, the outbound flight is already known. The 
flight plan may be used to update certain information such as type of 
aircraft. For long distance flights, the ELDT may differ from the 
airport slot. For non coordinated airports, the flight plan is used to 
initiate the outbound flight. The flight is ready not later than 15 
minutes after the planned EOBT. The DPI process commences the 
correct messaging with CFMU (if implemented - see attachment 2 
for details). 
Procedures To check consistency between ATC Flight Plan, Airport Slot and 
Airport flight data and then confirm the flight to the CFMU and 
allow further local processing of the flight. 
This check shall be performed to verify the consistency between 
the ATC Flight Plan, Airport Slot and Airport flight data before 
the first E-DPI is sent. The AO must provide correct information 
before this first E-DPI message, in order to feed CFMU with 
consistent SOBT, aircraft registration, and first destination data, 
as early in time as possible. The E-DPI message should not be 
sent if no or inconsistent information is provided. 
This process is triggered by: 
• The first activation of the ATC Flight Plan (earliest EOBT-3 hr), 
or 
• New or late submissions of the ATC Flight Plan, after 
cancellation or revised EOBT 
Operational Status SCHEDULED 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
ELDT and EIBT updated for an arrival 
EOBT and ETOT updated for a departure The DPI process 
commences (if implemented - see section 3.7.3 for details). 
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Milestone 2                                      EOBT – 2h  
Definition At EOBT-2 hr most flights will be known in the Airport CDM 
Platform including if they are regulated or not. All regulated flights 
receive a CTOT from CFMU. 
Origin and priority The CTOT is issued by the CFMU and is sent to relevant ATS units 
as well as the departure aerodrome. CTOT flights usually have a 
priority over unregulated flights. 
Timing If the flight is regulated, a CTOT is issued at EOBT-2h. 
Data Quality Not applicable. 
Effect For inbound flights, ELDT is updated based on information 
provided by the FUM messages, taking into account the actual 
progress of the flight. 
 
Procedures To check (before or TTo check (before or after takeoff from outstation) whether AO/GH 
flight estimates are consistent with the ATC Flight Plan and to 
inform CFMU about the updated take off time estimate, using a T-
DPI Message. 
This check shall be performed to verify feasibility of the ATC Flight 
Plan estimated off block time at EOBT-2 hrs. At EOBT-2 hrs 
CFMU is informed through the first T-DPI message. Calculation 
basis for the TTOT shall take into account EIBT+MTTT+EXOT, if 
later than EOBT+EXOT. In the case of manual input of TOBT, this 
estimate will override the E1BT+MTTT estimate, hence TTOT 
equals TOBT+EXOT. 
This procedure is triggered by  
• A time stamp, at EOBT - 2h. 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
N.A. 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
ETOT/TTOT/CTOT Mark appropriate fields as REGULATED 
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Milestone 3                                      Take Off from Outstation 
Definition The ATOT from the outstation (ADEP) 
Origin and priority The outstation provides ATOT to the CFMU and Aircraft Operator. 
Timing The information is directly available after occurrence of the 
milestone. 
Data Quality The accuracy of ATOT is +/- 1 minute. 
 
Effect If the departure airport is more than 3hrs flying time from the 
destination airport the ATOT is received from either the CFMU 
FUM or via the Aircraft Operator / Ground Handler. Using the 
ATOT an ELDT can be calculated by using the Estimated Elapsed 
Time on the FPL. 
If the flight is within 3hrs flying time of the destination airport the 
CFMU monitors progress of the flight using the ETFMS and send a 
Flight Update Message (FUM) that provides updates of the flight's 
progress. 
 
Procedures To check whether the AO/GH estimated landing time after take off 
from outstation are consistent with the outbound ATC Flight Plan, 
and when needed inform the CFMU about the updated take off time 
estimates using a T-DPI-c Message. 
This check shall be performed to verify feasibility of the ATC Flight 
Plan at take off from outstation. A TTOT tolerance of 5 minutes is 
respected before CFMU is informed of the updated TTOT. 
Calculation basis for the TTOT shall take into account 
EIBT+MTTT+EXOT. In case EOBT is later than EIBT+MTTT, 
TTOT equals EOBT+EXOT. In the case where TOBT is available 
this prediction will overrule the EIBT+MTTT estimate, hence TTOT 
equals TOBT+EXOT. 
This process is 
triggered by • the 
take off from 
outstation. 
Operational Status 
(changes to) 
AIRBORNE 
 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
ELDT, EIBT, TOBT and TTOT updated 
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Milestone 4                                      Local Radar Update  
Definition The flight enters the FIR (Flight Information Region) or the local 
airspace of the destination airport. 
Origin and priority This information is normally available from the Area Control Centre 
(ACC) or Approach Control Unit that is associated with an airport. 
The radar system is able to detect a flight based upon the assigned 
SSR code when the flight crosses a defined FIR/ATC boundary. 
Timing Dependent upon the position of the airport in relation to the FIR 
boundary. 
Data Quality Must be equal to the accuracy of the ATC system. 
Effect Update of the ELDT Update of the ELDT can trigger a new TOBT to be entered by the 
AO/GH, or calculated automatically by the Airport CDM Platform. 
The accuracy of ELDT is particularly important at this stage since 
downstream decisions are taken, such as stand /gate / aircraft 
changes, preparation of arrival sequence, preparation of ground 
handling operations, decisions for connecting passengers. 
Uncertainty and ELDT non-accuracy at this stage significantly 
increase risks for bad and last minute decisions and internal 
disruptions. The objective to decrease the number of stand and gate 
changes in the last 30 minutes requires high accuracy regarding 
departure and arrival times. Therefore, taking into account the taxi-
in time (EXIT), any change to a stand or gate is not preferred after 
ELDT-30'. 
The update of TOBT for the related departing flight takes place 
following this milestone. Decisions such as the turn-round period, 
connecting passengers etc are taken and need to be sTable at this 
event. An estimated in-block time (EIBT) is computed using the 
ELDT and the estimated taxi-in time. 
Procedures To commence the TOBT process and check whether the AO/GH 
TOBT is consistent with the ATC Flight Plan. CFMU is informed 
when the TTOT changes by more than the agreed TTOT tolerance. 
This check shall be performed to verify feasibility of the ATC Flight 
Plan given the updated TOBT. The TTOT tolerance is respected 
before CFMU is informed of updated TTOT. 
This process is triggered by • the detection of the flight by radar 
in either FIR, TMA, or on Final Approach. 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
FIR 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
ELDT, EIBT, TOBT and TTOT updated 
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Milestone 5                                     Final Approach 
Definition The flight enters the Final Approach phase at the destination airport. 
Origin and priority This information is normally available from ATC. The radar system 
detects a flight based upon the assigned SSR code and identifies 
when the flight crosses either a defined range / position or 
passes/leaves a predetermined level. 
Timing Dependent upon local parameters that are defined by ATC. 
Data Quality Must be equal to the accuracy of the ATC system. 
Effect Update of the ELDT to determine a new TOBT. When a flight 
reaches this stage it is usually between 2 and 5 minutes from landing 
(depending on the parameter set by ATC). This is often the prompt 
for many partners to start moving resources connected with the 
flight, such as positioning a parking marshal and ground handling 
services. 
 
Procedures To commence the TOBT process and check whether the AO/GH 
TOBT is consistent with the ATC Flight Plan. CFMU is informed 
when the TTOT changes by more than the agreed TTOT tolerance. 
This check shall be performed to verify feasibility of the ATC 
Flight Plan given the updated TOBT. The TTOT tolerance is 
respected before CFMU is informed of updated TTOT. 
This process is triggered by  
• The detection of the flight by radar in either FIR, TMA, or on 
Final Approach. 
 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
FINAL 
 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
ELDT, EIBT, TOBT and TTOT updated 
EOBT and ETOT updated for a departure The DPI process 
commences (if implemented - see section 3.7.3 for details). 
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Milestone 6                                      Landed  
Definition ALDT - Actual Landing Time. This is the time that an aircraft 
touches down on a runway. (Equivalent to ATC ATA - Actual Time 
of Arrival landing, ACARS=ON). 
 
Origin and priority Provided by ATC system or by ACARS from equipped aircraft. 
Timing The information is directly available after occurrence of the 
milestone. 
Data Quality Data is available with an accuracy of +/-1 minute. 
Effect The occurrence of ALDT triggers an update of downstream 
estimates: TOBT and TTOT are updated automatically or inserted 
manually by the Aircraft Operator / Ground Handler, calculated on 
the basis of the defined turn-round period for the departing flight. 
The EIBT can be updated according to the ALDT +EXIT. 
 
Procedures To check whether the AO/GH TOBT is 
consistent with the ATC Flight Plan. CFMU is 
informed when the TTOT changes by more than 
the agreed TTOT tolerance. 
This check shall be performed to verify 
feasibility of the ATC Flight Plan given the up-
dated TOBT or ATC Flight Plan. A TTOT 
tolerance is respected before CFMU is informed 
on updated TTOT. 
This process is triggered by  
• Actual Landing Time: ALDT 
 
Operational Status 
(changes to) 
LANDED  
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
ELDT changes to ALDT, EIBT, TOBT and TTOT updated 
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Milestone 7                                     In-Block  
Definition AIBT - Actual In-Block Time. This is the time that an aircraft 
arrives in-blocks. (Equivalent to Airline/Handler ATA - Actual 
Time of Arrival, ACARS = IN) 
Note: ACGT is considered to commence at AIBT 
Origin and priority ACARS equipped aircraft or automated docking systems or ATC 
systems (e.g. A-SMGCS) or by manual input. 
Timing The information is directly available after occurrence of the 
milestone. 
Data Quality Data is available with an accuracy of +/-1 minute. 
Effect The occurrence of AIBT should trigger an update of downstream 
estimates: TOBT and TTOT are updated automatically or inserted 
manually by the Aircraft Operator / Ground Handler, calculated on 
the basis of the estimated turn-round period for the departing flight. 
 
Procedures To check whether the AO/GH TOBT is consistent with the ATC 
Flight Plan. CFMU is informed when the TTOT changes by more 
than the agreed TTOT tolerance. 
This check shall be performed to verify feasibility of the ATC 
Flight Plan given the updated TOBT or ATC Flight Plan. A TTOT 
tolerance is respected before CFMU is informed on updated TTOT. 
This process is triggered by 
 • Actual In Blocks Time: AIBT 
 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
IN-BLOCK 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
EIBT changes to AIBT  
TOBT and TTOT updated 
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Milestone 8                                      Ground Handling Started  
Definition Commence of Ground Handling Operations (ACGT). 
Note: this milestone is specific to flights that are the first operation 
of the day or that have been long term parked. For flights that are on 
a normal turn-round ACGT is considered to commence at AIBT. 
Origin and priority Aircraft Operator / Ground Handler will provide the information. 
 
Timing The information is directly available after occurrence of the 
milestone. 
 
Data Quality Data is available with an accuracy of +/-1 minute. 
 
Effect The occurrence of ACGT triggers an update of downstream 
estimates: 
TOBT is updated automatically or inserted manually by the Aircraft 
Operator / Ground Handler, calculated on the basis of the estimated 
turn-round period for the departing flight. 
 
Procedures To check whether the AO/GH TOBT is consistent 
with the ATC Flight Plan. CFMU is informed 
when the TTOT changes by more than the agreed 
TTOT tolerance. 
This check shall be performed to verify feasibility 
of the ATC Flight Plan given the updated TOBT or 
ATC Flight Plan. A TTOT tolerance is respected 
before CFMU is informed on updated TTOT. 
This process is triggered by  
• Actual Commence of Ground Handling: ACGT 
 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
IN-BLOCK 
 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
ETTT/ TTOBT, TTOT updated 
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Milestone 9                                      Final Confirmation of the TOBT 
Definition The time at which the Aircraft Operator or Ground Handler provide 
their most accurate TOBT taking into account the operational 
situation. 
Origin and priority The Aircraft Operator / Ground Handler provides the information. 
Timing The information is provided t minutes before EOBT (t is a 
parameter time agreed locally). 
Data Quality Accuracy is agreed locally. 
Effect The aim of the final TOBT is to give a timely, accurate and reliable 
assessment of the off-block time. It is recognised that main benefits 
of sharing the TOBT are expected in case of disruptions (internal or 
external). In such cases, the difference between EOBT (shared by 
ATC, CFMU and Stand / Gate Management) and TOBT may be 
important. 
An accurate TOBT at [EOBT-t minutes] is a pre-requisite for ATC 
to establish a push back / pre-departure sequence. Emphasis is put 
on the need for the Aircraft Operator to integrate his own strategy to 
compute a TOBT related to the flight. Following the receipt of the 
TOBT, the ATC system will calculate and provide the Estimated 
Taxi-Out Time (EXOT) based on the predicted traffic load, gate / 
stand location, runway in use, and waiting period at the Holding 
Position, etc. 
The flight is introduced into the pre-departure sequence. The 
Aircraft Operator / Ground Handler, in coordination with the 
aircrew, can manage the turn-round process according toly. 
Procedures To check whether the AO/GH TOBT is consistent with the ATC 
Flight Plan. CFMU is informed when the TTOT changes by more 
than the agreed TTOT tolerance. 
This check should be performed at a predefined time (local 
parameter) to confirm TOBT prior to TSAT issue and verify 
feasibility of the ATC Flight Plan estimates given the updated 
TOBT. A TTOT tolerance is respected before CFMU is informed on 
updated TTOT. 
This Milestone Process is actually constantly applicable in the CDM 
Platform, as soon as a TOBT is available. However the confirmed 
TOBT prior to TSAT has special status, where AO/GH check the 
quality of TOBT before TSAT issue. 
This process is triggered by 
a new TOBT or TTOT update. No need to confirm an existing 
TOBT if it has been manually modified before. 
Operational Status SEQUENCED 
Action on CDM Operation  TTOT updated.  
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Milestone 10                                      TSAT Issued 
Definition The time ATC issues the Target Start Up Approval Time. 
Origin and priority ATC 
Timing The information is provided t-minutes before EOBT, where t is a 
parameter agreed locally. 
Data Quality Accuracy is agreed locally. 
Effect The flight is stabilised into the pre-departure sequence. The Aircraft 
Operator/ Ground Handler, in coordination with the aircrew, can 
manage the turn-round process according toly. 
 
Procedures First step: To inform all relevant partners of the TSAT that has been 
allocated to the flight. The CFMU is informed by a T-DPI-s for non 
regulated flights. 
Second step: To check whether the number of TOBT updates 
exceeds a tolerance defined locally, after TSAT has been issued. 
First: The TSAT will indicate to the partners the time when the start 
up approval can be expected. CFMU will be informed with a T-DPI-
s for non regulated flights. No check is performed. 
Second: A check shall be performed to see the number of TOBT 
updates after TSAT has been issued. In case the number of TOBT 
updates exceeds a threshold, then the TOBT input should be 
processed according to local procedure. 
This process is triggered by 
• A defined time (local parameter) before TOBT 
• TOBT update after TSAT issue 
 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
N.A. 
 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
TTOT updated 
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Milestone 11                                      Boarding Starts 
Definition The gate is open for passengers to physically start boarding 
(independent of whether boarding takes place via an air-bridge/pier, 
aircraft steps or coaching to a stand). 
This is not to be confused with the time passengers are pre-called to 
the gate via flight information display systems (FIDS) or public 
address systems. 
 
Origin and priority Automatic from airport system or manual input by Aircraft 
Operator/ Ground Handler. 
Timing The information is directly available after occurrence of the 
milestone. 
Data Quality Data is available with an accuracy of +/-1 minute. 
Effect When boarding commences it gives the Airport CDM Partners a 
good indication of whether the TOBT/TSAT will be respected. 
 
Procedures First step: To inform all relevant Airport CDM Partners of Actual 
Start Boarding Time (ASBT).    . 
Second step: To check whether boarding starts in time to respect 
TOBT and inform the AO/GH in case TOBT needs to be updated. 
Inform of Actual Start Boarding Time (ASBT) when it occurs. At a 
certain time before TOBT (local variable e.g. corresponding to 
aircraft type) a check shall be performed to check the boarding 
status. 
This process is triggered by • a time 
variable <value> minutes before 
TOBT. 
 
Operational Status 
(changes to) 
BOARDING 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
N.A. 
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Milestone 12                                      Aircraft Ready  
Definition The time when all doors are closed, boarding bridge removed, push 
back vehicle connected, ready to taxi immediately upon reception of 
TWR instructions (ARDT). 
Origin and priority Provided by the Aircraft Operator/ Ground Handler. 
Timing The information is directly available after occurrence of the 
milestone. 
Data Quality Data is directly available with an accuracy of +/-1 minute. 
 
Effect ATC refines the pre-departure sequence. The flight crew requests 
start up just before TSAT, following coordination with the Ground 
Handler. (Dispatcher / Supervisor / Redcap). 
 
 
Procedures   First step: To inform all relevant Airport CDM Partners of Actual 
Ready Time (ARDT) in the Airport CDM Platform and that the 
aircraft is ready for start up / pushback. 
Second step: To inform the AO/GH that TOBT has passed and the 
Airport CDM Platform has not yet received ARDT or Ready Status 
(RDY). 
Inform of ARDT or RDY confirming that the flight follows the 
indicated TOBT. At TOBT + tolerance the AO/GH are informed 
that TOBT has passed and there has not been a ready status message 
yet. 
This procedure is triggered by  
• An input to the Airport CDM Platform. 
 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
READY 
 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
N.A. 
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Milestone 13                                      Start Up Requested  
Definition The time that start up is requested (ASRT). 
Origin and priority ATC (based on flight crew request). 
Timing The information is directly available after occurrence of the 
milestone. 
 
Data Quality Data is available with an accuracy of +/-1 minute. 
 
Effect ATC confirms TSAT to the flight crew in order to maintain the 
aircraft in the pro-departure sequence. Provided the aircraft was 
ready on time (ARDT), it is now up to ATC to assure that a 
regulated flight can respect its CTOT. 
 
Procedures First step: To inform all relevant Airport CDM Partners of Actual 
Start up Request Time (ASRT) in the Airport CDM Platform. 
Second step: to alert all relevant Airport CDM Partners when no 
start up has been requested inside the locally agreed TSAT tolerance 
window. 
Inform of ASRT when it occurs. If the start up request is not made 
by TSAT + tolerance, the AO/GH is informed that no start up has 
been requested, and should update TOBT. 
Timestamp when the tolerance window has passed at TSAT. 
 
Operational Status 
 (changes to) 
N.A. 
 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
N.A. 
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Milestone 14                                      Start Up Approved 
Definition ASAT - Actual start up Approval Time. This is the time that an 
aircraft receives its start up approval. 
 
Origin and priority ATC 
Timing The information is directly available after occurrence of the 
milestone. 
Data Quality Data is available with an accuracy of +/-1 minute. 
Effect On receipt of ATC approval, the aircraft will start up, push back and 
start to taxi. 
 
Procedures   First Step: All relevant Airport CDM Partners are informed of 
Actual start up approval Time (ASAT) in the Airport CDM 
Platform and that the aircraft has received start up approval / 
pushback clearance. 
Second step: To check if ASAT is in accordance to TSAT and to 
alert all relevant Airport CDM Partners when no start up has been 
granted. 
Inform of ASAT when it occurs. In case the start up approval is not 
granted at TSAT + tolerance, all relevant partners should be 
informed. The flight will be re-sequenced. 
Start up request by flight crew (voice or DCL) or a locally defined 
time around TSAT if Milestone Process 13 is omitted. 
 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
N.A. 
 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
N.A. 
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Milestone 15                                      Off-Block  
Definition AOBT - Actual Off-Block Time. The time the aircraft 
pushes back/vacates the parking position (Equivalent to 
Airline/Handler ATD - Actual Time of Departure 
ACARS=OUT). 
 
Origin and priority ACARS equipped aircraft or automated docking systems or ATC 
systems (e.g. A-SMGCS) or by manual input. 
 
Timing The information is directly available after occurrence of the 
milestone. 
 
Data Quality Data is available with an accuracy of +/-1 minute. 
Effect TTOT updated considering the EXOT. 
Procedures First step: To inform all relevant Airport CDM Partners of Actual 
Off-Block Time (AOBT) in the Airport CDM Platform and that the 
aircraft has commenced pushback / taxi from parking position. 
Second step: To check if TTOT changes by more than the agreed 
tolerance and inform CFMU. 
Inform of AOBT when it occurs. AOBT always triggers an A-DPI 
message to CFMU or in the case of remote holding at a defined time 
prior to TTOT. After a first A-DPI is sent this check shall be 
performed to check TTOT updates against the TTOT tolerance 
before CFMU is informed, with a new A-DPI, of the updated TTOT. 
This process is triggered by AOBT detection. 
 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
OFF-BLOCK 
 
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
AOBT recorded 
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Milestone 16                                      ATC Flight Plan Activated  
Definition ATOT - Actual Take Off Time. This is the time that 
an aircraft takes off from the runway. (Equivalent to 
ATC ATD-Actual Time of Departure, ACARS = 
OFF). 
 
Origin and priority Provided by ATC system or from ACARS equipped aircraft. 
 
Timing The information is directly available as soon as possible after 
occurrence of the milestone. 
 
Data Quality Data is available with an accuracy of +/-1 minute. 
 
Effect FSA and MVT messages are sent. 
 
Procedures To inform all relevant Airport CDM Partners about the actual take 
off. 
An airborne message is generated and the flight is removed from the 
departure sequence. 
 
This process is triggered by Tower FDPS, A-SMGCS / Radar 
detection or ACARS. 
 
Operational Status  
(changes to) 
DEPARTED / TAKE OFF  
Action on CDM Operation 
(ACISP) 
ATOT recorded  
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FLIGHT CREW SURVEY
 
 
Dear Colleagues, 
 
As part of an ongoing research project at CRANFIELD University, I would like to invite you, to 
take part in this survey sponsored by the EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre and FRAPORT 
Foundation ‘Eric Becker’. 
It is about SITUATIONS during your day
parties like ramp agents, ATC, airport, flight manager, etc is required for punctual dispatch. 
This survey intends to find 
other parties involved during various turn
 
Cooperation from all parties involved in flight operation is viewed as an essential part of a 
successful turn-round execution. Therefore, EUROCONTROL i
Collaborative Decision Making (A
airports by improved information sharing and situational awareness between all parties 
involved.  
 
This survey looks at the cockpit
assess the current level of cooperation during various turn
critical for punctuality.  
 
The survey contains five typical turn
identical. That means, if you familiarize yourself with one of the proposed SITUATIONS, it is 
straightforward to answer the questions in the following SITUATIONS. All SITUATIONS are just 
examples. Please feel free, to add SITUATIONS fro
critical for punctuality or skip SITUATIONS which you have not experienced. Answering all 
questions takes about 15 minutes time, but your experience is needed and highly appreciated! 
 
The results from this survey wil
find a more effective way of information sharing and common situational awareness. Therefore 
I would like to invite you, to share Your experience. Please bear in mind that all data is treated 
anonymously. 
 
Thank you very much in advance,
 
 
Matthias Groppe 
F/O Lufthansa CityLine 
Doctoral Researcher at EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre
This survey has been created with '2ask'
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 Survey 
 
-to-day flight operations, where the cooperation of other 
your perspective on cooperation between your cockpit and the 
-round situations.  
nitiated the project about 
-CDM) with the aim of increasing punctuality at congested 
’s perspective on the Airport CDM project. You are asked to 
-round situations which are seen as 
-round SITUATIONS. The questions for each SITUATION are 
m your own experience which you see as 
l be used to review current Airport CDM procedures in order to 
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FLIGHT CREW SURVEY 
SITUATION I: You have just landed at your destination and your parking stand is still 
occupied. Please recall any of your more recent flights: 
When were you notified of that your parking stand is not yet 
available?   
 After landing 
 During flight 
 
I did not encounter 
a situation like this 
(please press -
How long did you have to wait for your parking stand? 
 1-5 minutes 
 6- 10 minutes 
 11 - 15 minutes 
 16- 20 minutes 
 More than 20 
minutes 
What was the impact on departure delay for the flight after the 
turn-round 
 1-5 minutes 
 6- 10 minutes 
 11 - 15 minutes 
 16- 20 minutes 
 More than 20 
minutes 
Do you think this delay would be avoidable through timely 
notification of 'parking stand problems'? (e.g. because it allows you to 
take an appropriate initiative) 
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very Likely 
How often does this happen 
 Daily 
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 Irregularly 
 
What could be the 
reason(s) for this 
waiting time/ delay? 
Competing Interests among functions 
responsible for the allocation of the parking 
stand such as airport, airline, or ground 
handling  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
Not enough parking stands available  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
Competence of responsible function/ 
individual  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
 
Any Comments?  
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SITUATION II: Delay of a Ground Handling Process: Please recall your last turn-round where you encountered such 
a delay: 
Please choose one event which you would like to refer to: 
 Baggage loading/ unloading  Airport Facilities 
 Ramp transfer bus (Crew or Passengers)  Wheelchair Boarding 
 Catering  UM Boarding 
 Cleaning  Special Loading (e.g. musical instrument) 
 Fuelling  VIP Boarding 
 Check-in  I cannot recall encountering a situation like this (please 
go to SITUATION III)  Security  Other Ground Handling event  
      (please name)  
 
 Boarding 
How were you notified of the delay? 
 You were duly informed about the problem 
 
You learned about it yourself, having observed that the process 
was not executed or you received information too late 
How much delay resulted from this lack of 
information? 
 1-5 minutes 
 6- 10 minutes 
 11 - 15 minutes 
 16- 20 minutes 
 More than 20 minutes 
What was the impact on departure delay for the 
flight after the turn-round 
 1-5 minutes 
 6- 10 minutes 
 11 - 15 minutes 
 16- 20 minutes 
 More than 20 minutes 
Do you think this delay would be avoidable 
through timely notification of ‘ground handling 
problems' (e.g. through taking appropriate 
initiatives)? 
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very Likely 
How often does this happen 
 Daily 
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 Irregularly 
 
What could be the 
reason(s) for this 
waiting time/ 
delay? 
Competing interests among 
responsible functions like 
airport, airline, or handling 
service provider   
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
Not enough resources 
available (e.g.personnel, 
vehicles, check-in desk...)  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
Competence of responsible 
function/ individual  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
 
Any Comments?  
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SITUATION III: You got operational changes at your destination (e.g. aircraft change, technical repair, crew duty 
changes….) Please consider your last turn-round where you encountered such situation: 
Please choose one event which you would like to refer to: 
 Aircraft Change  I cannot recall encountering a situation like this (please 
go to SITUATION V)  Technical Repair  Other Ground Handling event  
      (please name)  
 
 Crew Duty Change (new duty roster) 
 Crew Change (new crew member) 
How were you notified of the delay? 
 Before Departure 
 During Flight 
 After Arrival at Destination 
How much additional time did you need because 
of this? 
 1-5 minutes 
 6- 10 minutes 
 11 - 15 minutes 
 16- 20 minutes 
 More than 20 minutes 
Because of this, was there an impact on 
departure delay for the flight after the turn-
round? 
 1-5 minutes 
 6- 10 minutes 
 11 - 15 minutes 
 16- 20 minutes 
 More than 20 minutes 
Do you think this delay would be avoidable 
through timely notification of ‘operational 
changes? (e.g. because it allows you to take an 
appropriate initiative) 
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very Likely 
How often does this happen 
 Daily 
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 Irregularly 
 
What could be the 
reason(s) for this 
waiting time/ 
delay? 
Competing interests among 
responsible functions like 
airport, airline, or handling 
service provider   
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
Not enough resources 
available (e.g.personnel, 
vehicles, check-in desk...)  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
Competence of responsible 
function/ individual  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
 
Any Comments?  
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SITUATION IV: You have yourself proposed operational changes (e.g. via ACARS, telephone, radio…). Please recall 
your last flight or turn-round where you encountered such a situation 
Your proposal was about: (please choose one situation) 
 Necessary technical repair during turnaround  I cannot recall encountering a situation like this (Please 
go to GENERAL:DECISION MAKING) to SITUATION  Connecting passenger  Other Ground Handling event  
      (please name)  
 
 Avoidance of an unnecessary Aircraft Change 
Consequences from your proposal: 
 
Your proposal was considered (you got an answer on your 
proposal) 
 
Your proposal was not considered (no reaction on your 
proposal) 
How much extra time did you spend because 
your proposal was not considered? 
 1-5 minutes 
 6- 10 minutes 
 11 - 15 minutes 
 16- 20 minutes 
 More than 20 minutes 
Because of this, was there an impact on 
departure delay for the flight after the turn-
round? 
 1-5 minutes 
 6- 10 minutes 
 11 - 15 minutes 
 16- 20 minutes 
 More than 20 minutes 
Do you think this delay (if relevant) would be 
avoidable through ‘timely reaction on your 
proposal’? (e.g. because it allows you to take an 
appropriate initiative) 
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very Likely 
How often does this happen 
 Daily 
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 Irregularly 
 
What could be the 
reason(s) for this 
waiting time/ 
delay? 
Competing interests among 
responsible functions like 
airport, airline, or handling 
service provider   
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
Not enough resources 
available (e.g.personnel, 
vehicles, check-in desk...)  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
Competence of responsible 
function/ individual  
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very likely 
 
Any Comments?  
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GENERAL: DECISION MAKING 
Do you think it would be an advantage if the flight crew is more involved in decision making for operational issues in 
flight or during the turn-round? 
 Yes, please give reason 
 
 
 No, please give reason 
 
GENERAL: PROBLEMS DURING TURN-ROUND 
If problems arise during turn-round: what do you think could be the reasons? (please rate): 
Turn-Round Time too short?  Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very Likely 
Delays result from information overload: more 
important information is hidden among less 
important information? 
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very Likely 
Inappropriate distribution of responsibilities 
(e.g. decision making…)? 
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 Very Likely 
Inappropriate or insufficient communication 
facilities (radio, intercom…)? 
 Very unlikely 
 Unlikely 
 Likely 
 
Other Reason? 
(please name) 
 
 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Please name the company you are working for:  
How many years of experience do you have 
as Captain First Officer 
I would like to remind you that all information is treated completely anonymously. Many thanks for your 
participation! 
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APPENDIX III: IATA Commonly Used Airline Delay and Diversion Codes  
  
Numeric Alphabetic Description 
Airline Internal Codes 
00  IATA has recommended that these codes are used by individual airline to 
develop code definition that meet their specific requirements: e.g. 03 ‘Three-
class-System’ moving curtain 
 
Note: At time of writing the IATA Recommendation AHM 730 does NOT 
suggest any Alphabetic Equivalents fro these codes 
 
01  
02  
03  
04  
05  
Others 
06 OA NO STAND/GATE AVAILABILITY DUE TO OWN AIRLINE ACTIVITY 
Schedules 
09 
 
SG 
 
 SCHEDULED GROUND TIME LESS THAN DECLARED MINIMUM  
 Passenger and Baggage 
11 PD LATE CHECK-IN; acceptance after deadline 
12 PL LATE CHECK-IN; congestion in check-in area 
13 PE CHECK-IN ERROR;  passenger and baggage 
14 PO OVERSALES; booking errors 
15 PH BOARDING; discrepancies and paging, missing checked-in passenger 
16 PS COMMERCIAL PUBLICITY; PASSENGER CONVENIENCE, VIP, press, 
ground meals and missing items 17 PC CATERING ORDER; late or incorrect order given to supplier 
18 PB BAGGAGE PROCESSING;  sorting, etc.  
Cargo and Mail 
If delays caused by Mail handling can be identified use the Mail specific codes in the next section (27-29), 
otherwise use the codes detailed below (21-26) 
 21 CD DOCUMENTATION; errors, etc. 
22 CP LATEPOSITIONING 
23 CC LATE ACCEPTANCE 
24 CI INADEQUATE PACKING 
25 CO OVERSALES; booking errors 
26 CU LATE PREPARATION IN WAREHOUSE 
Mail Only 
27 CE DOCUMENTATION; PACKING; etc. 
28 CL LATE POSITIONING 
29 CA LATE ACCEPTANCE 
Aircraft and Ramp Handling 
31 GD AIRCRAFT DOCUMENTATION/INACCURATE; weight and balance, general declaration, pax manifest, etc. 
32 GL LOADING/UNLOADING; bulky, special load, lack of loading staff 
33 GE LODADING EQUIPMENT; lack of or breakdown, e.g. container pallet loader, lack of staff 
34 GS SERVICING EQUIPMENT; lack or breakdown, lack of staff, e.g.steps 
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35 GC AIRCRAFT CLEANING 
36 GF FUELLING/ DEFUELLING;  fuel supplier 
37 GB CATERING;  late delivery or loading 
38 GU ULD, lack or serviceability 
39 GT TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT; lack or breakdown, lack of staff, e.g. push-back 
 
 
Numeric Alphabetic Description 
Technical and Aircraft Equipment 
41 TD AIRCRAFT DEFECTS 
42 TM SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE; late release 
43 TN NON-SCHEDULED MAINENTANCE, special checks and/or additional works beyond normal maintenance schedule 
44 TS SPARES AND MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT; lack of or breakdown 
45 TA AOG SPARES, to be carried to another station 
46 TC AIRCRAFT CHANGE, for technical reasons 
47 TL STANDBY AIRCRAFT, lack of planned standby aircraft for technical reasons 
48 TV SCHEDULED CABIN CONFIGURATION VERSION ADJUSTMENTS 
Damage to Aircraft 
51 DF DAMAGE DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, bird or lightning strike, turbulence, heavy or overweight landing, collision during taxing  
52 DG 
DAMAGE DURING GROUND OPERATIONS, collisions (other than during 
taxiing), loading/off-loading damage, contamination, towing, extreme weather 
conditions 
Automated Equipment Failure/ EDP (Computer System) 
55 ED DEPARTURE CONTROL 
56 EC CARGO PREPARATION/ DOCUMENTATION 
57 EF FLIGHTPLANS 
Flight Operations and Crewing 
61 FP FLIGHT PLAN, late completion or change of flight documentation  
62 FF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, fuel, load alteration 
63 FT LATE CREW BOARDING OR DEPARTURE PROCEDURES, other than 
connection and standby (flight deck or entire crew) 
64 FS FLIGHT DECK CREW SHORTAGE; sickness, awaiting standby, flight time limitations, crew meals, valid visa, health documentations, etc. 
65 FR FLIGHT DECK CREW SPECIAL REQUEST, not within operational 
requirements 
66 FL LATE CABIN CREW BOARDING OR DEPARTURE PROCEDURES, other than connection and standby 
67 FC CABIN CREW SHORTAGE, sickness, awaiting standby, flighttime limitations, 
crew meals, valid visa, health documents, etc. 
68 FA CABIN CREW ERROR OR SPECIAL REQUEST, not within operational 
requirements 
69 FB CAPTAINS REQUEST FOR SECURITY CHECK, extraordinary 
Weather 
71 WO WEATHER AT DEPARTURE STATION 
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72 WT WEATHER AT DESTINATION STATION 
73 WR WEATHER EN ROUTE OR ALTERNATE 
75 WI DE-ICING OF AIRCRAFT, removal of ice and/or snow, frost prevention 
excluding unserviceable equipment 
76 WS REMOVAL OF SNOW, ICE, WATER AND SAND FROM AIRPORT 
77 WG GROUND HANDLING IMPARED BY ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
Numeric Alphabetic Description 
Air Traffic Flow Management Restrictions 
81 AT ATFM DUE TO ATC EN-ROUTE DEMAND/CAPACITY, standard 
demand/capacity problems 
82 AX ATFM DUE TO ATC STAFF/EQUIPMENT EN-ROUTE, reduced capacity 
caused by industrial action or staff shortage or equipment failure, extraordinary 
demand due to capacity reduction in neighbouring area 
83 AE ATFM DUE TO RESTRICTION AIRPORT, airport and/or runway closed due to 
obstruction, industrial action, staff shortage, political unrest, noise abatement, 
night curfew, special flights 
84 AW ATFM DUE TO WEATHER AT DESTINATION 
Airport and Governmental Authorities 
85 AS MANDATORY SECURITY 
86 AG IMMIGRATION, CUSTOMS, HEALTH 
87 AF AIRPORT FACILITIES, parking stands, ramp congestion, lighting, buildings, gate limitations, etc. 
88 AD 
RESTRICTIONS AT AIRPORT OF DESTINATION, airport and/or runway 
closed due to obstruction, industrial action, staff shortage, political unrest, noise 
abatement, night curfew, special flights 
89 AM RESTRICTIONS AT AIRPORT OF DEPARTURE WITH OR WITHOUT 
ATFM FESTRICTIONS; including Air Traffic Services, start-up and push-back, 
airport and/or runway closed due to obstruction or weather (restriction due to 
weather in case of AFTM regulation only, else refer to code 71) 
Reactionary 
91 RL LOAD CONNECTION, awaiting load from another flight 
92 RT THROUGH CHECK-IN-ERROR, passenger and baggage 
93 RA AIRCRAFT ROTATION, late arrival from another flight or previous sector 
94 RS CABIN CREW ROTATION, awaiting cabin crew from another flight 
95 RC CREW ROTATION, awaiting crew from another flight (flight deck or entire 
crew) 
96 RO OPERATIONS CONTROL, rerouting, diversion, consolidation, aircraft change for reasons other than technical 
Miscellaneous 
97 MI INDUSTRIAL ACTION WITHIN OWN AIRLINE 
98 MO INDUSTRIAL ACTION OUTSIDE OWN AIRLINE, excluding ATS 
99 MX NOT COVERED BY ANY OTH OTHER DEFINED CODES 
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APPENDIX IV: Currently Used Turn-round Monitoring Tools 
A number of tools with real-time turn-round process monitoring capabilities are 
currently available. However, none of the tools have predictive functionalities 
allowing TOBT predictions. 
1 GroundStar HubControl as process monitoring tool by INFORM GmbH, 
Aachen 
GroundStar HubControl claims itself as a process-monitoring tool able to identify 
factors that may negatively affect a seamless turn-round and to evaluate their impact 
on the turn-round operation. Characteristics of HubControl are: 
• provision of operational transparency via significant pre-warning times;  
• identification and prevention of bottlenecks for aircraft, passenger, and 
baggage handling. 
According to company information, between 100 million and 170 million Euro of 
cost is attributed to delay with one fourth that can be attributed to ground handling. 
HubStar describes itself as a generic product able to adapt to any turn-round operation.  
GroundStar HubControl also claims being able to monitor the concatenation of 
correlated handling tasks for turn-round flights, arrivals and departures, to identify the 
critical path and in doing so, supplying all decision-support information required. It 
detects actual delays and their reasons; delay durations are calculated automatically. It 
is able to produce warnings for predictable irregularities in handling processes and to 
offer various resolution options at the same time. 
Figure 42 shows a possible depiction of HubControl where all processes during turn-
round are displayed with a colour-code indicating the allocation of the process 
according to airlines’ requirements. The right half of the display shows the timeline 
indicating the temporal sequence and duration of the ground handling processes. 
Processes can be added or removed analogous the requirements of the airline. Real-
time tracking as well as process start/completion are colour-coded. 
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FIGURE 42: GUI FOR TURN-ROUND PROCESSES (SOURCE: INFORM, 2009) 
 
 
 
2 ALLEGRO as a process monitoring tool by Lufthansa German Airlines 
Until launch of this tool, no time-oriented information was available for ground 
handling processes. The target of ALLEGRO was to gather information with focus on 
timeliness of turn-round processes between in-block and off-block time. Landside and 
airside processes were analysed in order to identify required measurement points 
where timestamps can be set (Figure 43). The measurement points are indicated by the 
little triangles.  
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FIGURE 43: DEFINED TURN-ROUND MEASUREMENT POINTS (SOURCE: LUFTHANSA, 2004) 
 
Defined target times are flexible and include buffer times in order to incorporate 
delays of preceding processes. The underlying objective for development of this tool 
was to identify the root causes of delays.  
The tool should also provide: 
• a better ground handling transparency; 
• the base for debriefings with operational staff; 
 Appendices  
 
          Matthias Groppe                Influences on Aircraft TOBT Prediction Accuracy                    262                 
• the base for performance agreements with internal and external service 
partners; 
• the base for analyses by A/C type, by gate, by A/C position, by day of week, 
etc; 
• the reduction of spot checks and thereby cost of surveys; 
• the validation of target times; and 
• the base for inductive definition of minimum ground times. 
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APPENDIX V: Further Results from Literature Study 
1 Factors influencing Cooperation 
1.1 Organisational Structure 
Artman (1999) describes cooperative situations as ‘team-think’ and analyses 
cooperation and situation awareness within different teams. He demonstrated that 
serial teams engage more in cooperating activities than parallel teams which can 
result in problems for coordination. This is in line with findings from Brehmer and 
Svenmarck (1995) who claim that a hierarchical organisation of information 
distribution results in a better performance than an organisation where all 
participants can talk to everybody else. As a possible reason for this differences in 
performance levels he identifies that a central unit does not only collect and 
organize information, but understands the overall situation and plans for 
appropriate actions.  
1.2 Information Sharing and Conceptual Design 
Within the Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) research initiative, 
Davis (2000) studied information flows as the basis for creating shared information 
spaces on a web-based repository system that can be used to support asynchronous 
distributed collaborative work. He claims that a systematic approach uses a global 
perspective of information flows in the organisation with continuous participation 
of the end users. This allows him to uncover the complex technical and 
organisational requirements for effective acceptance and use of IT tools.  
Shouqian et al (2003) studied models and techniques of computer supported 
cooperative conceptual design for motorcycles. Hoc et al (2002) analysed the 
demands of task and function’ allocation on human-machine cooperation design 
from a psychological perspective; Rogalski (1996) analysed the cooperation 
process and how cooperation can evolve during training.  
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1.3 Generative Models for Cooperation among Operators  
When conflict resolution in terms of operators’ preferences and values is not 
possible during face-to-face or synchronous communication, a representation of 
operators’ proposition in form of a generative model was introduced by Jameson et 
al (2003). The underlying idea thereby is that, during asynchronous 
communication, operators have a poor awareness of how other operators’ tackle the 
problems that they jointly face because of the inherent difficulties of the media 
typically available during asynchronous communication. During such situations, a 
computational model of operators’ relevant beliefs, preferences, motivations, and 
other relevant properties as operators’ representative should be used (Figure 44).   
 
 
 
FIGURE 44: GENERATIVE PREFERENCES MODEL (SOURCE: JAMESON ET AL, 2003)    
1.4 Influence of Explanation on Cooperation 
Karsenty et al (1995) emphasized the role of explanation for the study of 
cooperation where little consideration has been placed so far and studied 
explanation in cooperation via human-human cooperative dialogues. Gregor (2000) 
catches up with explanations for the analysis of the role of explanation when 
knowledge-based systems are used for cooperative problem solving. Both argue in 
favour of an increased need for explanation. 
1.5 Human-Computer Interaction and Cooperation  
Focus of the Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) research has been 
placed on the interaction design and decision support. It was recognized that 
cooperation theories and models are an important aid for CSCW systems. Most 
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central there are the Activity Theory, Action/Interaction Theory, Coordination 
Theory, the Task Manager Model, and the Object-Oriented Activity Support Model 
(De Farias et al, 1999). De Farias denotes that these different models and theories 
have a set of common concepts and uses these commonalities for developing a new 
model based on these similarities and strengths. The identified generic concepts 
among all models include activities, actors, services, and information which should 
be used to develop cooperative systems.  
1.6. The Role of Performance Metrics for Cooperation 
Performance metrics can be useful for favouring cooperation and driving operators’ 
behaviour. E.g., during turn-round management, the IATA delay codes are used as 
performance metrics. These however, do not show appropriate characteristics to 
foster cooperation across participating functions. For ROI (2004) it is crucial that 
performance measures should be horizontally and not vertically integrated and be 
linked with the company's mission, vision, and value proposition. They should also 
be actionable and within that manager's span of control. Hence, if vertical 
integration of metrics prevails, all the measures of success for a supplier are only 
aligned along traditional functional lines. However, if horizontal integration of 
metrics is present the measures of success for an area look across functional 
boundaries to search for the effect on a process as a whole. Usage of horizontally 
integrated metrics can prevent sub-optimization by seeking to measure the success 
of a function by its impact on the process as a whole. But this raises the question of 
what to measure during process management. E.g. how can suppliers be aware what 
their contribution is to accomplishing the objectives of the company?  
1.7 Cooperation via Cascading Key Performance Indicators 
ROI (2004) propose the implementation of a technique called ‘KPI cascade’. 
This should ensure that measures which are required to accomplish the mission, 
vision, and value proposition of the organisation, are in place at all levels allowing 
a company to eliminate metrics that no longer have value. ROI identifies a number 
of advantages resulting from suitable performance metrics: 
• avoidance of sub-optimization; 
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• alignment within and between functional areas; 
• understanding of what is and what is not important to achieve the company 
objectives; 
• a "holographic" set of measures describing the health of a process; and 
• measures that are actionable and assigned at the appropriate level. 
Cascading KPIs have been proposed by ROI (2004) that are able to link the 
performance management strategies of the company to these KPIs. In such way, 
they create a process that is suitable for the overall outcome and not just the 
outcome of a single supporting process. E.g. the A-CDM key performance 
indicators could be cascaded into particularized KPIs, thus set the latter KPIs and 
target them to the processes and procedures that contribute to the overall success. 
Such form of cultural change with KPIs primarily for the whole company will 
require compensation processes for the supplying companies and also requires 
performance levels allowing the supplying companies to meet their own objectives. 
Miller (1996) proposes to use causal relationships in order to make supplying 
companies comprehend the overall goal and the meaning behind the importance of 
the key performance indicators.      
1.8 Influence of the Goal Structure on Cooperation 
Nezamirad et al. (2005) proposed a model that includes all individual actors’ and 
operators’ goals, tasks, and resources towards the establishment of group goals and 
group tasks. Figure 46 shows a possible application of this model to A-CDM and 
TOBT prediction. This representation allows an analysis of goal structures as an 
iterative refinement process: first, all participating operators’ local goals towards 
the collaborative goal have to be identified (Figure 45). The results should then be 
used to analyse how these local goals influence the overall goals and the global 
goal. The local goals should be continuously re-defined using the underlying sub-
goals of each participating operator. This allows getting a more realistic view on the 
individual operators’ goals which in turn influence the group goals. Using this form 
of analysis helps to identify the sub-goals which have negative or positive impact 
on the global goal or group goals.   
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Furthermore, this approach combined with the cascading performance indicators 
as proposed in Sub-Chapter 1.7 may allow identifying how the local operators’ 
goals can look like and how the global goal can be achieved: 
 
 
FIGURE 45: COOPERATION MODEL ANALOGOUS NEZAMIRAD (2005) APPLIED TO A-CDM 
 
As cooperation continues, operators identify group goals based on their 
individual goals and group knowledge. As the management of a process is 
dynamically entwined with the elaboration and maintenance of group knowledge, 
the goal structures are dynamic, e.g. focus of sub-goal C1 shifts the importance of 
sub-goal C2 which again may change the outcome of the global goal. Also the 
relationship between the group and individual goal structures is a recursive and 
cooperative process, e.g. as global goal changes, the individual goals may be 
amended or revised.  
Operators work together at different levels and forms of work. When looking at 
different levels of abstraction towards a process, goal structures and therefore 
cooperative activities are different for each situation which again has consequences 
on the overall global goal. Nezamirad et al (2005) emphasizes the importance that 
operators are aware of goals of other participants in order to allow them to 
anticipate events or to plan resources.  
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1.9 The Different Levels of Cooperation 
Ferber (1995) discusses cooperation as only one possible category of human-
human interaction situation (micro-level analysis). However, focus can also be 
applied on the social-organisational and cross-functional organisational aspects 
during interaction situations (macro-level analysis). Typical characteristics here are 
e.g. the cognitive factors related to common goals, influencing operators’ goals by 
other operators, control issues, types- and models of communication, influence of 
knowledge based behaviour on other operators, or the role of incentives. A macro-
level situation results from combinations of micro-level situations with emergent 
characteristics (Figure 46) where again the macro-situation imposes social 
constraints on the micro-level situation (Ferber, 1995).  
 
FIGURE 46: RELATION BETWEEN COOPERATION SITUATIONS (SOURCE: FERBER, 1995) 
 
1.10 Further Aspects on Cooperation  
Most theories about cooperation have looked at the interest of actors to 
cooperate with other actors (e.g. Axelrod, 1984) or communication in groups or 
teams (Stoetzel, 1978; Hoc, 2004). Research within multi-agent systems however 
looks to cognitive aspects and behavioural aspects required for implementation of 
cooperative acting (Demazeau and Mueller, 1991; Durfee et al, 1987; Galliers, 
1991; Castelfranchi and Conte, 1991; Bouron, 1992).  
The notion of cross-organisational cooperation emphasizes a holistic aspect of 
cooperation. While at task execution or human-human interaction level cooperation 
emerges from goal, motive, and the instrumental condition (Leontyev, 1959), the 
holistic perspective of cross-organisational cooperation includes also other 
influences. According to ROI (2004), three components are required for successful 
management across functions and organisations, including appropriate management 
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performance metrics, periodic cross-functional management meetings, and inter-
organisational communication channels. Thereby, a cross-functional system is 
defined as a ‘coalitional structure whose member groups maintain their separate 
identities and, if relevant, different goals, yet employ either some formal 
organisation or informal collaboration for joint decision making or problem 
solving’ (Cummings, 1984). Such a coalitional structure can be found during turn-
round management decision making.   
Studies by Winograd and Flores (1986), and Suchman (1987) started to provide 
radically different orientations for HCI with the introduction of new ideas of how to 
think about the design of computer systems. Frameworks like the activity theory, 
originating in Soviet psychology, have also been applied for interface design. With 
the emergence of the Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) as a new 
field in the mid 80’s, the HCI community realized the need to support groups of 
people communicating and working together, but did not take cognitive perspectives 
into account. Inspired by Suchman’s work, scientists started to conduct ethnographic 
studies of technology-mediated collaborative work (e.g. studies of Suchman and 
Trigg, 1991). The main findings of these studies showed how important informal 
working practices can be for the coordinating work and managing of unanticipated 
events.  
Piaget (1965) distinguishes between cooperation seen from a structural (e.g. 
network organisation) and functional point of view and looks at cooperation as 
activities performed by individuals within a team in real time. Two minimal 
conditions must be met in cooperative situations: (1) each of the actors strives 
towards goals and can interfere with other actors on goals, resources, and 
procedures. (2) Each actor tries to manage interferences to facilitate individual 
activities or common tasks. Both conditions are not necessarily symmetric, because 
goal orientation or interference management depend on individual behaviour or 
time constraints. 
In the context of Air Traffic Management (ATM) Hoc (2001) argues that current 
ATM is more concerned with operators’ plans, goals, or role allocation than with 
common situational awareness. Lee (2005) determines situational awareness, 
responsibilities and control, time, workload, and safety constraints as key factors 
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driving collaborative behaviour in air traffic control operation: To have proper 
awareness of the situation, a controller and/or flight crew needs to initiate or be 
informed of actions taken by other operators. Nevertheless, time pressure and 
safety issues have negative effect on communication behaviour and therefore also 
on cooperation or common situational awareness.  
Collaborative Decision Making means applying principles of individual decision 
making on groups, whereby groups are established with the aim to show 
collectively a specific behaviour (Jennings et al, 2001). This implies that 
cooperation of participating individuals should be beneficial for CDM operation, 
also in air transport management.  How does a cooperative working environment 
look like on a day-to-day basis? Cooperation has a wide variety of connotations in 
everyday usage (Schmidt, 1994). Do people only cooperate, if they are mutually 
dependant in their work? Is mutual dependency sufficient for cooperation to 
emerge? In context of CDM operation, confrontation and the combination of 
different perspectives of cooperation is an issue: how is the flight crew’s 
perspective embedded in the current CDM approach? For Schmidt (1994), the 
multifarious nature of a task can be matched by the application of multiple 
perspectives on a given problem via articulation of these perspectives and 
transforming/ translating information from different domains.  
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2 Aspects of Distributed Cognition and Distributed Decision Making  
2.1 Introduction  
The Distributed Cognition theory was used to model the A-CDM work system (See 
Chapter 4). This approach showed potential not only to analyse, how coordination and 
cooperation of the various subsystems during interdependent work practices are 
established or how information is currently shared within the system, but also allowed 
to include the environment as a factor influencing the individuals when executing their 
tasks.  
Another prevailing advantage of distributed cognition is that the theory can 
accommodate the rich variety of systems and media inherent in organisations’ or 
groups’ cognitive processes like within A-CDM. Since the unit of analysis is not 
committed to a fixed value, the entire system can be decomposed into the smaller, 
functional groups. However, Nardi (2002) and Rogers (2000) argue that analysis 
towards distributed cognition approach cannot generally be used: a low-level 
distributed cognition analysis will not enhance engineering practices for building 
design applications. Also the theoretical perspective is committed to ethnographical 
data collection: a substantial investment is required to actually apply the theory to any 
specific issue (Hutchins, 1994; Hollan et al, 2000).  
2.2 The Distributed Cognition Theory  
Distributed Cognition is a hybrid approach to studying all aspects of cognition, from 
a cognitive, social, and organisational perspective. It attempts to understand how 
cognitive phenomena are distributed across individuals and artefacts (e.g. how tools 
like computers can be used for solving problems). It emphasizes the fact that cognition 
does not lie strictly within the individual, but instead is an emergent, distributed 
activity, performed by people with tools, within the context of a team or organisation, 
in an evolved cultural context. Because of its focus on the whole environment, it gives 
the theory a special role in understanding interactions between people and technology. 
This includes what people do and how they coordinate activities in their environment, 
and so provides a radical reorientation about the design and support of human-
computer interactions.    
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2.3 Background of Distributed Cognition  
Distributed cognition was developed in the mid 1980s by Edwin Hutchins at the 
University of California, San Diego as a theoretical and methodological framework. 
While the traditional view saw cognition as a localized phenomenon that is best 
explained in terms of information processing at the level of the individual interacting 
with applications derived from decomposition of work activities into individual tasks, 
Hutchins argues that cognition does not strictly lie within the individual. Distributed 
cognition tends to reach of what is considered cognitive beyond the individual to 
encompass interactions between people with resources and materials in the 
environment.  
The theoretical and methodological approaches to distributed cognition derive from 
cognitive sciences, cognitive anthropology, and the social sciences. Traditional 
frameworks however were developed separately from respective disciplines (cognitive, 
social, and organisational). Therefore, they do not provide an adequate means of 
studying dynamics of collaborative activities in situ. As a consequence, distributed 
cognition emerged from this need to better understand the dynamics of human-
computer interaction within a complex networked world of information and computer-
mediated interactions (Hollan et al, 2000).  
After the theory was established, the challenge was to integrate concepts from social 
and organisational sciences with the cognitive analysis of micro-level descriptions from 
individuals’ interactions. Even with the distributed cognition approach has been able to 
provide analysis for problems experienced by individual users of awkward-to-use 
interfaces, the lack of consideration on those problems has led to a HCI design that is 
unable to support people using computer-based interaction systems. For Hollan et al 
(2000) this new approach is a radical reorientation of how to think about designing and 
supporting HCIs during complex tasks, and how to ensure human-centred focus. Such 
support should be achieved by extending the scope of the cognitive perspective beyond 
the individual to comprise human-human interactions with resources in such an 
environment in which people pursue their goals in collaboration with elements of the 
social and material world. 
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The distributed cognition approach can also be distinguished from others by its 
commitment to two principles: it looks for cognitive processes on the basis of the 
functional relationships of elements (e.g. a process is not cognitive simply because it 
happens in a brain, nor is a process non-cognitive simply because it happens in the 
interaction among many brains). Second principle concerns the range: distributed 
cognition does not limit cognitive events to reside at an individual only, but also the 
physical environment of thinking or material world can reorganize the distributed 
cognitive system.  
Hollan et al (2000) describe three kinds of distribution of the cognitive process: 
 Cognitive processes may be distributed across the members of a social 
group. 
 Cognitive processes may involve coordination between internal and external 
(material or environmental) structure. 
 Processes may be distributed through time in such a way that the products of 
earlier events can transform the nature of later events. 
The first tenet of socially distributed cognition was already determined in the 1970s 
by Roberts (Hollan et al, 2000) and studied by anthropologists, sociologists, and 
artificial intelligence researchers. This approach studied a social organisation itself as a 
cognitive architecture with the consequence that cognition of an individual is also 
distributed. According to Hollan et al (2000), the new approach to distributed cognition 
however integrates phenomena that emerge in social interactions with interactions of 
people and structure in their environment. He highlights three fundamental questions in 
this context: (1) how are the cognitive processes that we normally associate with an 
individual mind implemented in a group of individuals, and (2) how are the cognitive 
properties of groups differing from the cognitive properties of the people who act in 
those groups, and (3) how are the cognitive properties of individuals minds affected by 
participation in group activities.  
The second tenet is the approach that cognition is an embodied phenomenon and not 
an incidental matter. This approach is increasingly supported by Brooks (1991), Kirsh 
(1991), and Lakoff (1999) who emphasize the relations between internal and external 
processes. Such relations involve coordination at many different time scales between 
 Appendices  
 
          Matthias Groppe                Influences on Aircraft TOBT Prediction Accuracy                    274                 
internal resources like memory, attention, and external resources like objects or 
artefacts.       
The third tenet is that studies of culture cannot be separated from studies of 
cognition. While on one hand culture emerges out of human activities in their 
historical context, on the other hand culture shapes cognitive processes through the 
history of material artefacts and social practices (Hutchins, 1994). As a result, culture 
cannot be isolated or separated from cognition and so shapes the cognitive processes 
of systems that transcend the boundaries of individuals (Hutchins, 1994). This 
includes the notion that the environment constitutes as a reservoir of resources for 
learning, problem solving, and reasoning.  
2.4 Distributed Cognition as Integrated Framework for Research 
For the research in cognitive science and the design of new forms of human-
computer interactions, Hollan et al (2000) proposes an integrated research framework 
which puts together the core principles of the theory with classes of phenomena that 
serve the relations with these principles as an assemble of an completed integrated 
research system (Figure 47). 
 
FIGURE 47: INTEGRATED RESEARCH ACTIVITY MAP (SOURCE: HOLLAN ET AL, 2000) 
 
Core principles of an integrated framework include e.g.: 
• people which establish and coordinate different types of structure in their 
environment; 
• maintaining coordination requires an effort; and 
• social organisations hold improved dynamics of cognitive load-balancing 
available. 
These principles are used to identify classes of phenomena via cognitive 
ethnography e.g. (1) information flow or cognitive properties, to make experiments, or 
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(2) for demonstrating the impact of changes, where the distributed cognition principles, 
the ethnographic data, and the experiments mutually constrain each other.  
2.5 Methods used by the Framework of Distributed Cognition 
An analysis using the Distributed Cognition Framework comprises a number of 
different methods ranging from detailed analysis via video or audio recordings of real 
life events to neural network simulations and laboratory experiments. The method used 
for analysis depends on the unit of analysis and the level at which a cognitive system is 
being explained.  
A proper analysis requires focus on the relations and interactions between the 
individual and the artefacts, and a profound knowledge of analysed system domain. 
This entails going to the workplace and spending time determining and analysing the 
problems with the existing technology and work practices (Rogers, 1994). The central 
unit of analysis is the functional system which essentially is a collection of individuals 
and artefacts as well as their relations to each other in a particular work practice 
(Rogers et al, 1994). However, it is possible to adopt different units of analysis to 
describe a range of cognitive systems; whereby some subsume others (Hutchins, 1995). 
Focus is on the nature of distributed activities: how is information propagated through 
and across artefacts, and how is knowledge transmitted between individual members of 
a team or group.  
A distributed cognition analysis requires also an increased attention on the abstract 
functional relations in order to develop a framework for modelling and design 
(Rasmussen et al, 1994). Traditionally work systems are analysed by using a structural 
perspective which focuses on a causal interaction among parts. That means elements of 
analysis are arranged in cause-and-effect chains and the characteristics are determined 
by their output. This way may be true for machines, however human actors do not have 
such stable input-output characteristics because humans may change their 
characteristics or behaviour, and modelling human-machine systems cannot be 
accomplished in isolation. This means, in order to understand system behaviour where 
humans are involved, the entire system has to be contemplated and structural elements 
of the system have to be abstracted at a purely functional level in order to identify 
functional relations. Additionally, in order to make the functional relation more 
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effective, the actor should not be assigned to specific behaviour, but a space bounded 
by the goal and resource constraints (Rasmussen et al, 1994).  
Other issues which constitute important properties of distributed cognition are the 
access to information and dynamic aspects of activities: shared access together with 
shared knowledge is the basis for coordinated actions. Thereby the means of knowledge 
propagation is focusing on dynamic aspects of the activities rather than static entities. 
Rogers (1994) emphasizes the need to describe in increasing detail the seemingly trivial 
and usually taken for granted aspects of interactions (micro-level analysis) since they 
often play a crucial role in coordination of work activities. Additionally there are 
always situations emerging during day-to-day working activities where the members of 
the group are required to carry out additional tasks. This results in new coordination 
procedures giving additional aspects on the carried out interactions.  
2.6 Related Research Using the Distributed Cognition Framework 
A wide spectrum of approaches to apply distributed cognition can be found having 
analysed cognitive phenomena. Most of the attention has focused on cognitive systems 
of work practices, e.g. engineering, cockpits, ship navigation, software development in 
order to design interfaces between humans and/or humans and computers (e.g. Burns, 
2000; Burns, Bryant and Chalmers, 2000; Dinadis and Vicente, 1999; Gualtieri, Elm, 
Potter and Roth, 2001).  
2.7 Summary and Discussion 
A general advantage of the distributed cognition approach is that it provides a 
framework and analytic method for examining the interactions between people and 
artefacts which is not possible with traditional approaches to cognitive task analyses 
(Roger, 1994). Prevailing thereby is the advantage that the theory can accommodate the 
rich variety of systems and media inherent in an organisation’s or groups cognitive 
processes. Complex interdependencies between people and people and artefacts in their 
collaborative activities can be highlighted, and since the unit of analysis is not 
committed to a fixed value, the entire system can be decomposed into the smaller, 
functional groups that make it up. As a result, seemingly trivial communication failures 
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or interaction problems can be detected having significant and sometimes dramatic 
consequences for the operation of a system.  
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APPENDIX VI: The CWA and Critical Aspects for Application to A-CDM 
1 Characteristics of the CWA 
Cognitive Work Analysis has a number of characteristics which distinguish CWA 
from other forms of analysis. These include: 
• Formative Approach: a formative analysis intends to identify the technological and 
organisational requirements that need to be satisfied, in order to create interfaces 
able to support work effectively. It focuses on modelling work constraints instead 
of design of devices. This means, it looks on the way thinks could be done, rather 
than should be done like the normative approach, or on the way how things are like 
the descriptive approach. “Understanding the structure of work leads to supporting 
work at the level of structure, which rarely changes, and suggests structural 
changes that radically improve the work” (Vicente, 1999). A formative approach is 
also model based which means it allows for flexibility and continuing evolution of 
work practices, rather than building in a fixed and narrow work flow. As a 
consequence, interface device structure supports worker’s natural movement 
through his work and is flexible enough to allow the invention of new ways of 
working (Beyer and Holtzblatt, 1998 in Vicente). 
• Flexible Adaptive Action: Due to the demands of a complex socio-technical system, 
unexpected situations occur, where workers must respond with adaptive, problem 
solving behaviour tailored to the local context. E.g. during turn-round management, 
actors are faced with such situations and do not have appropriate support from 
computer-based information systems. CWA emphasizes an interface design which 
is able to support actors during such unpredictable contingencies. 
• Ecological Perspective: CWA is based on an ecological approach which gives 
primary importance to the constraints imposed by the environment on workers’ 
actions. This is in contrast to the more popular approach where focus is applied on 
the constraints of the human cognitive system. Even those constraints are relevant 
as well, the design process for CWA starts with consideration of the ecological 
constraints (Flach, 1990; Hancock et.a., 1988). 
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• Activity independent: The first phase of the CWA is the Work Domain Analysis as 
an activity independent form of analysis which focuses on the functional structure 
of the work domain rather than the activities within the domain. This is achieved by 
mapping out the functional, but activity independent properties of the work domain 
at five levels of abstraction and multiple levels of decomposition.  
• Revolutionary Design: Since evolutionary design is based on the analysis of current 
practices leading to a design that supports that practice, revolutionary design 
however creates opportunities for the development of new and more efficient work 
practices.  
• Practicality for unanticipated situations: CWA incorporates an analysis approach 
which is able to handle unpredictable events, because it is able to reveal the 
intentional as well as the physical constraints on actions. 
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2 The CWA – Control Task Analysis and Decision Ladder  
A. Description of the Decision Ladder  
Rasmussen et al (1994) proposes the decision ladder (Figure 48) as a modelling 
template for control tasks. He has developed the decision ladder based on his field 
studies on operators from nuclear industry.  
 
FIGURE 48: RASSMUSSEN’S DECISION LADDER (SOURCE: NAIKAR, 2006)       
 
The decision ladder is able to identify the control tasks. The boxes represent 
information-processing activities; the ovals represent the states of knowledge that are 
the results or outputs of these activities. The arrows in the centre of the decision ladder 
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allow shortcuts from one part of the decision ladder to another. While shunts connect 
an information-processing activity to a state of knowledge, leaps connect two states of 
knowledge. This indicates that two states of knowledge can be directly associated with 
each other. Rasmussen (1994) and Vicente (1999) describe a variety of other shortcuts. 
The decision ladder can be divided in three parts: Understanding the system state with 
related control tasks (left side), goal evaluation with related control tasks (top), and 
achieving the goals with related control tasks (right side). Observations of the 
information or data present in the environment are necessary in order to achieve the 
required knowledge about the system state. While some system states may allow to 
shortcut to directly execute procedures or tasks, other occasions require evaluation of 
the target state against the different options available. 
The advantages of the decision ladder compared to traditional information 
processing for decision support include: 
• Shortcuts which allow following the decision ladder directly to the knowledge 
states which are suitable to the specific situation instead of fixed decision 
nodes. 
•  The decision ladder accommodates various start and end points, and  
• The decision ladder allows choosing the sequence of following the ladder 
where information processing paths can be established in all directions.  
Traditional approaches however require following all steps in a linear sequence, but 
the order is not always necessary to be followed in the particular situation. E.g. experts 
are able to recognize situations and as a consequence, take efficient shortcuts or even 
move from right to left after task definition is completed.“Expertise is the ability to 
compose a process needed for a specific task as a sequence of familiar subroutines 
that are useful in different contexts” (Rasmussen, 1976). This means by using their 
‘subroutines’ as a ‘collection of tricks’, experts actively generate a contextually 
tailored sequence of cognitive activities which is appropriate for the present situation 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1988).  
The decision ladder can then be used for each work function in order to find the 
associated control task. As applied to the contextual activity template (Figure 49), it 
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shows the qualitatively different sets of cognitive demands on actors which are 
imposed during the different situations: 
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FIGURE 49: CONTEXTUAL ACTIVITY TEMPLATE WITH CONTROL TASKS 
 
B. Critical Aspects of the Decision Ladder when applied to Turn-round Control 
Even with all steps identified where decisions are required during turn-round it still 
has to be questioned whether the decision ladder is useful for decisions as they have to 
be made during turn-round control. Initially the model was developed for describing 
problem solving of operators in nuclear power plant control rooms (Rasmussen, 1985). 
It has now to be demonstrated that the model can be applied as a formal tool for the 
specification of control structures prevailing during turn-round decision making. E.g. 
Lind (1986) argues that Rasmussen’s decision model can also be used for decision 
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support when designing Advanced Knowledge Based System architectures. He shows 
how the decision model integrates rule-based problem solving support for planning 
and decision making, as well as knowledge-based support corresponding to the deeper 
knowledge corresponding to Rasmussen’s theory of how to make distinctions among 
human performance. This makes the model useful for planning the use of different 
types of knowledge in problem solving. He argues that the model can also be used 
either in a normative way via specifying the tasks involved and the relation between 
tasks, or in a formalized way via representing knowledge to be used for control of the 
system. However, the strategy used for decision making depends on the knowledge 
owned by the decision maker. This in turn defines the information requirements for 
analysis of the situation.  
However, Lind (1986) also argues that the decision ladder does not specify all 
aspects required in order to use it as a formalized decision aid: Instead of fully 
describing the information flow during decision making, the model only describes the 
flow of control from task to task. This is also true for the diagnostic process: if the 
overall target state is not known, it is not possible to determine the proper level of 
system state that would allow taking the proposed shunt or leap. Another problem is 
that the knowledge as the basis for decision making changes over time and so the 
decisions made. Therefore a formalized way of decision making where each decision 
task corresponds to an information process which applies for the knowledge presently 
available should be considered. Furthermore, the decision making based on rules or 
knowledge is not entirely represented in the model: different decisions require 
different level of knowledge that must be represented in the flow of data to support 
decision making. But what if the decision cannot be made due to lack of sufficient 
information?  
Since turn-round management has characteristics of decision making as described 
by Lind with often unknown target states, changing knowledge, and lack of 
information, the decision ladder was not used to model the control task as they were 
identified in the critical path of turn-round events.  
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3 The CWA - Strategies Analysis 
A. Introduction 
The third stage of the CWA identifies how the different tasks can be conducted 
involving the identification of strategies that workers might employ when performing 
the control tasks. During this phase of analysis, the focus is applied on the ways of 
performing the control tasks. The analysis can be done, e.g. by using information flow 
maps to identify different cognitive procedures that are possible during control tasks 
execution.  
The strategies adopted by actors under a specific situation may vary significantly 
depending on the actor’s work demand level. This means that different agents may 
perform work in different ways depending on the situation and strategies depend on 
variables like knowledge level, experience, training, work load, and familiarity with 
the given situation. As a consequence, actors might even use different strategies at 
different occasions.  
While during CTA it has been identified what decisions have to be made, it is the 
scope of the Strategies Analysis to describe how these decisions can be made and what 
alternatives courses of actions are available. Luce (1995) describes the difference 
between these two phases of analysis (Figure 50):  
 
 
FIGURE 50: COMPARISON OF CONTROL TASK AND STRATEGIES ANALYSES (SOURCE: LUCE, 1995)  
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If the decision ladder is applied to the CTA, it represents the information processing 
activities which result in the outputs by using the different strategies, because there are 
often multiple ways of solving a task. The strategies analysis tries now to identify each 
of the possible strategies that can be used to provide tailored support to each strategy 
(Vicente, 1999).   
B. Methods of Strategy Analysis  
Vicente (1999) compares two contrasting approaches to define strategy. While 
Payne et al (1993) defines strategy as application of knowledge transformation onto a 
particular decision problem, Rasmussen (1981) views the knowledge transformation as 
a category of cognitive task procedures. The fundamental difference with Rasmussen’s 
approach is that he sees strategy as a category of procedures (Rasmussen), compared 
to an instance of a procedure (Payne et al). The underlying reason for Rasmussen’s 
definition is the inherent variability across different situations and therefore the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of cognitive procedures and behaviours used by actors. 
Therefore, a detailed strategy description may result in a normative way of work 
analysis only with the limitations of the ‘one right way’ rather than context-
conditioned variability required during complex and unexpected decision making 
situations. The definition of ‘categories’ of cognitive procedures with action sequences 
as instantiation of a category should help to solve such problems, because a detailed 
level of description is not very useful for design. The definition of categories however 
offer a bounded, but infinite number of action sequences. 
Rasmussen (1981) proposes information flow maps to describe such categories of 
cognitive task procedures. Vicente (1999) distinguishes topographic and symptomatic 
search strategies, where topographic strategies are idealized process representations 
from which particular instances of action sequences can be generated. Symptomatic 
problem solving strategies can be ‘pattern recognition’ driven where actor recognizes a 
pattern of familiar data, ‘decision table’ driven where actor relies on a number of state 
models that are used to associate a particular data pattern with a particular state, or 
‘hypothesis-and-test’ driven where actor uses a hypothesis about the particular state 
derived from earlier applications or other search strategies.   
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Vicente (1999) points out that information flow maps are not yet exist as a 
modelling tool like the decision ladder, but as a generic and context-specific tool to 
model strategies. Information required to conduct a strategy analysis should be derived 
from descriptive field studies, an a priori analysis of actions required by study of the 
work domain, and then identify the degree of freedom associated with particular 
classes of situations using a control task analysis. Finally, Vicente (1999, p.234) 
proposes also operational research models for identification of strategies.   
C. Critical Review of the Strategies Analysis for Application to Turn-Round 
Managment 
A review of the degree of freedom as proposed by Vicente (1999) reveals that each 
decision of one function within the critical turn-round path can have significant 
influence on other functions within the sequential turn-round processes. As a result, 
the outcome of an individual decision from one function propagates to other functions 
and so influences decision makers who have to build on the outcomes of other 
decisions. However, performing a Strategies Analysis does not incorporate 
interdependencies between strategies as they are applied during turn-round 
management. Even if a strategy analysis shows how activities may be executed by 
using the various options, it does not automatically link the neighbouring tasks or 
strategies from other participating decision makers to a global activity of an overall 
optimum turn-round management strategy. Therefore, seen from such an overall turn-
round operation perspective, the advantage of a service delivery for one service 
provider could be a disadvantage for another service provider. For example, the 
catering trolleys can block the working space for cleaning personnel when moved 
through aircraft cabin and vice versa. As a consequence, only local optimum strategies 
can be identified, if the strategies analysis is conducted separately for an individual 
participating decision maker using the decision ladder.      
Also, even consistently taking into account the constraints from other participants 
does not automatically result in a global optimum turn-round strategy. Since actors 
have the tendency to switch strategies depending on their cognitive load it is also 
difficult to predict shifts in their strategies (Vicente, 1999). As a consequence, 
coordination of a very large number of possible strategies is necessary to provide an 
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intelligent decision support for such situations. This suggests that a strategy analysis 
for the purpose here should first identify the information requirements associated with 
each of the strategies so that a conceptualized support of information can be offered 
allowing a centralized decision making of turn-round operation and TOBT predictions. 
Such approach is able to provide formalized information support in a tailored manner 
for all participating decision makers.  
D. Possible Application of a Strategies Analysis to the A-CDM work system 
As outlined before, a number of decision makers are involved in TOBT decision 
making with each participant having its own strategy for tackling problems as they 
arise within their local environment.  As a consequence, even with information flow 
maps as proposed by Vicente (1999), participating actors only receive support for 
possible local strategies. It is therefore proposed to use an approach where a single 
turn-round manager is responsible for the overall turn-round strategy and 
communicates this strategy to all actors involved. As a consequence, actors’ task 
definitions are based on the turn-round managers’ strategy. However, it has also to be 
considered that actors may switch their individual strategies for task execution based 
on their cognitive load, performance levels, conflicting interests, or sudden shifts in 
the environment. 
 For achieving the specific task goals, tailored information support should be 
provided to all involved. Therefore the primary aim of a step towards an application to 
the A-CDM system should be to develop a systematic approach of the information 
requirements of each participating actors which allows him to execute his task, but 
also allows the decision maker to chose and pursue a strategy based on the given 
situation and existing constraints. This goes along with the design implications 
identified by Vicente (1999) that strategies can in principle be actor-independent and 
can be distributed across workers and automation.  
Such a significant prerequisite for decision making should be achieved via information 
sharing by providing synchronous information support to all participating actors for 
turn-round tasks execution or required negotiation between actors and turn-round 
controller. The research in Computer Supported Collaborative Work (CSCW) has 
already drawn attention to developing comprehensive understanding of such 
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complexities in collaborative working environments. The CSCW approach builds on a 
search for an in-depth understanding of the practical contingencies of today’s work 
practices including social and organisational context (Davis et.al, 2000). Divergent 
perspectives have emerged as ‘shared information spaces that provide contextual 
guidance and support’ and ‘automated work flow systems with the ability to deal with 
contingencies’ (Schmidt, 1997). Davis et al (2000) proposes a structure of information 
sharing using a personal and group perspective. As a novel aspect he also proposes 
that the participants are organized as a cooperative ensemble whether derived from a 
project or functional structure, but operating with own coordination and interaction 
patterns among the participants. Such study should be able not only to identify the 
different modes of coordination and information exchange required, but also 
information sharing breakdowns and functional system design specifications. As a 
method of data collection for such information flow analysis David (2000) uses a 
questionnaire with questions like:  
• Which tasks do you perform in relation to the product development process?  
• For each of the tasks: which documents or other information do you need/ use? 
(e.g. specifications, contracts, orders, invoices, procedures, standards, etc.) 
• For each of the above: where /who do you get this information from 
(Customers, colleagues, other departments, databases, archives etc….)? 
• What format is the information in? (Text/letters, spreadsheets, drawings, 
photos. Database-data, sound recording, video, etc.) 
• How is the information transferred to you? (Collected, post, fax, mail, oral, 
phone, fileserver etc.) 
• How do you sort and store this information? 
• What kind of results do you produce? (Different kinds of documents, 
approvals, controls, physical products etc…) 
• Who uses the results of your work? (customer, subcontractor, supplier, 
colleagues, archives, etc.) 
• How are the results passed on? (automatically or on request) 
• Who checks the results/ what kind of feedback do you get? 
• Which tools do you use for your tasks?(computer assisted or /and manual ones) 
• Which of your tasks seem most time-consuming or in-efficient? 
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4 The CWA - Organisation and Co-operation Analysis 
During this stage of the CWA, the distribution of activities and associated strategies 
amongst the workers and artefacts within the system should be identified. The CWA 
uses the modelling tools from previous phases of the framework in order to identify 
how the actors may be organized in groups or teams, how they communicate, and how 
the authority relationships govern their cooperation. However, modelling tools from 
the CWA do not reflect how the individual goal structures have influence on the 
cooperative activities towards a global goal. As the CWA constitutes using modelling 
tools building on the constraints identified from previous phases of analysis with 
conclusions of how cooperative interactions should be designed, the CWA was not 
applied for this project. 
E.g. during turn-round, the operators from the different domains not necessarily 
work together cooperatively, increasing the need for identification of the group goals, 
the cooperative processes supporting the group goals and the underlying group tasks. 
The overall aim should be pursued in a way that all work is coordinated towards the 
common goals and establishing a global goal, while each operator attempts to satisfy 
its’ own organisational sub-goal. Goal complexity even further increases with dynamic 
aspects of operators’ goal scenarios: for goal achievement, subordinate goals are 
identified during task execution and operators act on their immediate goals in order to 
achieve the higher level goal (Hacker, 1994). Goal creation can also follow the other 
direction, where operators first become aware of the problem, then make the highest 
level of their own goal structure and construct lower level subordinate goals during 
action in order to achieve the higher level goal (see Figure 51).  
 
 
 
FIGURE 51: THE OPERATORS’ GOAL STRUCTURE (SOURCE: HACKER, 1994) 
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APPENDIX VII: The Results from Games-Howell Test 
The data presented in this appendix results from a Games-Howell test that was used to 
demonstrate the homogeneity among the experiment participants.  
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
Control (J) Control 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std Error Significance 
95%-Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
D_T01 1 2 -13,20000 7,01739 ,435 -34,7239 8,3239 
3 -7,33333 5,83117 ,803 -25,9359 11,2693 
4 -6,33333 6,94829 ,940 -27,6631 14,9965 
5 -5,46667 7,02287 ,969 -27,0060 16,0727 
6 -8,26667 5,93654 ,731 -27,0799 10,5466 
2 1 13,20000 7,01739 ,435 -8,3239 34,7239 
3 5,86667 4,76422 ,816 -9,1625 20,8958 
4 6,86667 6,08062 ,865 -11,7159 25,4492 
5 7,73333 6,16570 ,806 -11,1083 26,5750 
6 4,93333 4,89262 ,910 -10,3827 20,2494 
3 1 7,33333 5,83117 ,803 -11,2693 25,9359 
2 -5,86667 4,76422 ,816 -20,8958 9,1625 
4 1,00000 4,66183 1,000 -13,6860 15,6860 
5 1,86667 4,77227 ,999 -13,1895 16,9228 
6 -,93333 2,94898 1,000 -9,9580 8,0913 
4 1 6,33333 6,94829 ,940 -14,9965 27,6631 
2 -6,86667 6,08062 ,865 -25,4492 11,7159 
3 -1,00000 4,66183 1,000 -15,6860 13,6860 
5 ,86667 6,08694 1,000 -17,7353 19,4686 
6 -1,93333 4,79298 ,998 -16,9162 13,0495 
5 1 5,46667 7,02287 ,969 -16,0727 27,0060 
2 -7,73333 6,16570 ,806 -26,5750 11,1083 
3 -1,86667 4,77227 ,999 -16,9228 13,1895 
4 -,86667 6,08694 1,000 -19,4686 17,7353 
6 -2,80000 4,90047 ,992 -18,1423 12,5423 
6 1 8,26667 5,93654 ,731 -10,5466 27,0799 
2 -4,93333 4,89262 ,910 -20,2494 10,3827 
3 ,93333 2,94898 1,000 -8,0913 9,9580 
4 1,93333 4,79298 ,998 -13,0495 16,9162 
5 2,80000 4,90047 ,992 -12,5423 18,1423 
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D_T02 1 2 -15,46667 7,29092 ,309 -37,9166 6,9833 
3 -13,93333 6,54978 ,314 -34,5466 6,6799 
4 -15,73333 7,38755 ,304 -38,4465 6,9798 
5 -11,93333 7,78733 ,647 -35,7758 11,9092 
6 -13,53333 6,73079 ,369 -34,5593 7,4927 
2 1 15,46667 7,29092 ,309 -6,9833 37,9166 
3 1,53333 5,04330 1,000 -14,0558 17,1225 
4 -,26667 6,09189 1,000 -18,8846 18,3513 
5 3,53333 6,57098 ,994 -16,5892 23,6559 
6 1,93333 5,27624 ,999 -14,2807 18,1474 
3 1 13,93333 6,54978 ,314 -6,6799 34,5466 
2 -1,53333 5,04330 1,000 -17,1225 14,0558 
4 -1,80000 5,18202 ,999 -17,8478 14,2478 
5 2,00000 5,73760 ,999 -15,8958 19,8958 
6 ,40000 4,19296 1,000 -12,4300 13,2300 
4 1 15,73333 7,38755 ,304 -6,9798 38,4465 
2 ,26667 6,09189 1,000 -18,3513 18,8846 
3 1,80000 5,18202 ,999 -14,2478 17,8478 
5 3,80000 6,67804 ,992 -16,6338 24,2338 
6 2,20000 5,40899 ,998 -14,4464 18,8464 
5 1 11,93333 7,78733 ,647 -11,9092 35,7758 
2 -3,53333 6,57098 ,994 -23,6559 16,5892 
3 -2,00000 5,73760 ,999 -19,8958 15,8958 
4 -3,80000 6,67804 ,992 -24,2338 16,6338 
6 -1,60000 5,94338 1,000 -20,0049 16,8049 
6 1 13,53333 6,73079 ,369 -7,4927 34,5593 
2 -1,93333 5,27624 ,999 -18,1474 14,2807 
3 -,40000 4,19296 1,000 -13,2300 12,4300 
4 -2,20000 5,40899 ,998 -18,8464 14,4464 
5 1,60000 5,94338 1,000 -16,8049 20,0049 
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D_T11 1 2 -4,00000 2,28397 ,515 -11,1168 3,1168 
3 -3,66667 1,82244 ,363 -9,2614 1,9280 
4 -3,80000 1,96719 ,408 -9,8668 2,2668 
5 -,06667 1,90171 1,000 -5,9190 5,7857 
6 -,53333 1,49560 ,999 -5,1073 4,0406 
2 1 4,00000 2,28397 ,515 -3,1168 11,1168 
3 ,33333 2,46254 1,000 -7,2438 7,9105 
4 ,20000 2,57152 1,000 -7,6812 8,0812 
5 3,93333 2,52178 ,631 -3,8073 11,6740 
6 3,46667 2,23152 ,636 -3,5268 10,4601 
3 1 3,66667 1,82244 ,363 -1,9280 9,2614 
2 -,33333 2,46254 1,000 -7,9105 7,2438 
4 -,13333 2,17197 1,000 -6,7769 6,5103 
5 3,60000 2,11285 ,541 -2,8586 10,0586 
6 3,13333 1,75626 ,493 -2,2805 8,5471 
4 1 3,80000 1,96719 ,408 -2,2668 9,8668 
2 -,20000 2,57152 1,000 -8,0812 7,6812 
3 ,13333 2,17197 1,000 -6,5103 6,7769 
5 3,73333 2,23891 ,563 -3,1097 10,5764 
6 3,26667 1,90605 ,537 -2,6414 9,1747 
5 1 ,06667 1,90171 1,000 -5,7857 5,9190 
2 -3,93333 2,52178 ,631 -11,6740 3,8073 
3 -3,60000 2,11285 ,541 -10,0586 2,8586 
4 -3,73333 2,23891 ,563 -10,5764 3,1097 
6 -,46667 1,83839 1,000 -6,1508 5,2175 
6 1 ,53333 1,49560 ,999 -4,0406 5,1073 
2 -3,46667 2,23152 ,636 -10,4601 3,5268 
3 -3,13333 1,75626 ,493 -8,5471 2,2805 
4 -3,26667 1,90605 ,537 -9,1747 2,6414 
5 ,46667 1,83839 1,000 -5,2175 6,1508 
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D_T12 1 2 -3,26667 5,70185 ,992 -20,6958 14,1625 
3 -7,06667 4,99759 ,719 -22,4984 8,3651 
4 -11,53333 5,23116 ,269 -27,5975 4,5308 
5 -5,53333 6,18318 ,945 -24,4405 13,3738 
6 -4,53333 4,97741 ,940 -19,9123 10,8456 
2 1 3,26667 5,70185 ,992 -14,1625 20,6958 
3 -3,80000 4,78609 ,966 -18,5375 10,9375 
4 -8,26667 5,02950 ,578 -23,6810 7,1477 
5 -2,26667 6,01353 ,999 -20,6756 16,1423 
6 -1,26667 4,76502 1,000 -15,9474 13,4141 
3 1 7,06667 4,99759 ,719 -8,3651 22,4984 
2 3,80000 4,78609 ,966 -10,9375 18,5375 
4 -4,46667 4,21434 ,893 -17,3616 8,4282 
5 1,53333 5,35045 1,000 -15,0656 18,1323 
6 2,53333 3,89489 ,986 -9,3691 14,4358 
4 1 11,53333 5,23116 ,269 -4,5308 27,5975 
2 8,26667 5,02950 ,578 -7,1477 23,6810 
3 4,46667 4,21434 ,893 -8,4282 17,3616 
5 6,00000 5,56925 ,886 -11,1665 23,1665 
6 7,00000 4,19039 ,562 -5,8249 19,8249 
5 1 5,53333 6,18318 ,945 -13,3738 24,4405 
2 2,26667 6,01353 ,999 -16,1423 20,6756 
3 -1,53333 5,35045 1,000 -18,1323 15,0656 
4 -6,00000 5,56925 ,886 -23,1665 11,1665 
6 1,00000 5,33161 1,000 -15,5518 17,5518 
6 1 4,53333 4,97741 ,940 -10,8456 19,9123 
2 1,26667 4,76502 1,000 -13,4141 15,9474 
3 -2,53333 3,89489 ,986 -14,4358 9,3691 
4 -7,00000 4,19039 ,562 -19,8249 5,8249 
5 -1,00000 5,33161 1,000 -17,5518 15,5518 
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D_T21 1 2 -4,60000 2,95361 ,634 -13,8952 4,6952 
3 -,06667 1,58284 1,000 -4,9222 4,7888 
4 1,00000 1,61068 ,988 -3,9347 5,9347 
5 3,26667 1,33832 ,193 -,9775 7,5109 
6 ,46667 1,54262 1,000 -4,2770 5,2103 
2 1 4,60000 2,95361 ,634 -4,6952 13,8952 
3 4,53333 2,85301 ,616 -4,5517 13,6184 
4 5,60000 2,86855 ,405 -3,5159 14,7159 
5 7,86667 2,72496 ,096 -,9898 16,7231 
6 5,06667 2,83090 ,497 -3,9755 14,1088 
3 1 ,06667 1,58284 1,000 -4,7888 4,9222 
2 -4,53333 2,85301 ,616 -13,6184 4,5517 
4 1,06667 1,41780 ,973 -3,2666 5,3999 
5 3,33333 1,09863 ,061 -,1078 6,7745 
6 ,53333 1,33998 ,999 -3,5629 4,6296 
4 1 -1,00000 1,61068 ,988 -5,9347 3,9347 
2 -5,60000 2,86855 ,405 -14,7159 3,5159 
3 -1,06667 1,41780 ,973 -5,3999 3,2666 
5 2,26667 1,13836 ,381 -1,3075 5,8408 
6 -,53333 1,37275 ,999 -4,7321 3,6655 
5 1 -3,26667 1,33832 ,193 -7,5109 ,9775 
2 -7,86667 2,72496 ,096 -16,7231 ,9898 
3 -3,33333 1,09863 ,061 -6,7745 ,1078 
4 -2,26667 1,13836 ,381 -5,8408 1,3075 
6 -2,80000 1,03984 ,118 -6,0446 ,4446 
6 1 -,46667 1,54262 1,000 -5,2103 4,2770 
2 -5,06667 2,83090 ,497 -14,1088 3,9755 
3 -,53333 1,33998 ,999 -4,6296 3,5629 
4 ,53333 1,37275 ,999 -3,6655 4,7321 
5 2,80000 1,03984 ,118 -,4446 6,0446 
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D_T22 1 2 -1,80000 2,34866 ,970 -9,1266 5,5266 
3 1,00000 1,45406 ,982 -3,4557 5,4557 
4 -3,26667 2,08958 ,629 -9,7319 3,1985 
5 3,40000 1,22202 ,105 -,4643 7,2643 
6 2,13333 1,47637 ,700 -2,3866 6,6533 
2 1 1,80000 2,34866 ,970 -5,5266 9,1266 
3 2,80000 2,25769 ,812 -4,3193 9,9193 
4 -1,46667 2,71094 ,994 -9,7652 6,8319 
5 5,20000 2,11570 ,196 -1,6451 12,0451 
6 3,93333 2,27212 ,529 -3,2175 11,0841 
3 1 -1,00000 1,45406 ,982 -5,4557 3,4557 
2 -2,80000 2,25769 ,812 -9,9193 4,3193 
4 -4,26667 1,98678 ,302 -10,4789 1,9455 
5 2,40000 1,03648 ,232 -,8428 5,6428 
6 1,13333 1,32689 ,954 -2,9219 5,1885 
4 1 3,26667 2,08958 ,629 -3,1985 9,7319 
2 1,46667 2,71094 ,994 -6,8319 9,7652 
3 4,26667 1,98678 ,302 -1,9455 10,4789 
5 6,66667* 1,82383 ,022 ,7917 12,5416 
6 5,40000 2,00317 ,117 -,8508 11,6508 
5 1 -3,40000 1,22202 ,105 -7,2643 ,4643 
2 -5,20000 2,11570 ,196 -12,0451 1,6451 
3 -2,40000 1,03648 ,232 -5,6428 ,8428 
4 -6,66667* 1,82383 ,022 -12,5416 -,7917 
6 -1,26667 1,06756 ,838 -4,6134 2,0801 
6 1 -2,13333 1,47637 ,700 -6,6533 2,3866 
2 -3,93333 2,27212 ,529 -11,0841 3,2175 
3 -1,13333 1,32689 ,954 -5,1885 2,9219 
4 -5,40000 2,00317 ,117 -11,6508 ,8508 
5 1,26667 1,06756 ,838 -2,0801 4,6134 
*. The difference of the means  is on the level 0.05 significant  
 
